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A small Kurdish city located in northern Syria, Kobane, became symbolically significant when ISIS laid siege to the city between September 2014 and January 2015. 
This pivotal moment in the fight against ISIS threw the inter­
national spotlight on the Kurds. The Kobane Generation analyses 
how Kurdish diaspora communities mobilised in France after the 
breakout of the Syrian civil war and political unrest in Turkey and 
Iraq in the 2010s. Tens of thousands of people, mostly but not 
exclusively diaspora Kurds, demonstrated in major European 
capitals, expressed their solidarity with Kobane, and engaged 
in transnational political activism towards Kurdistan.
This seminal book discusses a series of critical events that led 
to different forms of transnational participation towards Kurdistan. 
The focus is particularly on how diaspora mobilisations became 
visible among the second generation, the descendants of Kurdish 
migrants. The Kobane Generation offers important insights on 
the generational dynamics of political mobilisations and their 
significance to understanding diaspora contributions. More 
broadly, it sheds light on second­generation political activism 
beyond the diaspora context, analysing it in relation to global 
transformations in political subjectivities.
Mari Toivanen, PhD, Docent in Sociology, currently works as 
Academy Research Fellow at the Swedish School of Social 
Science at the University of Helsinki. She has conducted ethno­
graphic research on a wide range of migration­related topics, 
focusing on diaspora mobilisation, transnational connections 
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Kobane became the buzzword in the fight against the so-called 
Islamic State (ISIS) in late 2014. Before September that year, the 
small Kurdish city located in northern Syria (Rojava), bordering 
Turkey, was barely known outside the region. Few outside Syria, 
even Kurds, would have been able to pinpoint the city on the map. 
This all changed between September 2014 and January 2015. The 
Syrian civil war, with its ever-growing human suffering and civil-
ian death toll, had featured in the headlines since its outburst in 
March 2011. ISIS had ravaged the region and committed unspeak-
able atrocities as it had moved forward to invade new land areas. 
So, what exactly did happen in Kobane in 2014 that made the 
small Kurdish city known to the world?
In autumn 2014, the war in Syria took another turn as ISIS grew 
out of Al Qaeda in Iraq and gradually moved to invade great land 
areas both in Iraq and in Syria. In early 2014, the quickly advanc-
ing ISIS seemed unstoppable. In January, the organisation took 
over the Syrian city of Raqqa, declared it the capital of the emirate, 
and six months later declared the establishment of the ‘caliphate’. 
In June, Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, fell under ISIS control, 
and, a month later, the US-led coalition started airstrikes against 
the organisation in Iraq. In August, ISIS started to carry out geno-
cidal attacks on Yezidi Kurdish and other minorities in northern 
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Iraq.1 It is estimated that around 10,000 Yezidis were slaughtered 
or abducted and sold into slavery. Some 40,000 to 50,000 Yezidis 
fled to Sinjar Mountain, where a week later Kurdish troops man-
aged to secure a corridor for them to pass through Syria to the 
Kurdistan Region in Iraq.2
Five weeks later in September, ISIS arrived in the outskirts of 
Kobane. Having captured some 300 surrounding villages, the situ-
ation quickly escalated within the city and thousands of refugees 
crossed the border into Turkey. At the same time, the Turkish bor-
der authorities closed the border to Rojava, in an attempt to stop 
Kurdish combatants crossing over to the Syrian side and joining the 
battle for Kobane. Combatants outside Rojava poured in from 
the ranks of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) following the 
call by the jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan in Turkey, and 
a number of international combatants joined the battle, including 
diaspora Kurds.
So began the siege of the city that would last till January 2015. 
The Syrian Kurdish Protection Units (YPG and its female battalion 
YPJ) led combat operations on land and were aided by American-
led airstrikes to deter the attacks and attempts by ISIS to take over 
Kobane. Both parties knew that a lot was at stake. If ISIS managed 
to capture the town, it would control a large section of the Turkish– 
Syrian border and a long stretch extending from the province of 
Aleppo to Raqqa. On 26 January 2015, the siege finally ended with 
the defeat of ISIS, but the joy was overshadowed by the massive 
destruction that had fallen upon the city.
Nevertheless, the siege of Kobane quickly became symbolically 
significant – in the region and beyond it. First of all, the end of the 
siege was considered pivotal in the fight against ISIS, representing 
a first major defeat for the organisation that had seemed unstop-
pable. Indeed, the Kurdish troops were soon depicted as the only 
forces capable of deterring the organisation’s attacks in the region. 
This was particularly the case after the massive breakdown of the 
Iraqi army and the flight of its soldiers during summer 2014 that 
left a sizeable arsenal of weaponry in the hands of the advanc-
ing ISIS. Kobane came to symbolise the victory over the barbaric 
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enemy that had so far seemed undefeatable, and led to widespread 
mobilisations in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, mainly, although not exclu-
sively, among the Kurds.
Secondly, the siege of Kobane threw the Kurds into the inter-
national spotlight. Situated in the border zone between Turkey 
and Syria, a large number of journalists and photographers could 
follow and deliver up-to-date news on the ongoing battle, visible 
from the hilltops located on the Turkish side. The world witnessed 
the siege in real time via the substantial video and photographic 
material that the army of journalists produced during the four-
month siege. The siege featured almost daily in the headlines of 
prominent newspapers in Europe. The focus on Kurdish female 
fighters and the role women played in combat was unprecedented: 
the BBC even released a news story, titled ‘The Kurdish Female 
Combatants Bringing the Fight to IS’, accompanied by a short 
video documentary with nearly 1.3 million views on YouTube.
Thirdly, Kobane was highly significant for the Kurdish diaspora 
communities in Europe. During the humanitarian crises in Syria, 
diaspora Kurds had already engaged in providing material aid to 
the region. As the siege left the city of Kobane in rubble, diaspora 
Kurds participated in the reconstruction initiatives in the region. 
The international media and solidarity campaign initiated by 
Kurdish diaspora communities in Europe during Kobane proved 
to be ‘decisive in mobilising an increasingly unified Kurdish 
response in opposition to ISIS’ (Eccarius-Kelly 2017: 41). Tens 
of thousands of people, including, mostly but not only, diaspora 
Kurds, demonstrated in major European capitals and expressed 
their solidarity with Kobane (ibid; Schøtt 2021 forthcoming). In 
October 2014, about a hundred Kurdish protesters broke into the 
European Parliament in Brussels to demand international support 
for Kobane. Numerous seminars on the situation of Kurds were 
organised at the European Parliament, and TV channels allocated 
a significant amount of time to expert interviewees discussing 
Kobane. Also, the Kurdish troops’ combat against ISIS increased 
the legitimacy of Kurdish political actors in the international 
political arena.
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Now, some seven years later, we can say that the memory of 
Kobane lives on. During the years following the siege, Kurdish 
diaspora communities have taken action to ‘keep the memory of 
Kobane alive’. Diaspora associations have organised the annual 
World Kobane Day in major European capitals to commemorate 
the battle, and to show solidarity and support for Syrian Kurds. 
Kobane was also frequently evoked during the siege of Afrin, a 
city on the Turkish–Syrian border that Turkish-backed militias 
moved to invade in 2018, following the withdrawal of US troops. 
The diasporic mobilisations for Kobane were largely intercon-
nected with those among the Kurdish populations in their home-
land. The significance of the siege was evidenced in the popularity 
of symbolic images, narratives and claims that circulated widely in 
the Kurdish territories, as well as in the diaspora.
1.2 Kurdish Mobilisation in France
Kurdish diasporic mobilisations for Kobane were visible on the 
streets of several European capitals between 2014 and 2015. For 
instance, Eccarius-Kelly (2017: 41) observes that ‘Kurds showed 
unprecedented levels of unity in continental Europe and in the 
UK’ during the siege. The mobilisations for Kobane were evi-
denced in large-scale demonstrations, and in efforts to raise 
awareness and expressions of solidarity that extended well beyond 
the diaspora communities. The mobilisation took more concrete 
forms when diaspora members sent material and humanitarian 
convoys towards Rojava in northern Syria. A number of diaspora 
members also joined the battle against ISIS, although most par-
ticipated at a distance via humanitarian convoys and knowledge 
transfer during the stage of reconstruction. The siege of Kobane, to 
some extent, also transcended the political divisions that existed 
between diaspora groups and created nodes of solidarity between 
diaspora organisations and non-ethnic civil society actors in the 
host society (Eccarius-Kelly 2017; Schøtt 2021 forthcoming).
France makes an interesting case to study Kurdish mobilisations 
for several reasons. The Kurdish community in France mostly 
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originates from the Kurdish regions in Turkey, and the migra-
tion patterns include both conflict-induced migration and labour 
migration dating back to the 1960s and 1970s (Hassanpour & 
Mojab 2005). The formation of Kurdish diaspora communities 
in France is shaped by particular migration histories, settlement 
patterns and demographic characteristics. One particularity is 
also the relatively strong support that the pro-PKK movement 
holds in the country. The PKK has transformed from a military 
organisation in the 1990s to become a political and social move-
ment that enjoys significant mobilising power and transnational 
networks in the diaspora, especially in France (Grojean 2015; 
Jongerden & Akkaya 2016). The mobilisations for Kobane relied – 
at least to some extent – on such pre-existing networks and asso-
ciative structures.
At the same time, the PKK continues to be listed by the EU and 
the United States as a terrorist organisation, which means that the 
diasporic mobilisations took place in the context of political 
ambivalence towards the PKK movement, considered ideologi-
cally close to the Syrian Kurdish political leadership. One exam-
ple showcasing this ambivalence was when the French president, 
then François Hollande, received three Kurdish leaders from 
Syrian Kurdistan to the Elysée Palace in Paris to discuss the future 
of Rojava, the autonomous region in northern Syria. This was 
strongly opposed by the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
who equated the Syrian Kurdish forces with the PKK, which, as 
well as being listed as a terrorist organisation by the EU and US, 
was outlawed in Turkey. Regardless, the siege of Kobane and the 
visibility it received led to political outcomes (Kardaş and Yesiltaş 
2017) and provided Kurdish political actors with the possibility 
to interact with high-profile European politicians, thus grant-
ing more legitimacy to Syrian Kurdish political organisations 
(Eccarius-Kelly 2017).
The critical events taking place in Kobane resonated particularly 
strongly among the Kurdish diaspora community in the French 
capital, which had also witnessed the assassination of three 
Kurdish women activists a year earlier. Three women were killed 
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in the heart of Paris in January 2013, presumably by a member of 
the Turkish secret services, who had infiltrated the community 
and gained the trust of its members (Marchand 2017). One of the 
killed activists, Sakine Cansız, was the co-founder of the PKK. 
The diasporic mobilisations in France were also shaped by these 
assassinations, as I will discuss later. Overall, the diasporic mobi-
lisations in France were shaped by a series of events, including 
both in the country as well as in Kurdistan that experienced major 
transformations and political developments in the 2010s.
This book examines how a series of events that have taken place 
in the Middle East and in Turkey in the 2010s, including the siege 
of Kobane but not limited to it, have resonated in Kurdish dias-
pora communities in France. Critical events, such as Kobane, 
have mobilised the diaspora communities and their members in 
a multitude of ways and led to different forms of participation 
towards Kurdistan (Eccarius-Kelly 2017; Schøtt 2021 forthcom-
ing). Firstly, the focus of this book is on how Kurdish diaspora 
communities in France have mobilised in the context of the Syrian 
civil war and the political unrest in Turkey and Iraq in the 2010s. 
It discusses events and analyses factors that have shaped mobili-
sation processes and participation in homeland affairs, including 
transnational opportunity structures, host societies’ institutional 
and political opportunity structures, and integration regimes, in 
this case those in France. Secondly, it focuses specifically on how 
diasporic mobilisations were visible among second-generation 
members of Kurdish parentage in France, who mobilised, possi-
bly in an unprecedented manner in the recent history of Kurdish 
diasporic mobilisations in Europe. Thirdly, it discusses the gene-
rational dynamics of diasporic mobilisations and activism, and 
what ramifications understanding such dynamics can bring to 
understanding diaspora contributions.
Based on these observations, I aim to address the following 
questions in this book:
1. How has the Kurdish diaspora community in Paris mobilised in 
the 2010s? What events have affected such mobilisation, and what 
factors have played into how diasporic claims and projects were 
formulated?
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2. How has this mobilisation affected the second generation? How 
to understand their local and transnational participation and 
mobilisation?
3. How to better grasp the potential of diaspora contributions from 
the generational perspective?
The Syrian civil war and the spiralling violence that has spilled 
over to Iraq and Turkey raises the question of what potential lies 
in diasporas once the war and violence has subdued and once 
the reconstruction begins. The last question specifically opens 
a venue to discuss how the Kurdish diaspora can contribute to 
post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building in Kurdistan. 
By maintaining dense transnational networks and active organi-
sational life, the Kurdish diaspora has great mobilising power 
and is active in the host society’s political and civic spheres, but 
the ultimate contributions that subsequent generations can gener-
ate towards the region remain largely unstudied.
1.3 Diasporas as Non-state Actors:  
From Mobilisation to Contributions
The Kobane siege is one example of critical events back home 
that can mobilise diasporas and prompt them to operate as non-
state actors towards the homeland. The phenomenon is not new 
in itself. Diaspora communities have a long-standing precedence 
of being engaged in nation-building efforts since the great migra-
tion waves of the 19th century and to homeland affairs even before 
that (Cohen 2008). Such long-distance participation has taken 
different forms depending on the diaspora communities’ profiles, 
the needs of the ‘homeland’ and the possibilities in the host socie-
ties to contribute to the ‘homeland’. Ranging from transnational 
political participation (Cano & Delano 2007) to economic remit-
tances and participation in development (Itzigsohn et al. 1999), to 
cultural exchanges (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 768) – and often 
the combination of these (Portes, Guarnizo, & Landolt 1999) – 
diasporas’ contributions towards the ancestral ‘homeland’ can be 
multiple and important in terms of development.
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Although the phenomenon is not new (Kivisto 2001; Dahinden 
2017), the related research on diasporas’ transnational participa-
tion in homeland affairs and on their cross-border engagements 
and activities dates to the latter half of the 20th century (Glick 
Schiller, Green Basch, & Szanton-Blanc 1992; Levitt & Glick Schiller 
2004; Vertovec 2009). Such inquiries into migrants’ cross-bor-
der attachments and ties often include case studies on particular 
diaspora communities. For instance, the Kurdish and Palestinian 
diasporas have been shown to have a long history of mobilisation 
towards homeland affairs, partially due to the state of statelessness 
and the experienced oppression in the states in which the Kurdish 
and Palestinian minorities are located (Baser 2015a; Mason 2007). 
More recently, diasporas have mobilised in the context of the Arab 
Spring and as a result of critical events taking place back home. 
This has been the case, for instance, with the Egyptian diaspora 
in the UK (Underhill 2016) and in Austria (Müller-Funk 2016), 
with the Syrian, Libyan and Yemeni diasporas in the US and UK 
(Moss 2016) and with the Tunisian diaspora (Graziano 2012), to 
mention a few.3
Different diaspora groups from the Middle East have parti-
cipated in peace-making efforts in their conflict-ridden home 
countries (Baser & Toivanen 2018a). Diaspora organisations can 
have a significant role in democracy-building and post-conflict 
reconstruction in different states or regions that are politically 
unstable and/or in the process of democratic transition. This has 
been the case for Kurdish diaspora organisations in northern Iraq 
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Emanuelsson 2005), Somali diaspora 
organisations in Somalia and the self-declared Somaliland (see 
Kleist 2008a, 2008b; Pirkkalainen 2013), Turkish diaspora organi-
sations in Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003) and Lebanese dias-
pora organisations in Lebanon (Hourani 2012; Pearlman 2014).4 
On the other hand, the Syrian diaspora members have operated 
as brokers between the protest and mainstream media to raise 
awareness on the ongoing conflict (Andén-Papadopoulos & Pantti 
2013). Concerning the Kurdish diaspora, several studies have 
examined Kurdish diaspora mobilisation and diaspora politics 
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during the past two decades (Wahlbeck 1999; Østergaard-Nielsen 
2003; Emanuelsson 2005; Sökefeld 2006; Baser 2015a; Baser, 
Emanuelsson, & Toivanen 2015; Baser 2019).
Diasporas can play a significant role in mobilising resources 
towards homeland development and in partaking in peace-
building processes in conflict-ridden societies. The need to 
understand this role has become particularly acute in the cur-
rent political context in the Middle East. Located within the 
national borders of Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey and dispersed 
around the globe, the Kurdish diaspora offers a case par excel-
lence to study diaspora participation in homeland affairs and 
the motivating factors behind it. At the same time, dispersed 
around the globe in diaspora communities and with Kurdistan 
being divided across several nation-states, examining Kurdish 
diaspora mobilisation and the potential for homeland participa-
tion in the current political context in the region is particularly 
compelling as it provides insights into both ‘homeland’ and host 
society dynamics.
1.3.1 The Kurdish case
So why focus on the Kurdish diaspora? With a diaspora over a 
million strong (Wahlbeck 2007) and with dynamic transnational 
networks, relations and associative structures around the globe, 
the Kurdish diaspora presents an exemplary case to study the sug-
gested topic. The Kurds are dispersed across Turkey, Syria, Iraq 
and Iran, with the unofficial region of Kurdistan lying at the heart 
of the current geopolitical struggles in the region. For this reason, 
the Kurdish population in the Middle East has been in the midst 
of the ongoing conflicts on several fronts – in northern Iraq, in 
northern Syria and in eastern Turkey. There is a long history of 
Kurdish migration from the region, which has led to the creation 
of vibrant Kurdish diaspora communities, mainly in Europe and 
North America. Fleeing persecution and conflict, but also moti-
vated by work opportunities outside the region, the Kurds have 
settled and established active communities in the United States, 
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Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries and 
several others (Hassanpour & Mojab 2005).
The history of Kurds is marked by the long-standing political 
instability and conflict in the region (McDowall 1996). The cur-
rent conflict dynamics and Kurdish societies look quite different 
from those of the 1990s or before (Gunter 2015). Indeed, Kurdish 
regions have experienced major changes in the new millennium. 
For instance, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) experienced a sig-
nificant economic boom in the 2010s and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) has become a prominent actor in the Middle 
East since 2003, when the Ba’athist regime’s reign terminated and 
Kurdish political actors replaced its political institutions (Aziz 
2011: 79). In autumn 2014, ISIS rapidly seized large parts of 
Iraq, but by autumn 2017 it had lost nearly all of its previously 
invaded territories, and the final battle over Raqqa had just ended. 
In the light of this, the KRG held an independence referendum in 
September 2017, with a clear majority of voters (92.73%) saying 
yes to independence – having also invited Kurdish diaspora mem-
bers with Iraqi citizenship to participate.
Across the border in Turkey, the Turkish state has engaged in 
a four-decade-long conflict with the PKK. The ceasefire (1999–
2004) between the PKK and Turkish state and the settled peace 
process that followed were fragile. The negotiations were effec-
tively pursued until 2013, before finally collapsing in June 2015. 
Subsequently, both sides have resumed the armed conflict and 
the escalating violence has spread to the country’s political 
sphere. The curfews imposed across largely Kurdish-populated 
towns and cities under a state of emergency have further exacer-
bated the security situation and led to an increased mobilisation 
in the diaspora.5
In northern Syria, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) took 
over the rule of Rojava in 2003, a year after the Syrian government 
forces withdrew from the region. The People’s Protection Units 
that fought against ISIS in the liberation of Kobane have oper-
ated as the security forces of Rojava since 2012. Whereas the situ-
ation in Iraqi Kurdistan can be characterised as relatively secure 
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in terms of autonomy and self-determination, this is to a much 
lesser degree in Turkish Kurdistan. Also, the situation has rap-
idly changed in Syrian Kurdistan, with Turkey launching a cross-
border operation against the YPG/YPJ units in October 2019 and 
occupying parts of the territories that had previously been under 
the rule of the PYD.
Relatedly, the Kurdish societies in Iraq, Turkey and Syria are to 
some extent different from each other owing to different major-
ity–minority relations and histories. In this sense, the Kurdish 
case also differs from other ethnonational diasporas, such as the 
Tamil and Palestinian diasporas, whose migration is traceable 
back to one nation-state. Divided into four nation-states and dis-
persed into diaspora communities around the globe, the Kurdish 
case offers interesting insights into how non-state actors, in this 
case the Kurdish diaspora, politically organises and mobilises in 
the context of war and conflict in the new millennium.
1.3.2 Theoretical approach
Diasporas, and the Kurdish diaspora especially, cannot be char-
acterised as homogeneous entities. Today Kurdish populations 
form a rather heterogeneous group in terms of language, religion, 
political affiliation, residence in urban or rural settings, and place 
of living – in the Kurdistan region or in diaspora communities. 
Furthermore, the diaspora community is heterogeneous in terms 
of gender, age, generation, social class and so forth, which all 
shape individual diaspora members’ positioning in the transna-
tional space. At the same time, there are similarities concerning 
the understanding of ‘Kurdishness’, diaspora politics, transna-
tional networks and relations, and political organisation across 
Kurdish communities in the diaspora (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; 
Emanuelsson 2005; Baser 2015a). This does not, however, auto-
matically mean that the mobilisation processes are similar, as 
also suggested by Bahar Baser’s study (2015a). The dynamics of 
mobilisation and the possibilities to take part in homeland affairs 
can be considerably different depending on the hostland, where 
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such efforts are organised and taken up, as well as on the transna-
tional opportunity structures available for diaspora actors.
This study draws from a transnational approach, simultaneously 
engaging with it critically. Studies on Kurdish diaspora commu-
nities have abundantly employed the transnational frame (Baser, 
Emanuelsson, & Toivanen 2015). This study also leans on litera-
ture that, in addition to the transnational focus, suggests that it 
is important to consider the national context in which diaspora 
formation has taken place. Several studies have shown that the 
formulation of diaspora organisations’ activities need to be under-
stood in relation to the host society context and how the incor-
poration regimes shape diaspora organisations’ activities. For 
instance, the studies by Östen Wahlbeck (1999) on Kurdish dias-
pora communities’ political activities in Finland and the United 
Kingdom, by Khalid Khayati (2008) on transborder citizenship 
and the narratives of victimhood among the Kurdish communi-
ties in France and in Sweden, and by Bahar Baser (2015a) on the 
Kurdish diaspora communities in Sweden and Germany show 
the significance of the national context in understanding dias-
pora mobilisations and political action. This means, for instance, 
examining the institutional and political opportunity structures, 
social policies, citizenship and incorporation regimes, political 
culture and minority–majority relations. This allows the fleshing 
out of any national particularities and factors that shape diaspora 
participation and mobilisation processes.
Therefore, the book provides insights into the significance of 
local settings, including the political and institutional contexts in 
France, and how such contexts condition mobilisation and struc-
ture diaspora participation to homeland affairs. At the same time, 
it includes a transnational approach in understanding how dias-
pora mobilisations and the related political action is organised, 
articulated and enacted in the transnational social space. This is 
particularly important as, in the latter part of the book, the focus 
is on the second generation. This also forces us to think of other 
dynamics that move the focus beyond national, transnational and 
diaspora lenses.
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1.4 The Second Generation in Focus
Between 2013 and 2015, it was the Kobane generation.
(Interviewee)
In this book, I will focus on how diasporic claims and projects in 
Paris were formulated in the context of the armed combat between 
ISIS and the Kurdish military troops in the 2010s. In this way, 
the book contributes to the previous body of literature on dias-
poras’ transnational participation towards the ‘homeland’ and 
the related mobilisation processes and does so in the context of 
recent political dynamics in the Middle East. Furthermore, I have 
particularly focused on the second generation of Kurdish parent-
age and examined how they have mobilised and engaged towards 
Kurdistan during the mobilisations that took place in the 2010s. 
The words above are those of a young interviewee belonging to 
the second generation. He referred to the ‘Kobane generation’, 
which ended up being in the title of this book. Generation, as dis-
cussed later, forms one of the key concepts and themes running 
throughout this study.
There is an abundant literature on how migrants’ children, the 
so-called second generation, engage in transnational activities 
and networks (Baser 2012, 2014; Beauchemin, Hamel, & Simon 
2010; Eliassi 2010; Lee 2008; Levitt 2009; Levitt & Glick Schiller 
2004; Levitt & Jarowsky 2007; Levitt & Waters 2006; Premazzi 
et al. 2013; Somerville 2008; Toivanen 2014) or even ‘return’ to 
the sending region of their parents (Fokkema, Cela, & Ambrosetti 
2013; King & Christou 2010, 2014; Potter 2005; Teerling 2011). 
Concerning studies on the Kurdish second generation, their 
role in diaspora organisations has been the subject of few stud-
ies (Baser 2012; Mügge 2010). There are also few studies on the 
second generation in relation to Kurdish diaspora mobilisation 
and politics. These include the works by Liza Mügge (2010) on 
the second generation of colonial migrants and guest work-
ers in the Netherlands and by Baser (2015a) on the Turkish 
and Kurdish second generations in Germany and Sweden. The 
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formation of the Kurdish diaspora dates back to the second half 
of the 20th century, which also means that the current diaspora 
communities consist of not only well-settled communities and 
more newly arrived members but also the second and subsequent 
generations born in their parents’ societies of settlement. The 
means and motivations to take part in ‘homeland’ development 
might be considerably different for migrants’ children, the so-
called second generation born outside Kurdistan, as their expe-
riences of the ‘homeland’ are quite different from those of their 
parents (Alinia & Eliassi 2014).
This book opens venues to study the potential that lies in the 
Kurdish diaspora in terms of transnational contributions towards 
Kurdish societies in the region. Similarly to Baser’s (2015a) study, 
this book also includes a focus on the Kurdish second genera-
tion, with the distinction that it examines their participation in 
‘homeland’ affairs. Indeed, what is still largely missing in stud-
ies that concentrate on diasporas’ transnational engagements is 
a focus on the second generation’s transnational participation 
from the perspective of diaspora contributions. There is a need to 
better understand how mobilisation processes relate to transna-
tional participation towards the ancestral ‘homeland’ among the 
second generation. The question of transnational participation 
touches upon that of mobilisation and relatedly of motivations 
to take part in transnational participation towards the ancestral 
‘homeland’. In the context of current events in Kurdistan, we also 
need to ask what motivates the diaspora’s participation in home-
land affairs, particularly among the younger generations, and to 
do this in a way that considers their lived realities, which are not 
(only) limited to the diaspora context. One way to do this is to 
take into consideration how the second generation’s contribu-
tions and participation, as well as the related motivations, means 
and know-how towards the ‘homeland’, possibly differ from those 
of their parents.
This book opens questions on second-generation participation 
towards the ancestral ‘homeland’ that may differ from their par-
ents’ participation and motivations to contribute to homeland 
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development. Furthermore, it acknowledges that the second gen-
eration does not always have similar interests or views on poli-
tics as their parents’ generation, as their reasons to mobilise can 
extend beyond traditional (diaspora) politics and be shaped by 
political structures, political culture and transformations taking 
place in the host societies – and more globally. Indeed, their polit-
ical activism and mobilisation can also be transcribed into more 
global transformations in political subjectivities that particularly 
concern their age cohort. I argue that, in order to better under-
stand different forms of social and human capital that the second-
generation members possess to engage transnationally towards 
their ancestral ‘homeland’, we need to consider the generational 
dynamics more broadly than merely limited to the understanding 
of the ‘migrant’ generation.
Therefore, this book also urges researchers to examine second-
generation members’ transnational participation and role towards 
diaspora contributions in a way that moves beyond the ‘ethnic’ lens. 
In other words, this book also asks to what extent it is justifiable to 
approach second-generation members’ political dis(engagement) 
through the diaspora lens, and what other dynamics need to be 
considered to better grasp their role in diaspora contributions. 
Such other dynamics at play that are more rarely the topic of dis-
cussion include the changing nature of political activism and the 
very notion of what ‘political’ means for that particular genera-
tion, in this case meaning the age group. Therefore, ‘generation’ 
forms the central theme in this book, and it is approached both 
as referring to the ‘migrant’ generation (that is, ‘second genera-
tion’) and as belonging to a particular age group of young adults. 
Coming back to the term ‘Kobane generation’, the central ques-
tion in this book is not formulated in terms of whether there is or 
not a Kobane generation. Instead, the book focuses on analysing 
how the Kobane generation came into being and how it mani-
fested itself in the midst of the Kurdish diasporic mobilisations in 
Paris in the 2010s. These mobilisations were triggered by a series 
of events, as discussed later, particularly among them the Kobane 
siege and the assassination of three Kurdish activists in Paris.
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1.4.1 The fieldwork
I finalised my doctoral research and defended my thesis on nego-
tiations of belonging among second-generation Kurds in Finland 
in August 2014, immediately before the siege of Kobane started. 
To show their solidarity with Kobane, demonstrators took to 
the streets in Paris, London, Berlin and Stockholm, as well as in 
Helsinki, where they protested against the looming occupation of 
the city by ISIS. In Paris, an unprecedented number of second-
generation Kurds took part in protests and felt concerned by 
Kobane. The critical events taking place in Kobane resonated 
particularly strongly among the Kurdish diaspora in the French 
capital, which had witnessed the assassination of three Kurdish 
women activists a year earlier. The women were killed in the heart 
of Paris in January 2013, presumably by a member of the Turkish 
secret services, who had infiltrated the community and gained the 
trust of its members (Marchand 2017).
It was in this context that I started my fieldwork in Paris in 2016, 
interviewing first- and second-generation Kurds and attending 
political meetings, cultural events, demonstrations, exhibitions, 
film festivals and other get-together events organised by the com-
munity members. In the meantime, the situation in the Kurdish 
regions was rapidly shifting and the mounting violence since sum-
mer 2015, which continued till 2016, also became reflected in the 
Kurdish diaspora members’ activities in France, a great number of 
whom had migrated from Turkey. At the same time, there was a 
boom of cultural production in the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. 
This became particularly visible in the form of Kurdish film fes-
tivals and photograph exhibitions, which were numerous in Paris 
and which often featured images of the Kurds’ combat against 
ISIS, including Kurdish female combatants from Rojava.
The book is based on the material that I collected, mainly 
between 2015 and 2017 in France. The main material consists of 
interview material with first- and second-generation Kurds in 
Paris, whereas other material includes written interviews, online 
material, and observation notes from different events I attended 
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and was invited to. I paid careful attention to research ethics in all 
stages of the fieldwork, including in terms of what terminology 
to use. This is not least because the Kurdish question is a sensi-
tive one and naming carries social meanings (Toivanen & Baser 
2018). I also fully acknowledge the possibly severe consequences 
for those members active in diaspora organisations in the event of 
careless data preservation or treatment. I have set out this study’s 
methodological premises, including the ethical questions, in more 
detail in the Appendix: Methodology.
1.4.2 Structure
The book is divided into three parts. The first, titled ‘Background’, 
introduces the topic, and lays out the central questions that are tack-
led in the following chapters. It also provides an overview of the 
related theoretical and empirical debates concerning diaspora mobi-
lisation and transnational participation towards the ‘homeland’.
The second part, titled ‘Here and There: Between Kurdistan and 
Europe’, provides a historical and current-day contextualisation 
on the underlying geopolitical tensions and divisions that today 
still structure the conflictual dynamics in the region – and in dias-
pora. It also offers more information on the formation of Kurdish 
diaspora communities outside the borders of Kurdistan and shows 
how, over the decades, the diaspora created vibrant transnational 
networks of associative life and political organisation, including 
in online spaces. In relation to this, the formation of the Kurdish 
diaspora in France is discussed in more detail.
The third part, titled ‘Mobilisation and Participation towards 
Kurdistan’, includes three analysis chapters. The first discusses 
the mobilisation and transnational participation of Kurdish 
diaspora communities in France in the 2010s. It shows how a 
series of critical events shaped mobilisations in Paris, what rep-
ertoires of action the mobilisation entailed and what factors 
shaped the observed mobilisations. The latter part of this chap-
ter discusses the mobilisation in Paris in the context of political 
ambivalence towards the Kurdish question, namely concerning 
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the criminalisation of the PKK in the EU countries, including 
in France.
The second analysis chapter focuses specifically on the second 
generation. I will first discuss the second generation’s transna-
tional participation and its generational particularities, before 
moving forward to discuss the online dimension of such partici-
pation. The third analysis chapter questions the extent to which 
the second-generation participation towards Kurdistan should be 
understood as a form of ethnonational participation or a manifes-
tation of diasporic belonging, and to what extent it reflects other 
dynamics at play that cannot be limited to explanations via the 
‘ethnic’ or ‘diaspora’ lens. The book ends with a conclusion chapter 
in which I open up new venues for looking at the potential of dias-
pora contributions.
CHAPTER 2
Mobilising for the ‘Homeland’
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the conceptual approaches to diasporic 
mobilisation and homeland participation, including a focus 
on their generational dynamics. How can we best understand 
diasporic mobilisation processes? It has been suggested that many 
questions remain unanswered concerning diasporas, concerning 
namely their ability, willingness and extent to mobilise (Beyene 
2015; Mavroudi 2018). Such questions deal with, for instance, 
whether we can assume that diasporas act as a collective instead 
of paying attention to individual actors (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013) 
and whether we can assume that mobilisations are directly linked 
to questions of diasporic identity and belonging (Faist 2008).
These questions particularly raise the concern over how to 
understand and approach diaspora mobilisations in all their 
complexity. I find the criticism that has been presented towards 
the nation-state and ethnicity-centred epistemology (that is, 
methodological nationalism) that underlies a large share of the 
migration research particularly relevant in this regard (Bommes & 
Thränhardt 2010; Dahinden 2016; Pries 2005; Wimmer & Glick 
Schiller 2002). As Dahinden (2016: 2211) notes,
A problem of an epistemological nature is created, however, 
when researchers accept and reproduce them without reflection 
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by enlisting migration or ethnicity as the central criterion of dif-
ference in research questions, research design, data collection, 
analysis and theory, even when it may not be empirically relevant.
Concerning the topic of this particular study, this means question-
ing what actually constitutes a ‘diaspora’ and ‘mobilisation’, instead 
of taking them at face value, and how to understand individuals’ 
motivations and ways to mobilise and (dis)engage politically 
from the perspectives that move beyond migration theories. In 
this study, I have leaned on the observations by Janine Dahinden 
(2016: 2213–2218), who calls for us to ‘de-migrantize’ migration 
and integration research by outlining three different strategies. 
The first is to distinguish between analytical and common-sense 
categories (see also Brubaker 2002), the second is to move migra-
tion theory into closer communication with social theory, and 
to ‘remove it from its “migration container”’, and the third is to 
‘change the object of study from the migration population to seg-
ments of the overall population’. These strategies and the main 
debates concerning methodological nationalism and transnation-
alism will be explored next.
2.2 On Methodological Nationalism
In terms of volume, an unprecedented number of people, but also 
goods and ideas, are on the move. They are crossing nation-states’ 
borders, which became more or less established in the course of the 
latter half of the 19th and especially the first half of the 20th cen-
tury. Nationalism, one of the most powerful ideologies of past two 
centuries, was paradoxically a very global idea to begin with. Its 
central premise was (and continues to be) the idea of a nation-state 
– a seamlessly overlapping configuration of a nation within a state. 
This has long proven to be a myth – albeit a very powerful one.
As Benedict Anderson (1991) has suggested, nations are ‘imag-
ined political communities’. They are ‘imagined’ in the sense that, 
unlike families, nations’ members do not know each member that 
feels a belonging to such an entity, yet this does not prevent feeling 
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a sense of belonging to such a socially constructed community, 
that is, a nation. Cutting through linguistic, ethnic and religious 
communities, nation-states’ frontiers, and national identities, 
have become to be considered something natural and of long 
precedence. This is the case with France, where the respondents 
of this study lived and where the notion of national belonging is 
very closely associated with civic belonging to the state. The fact 
that nation-states are constructed along man-made boundaries 
is perhaps even more striking with the country of birth of many 
first-generation respondents – Turkey – the state whose modern-
day boundaries were designed in the early 20th century and have 
been considered indivisible ever since.
Yet, the idea that the world could be structured into clear-cut 
nation-states with more or less homogeneous national communi-
ties and identities was effectively naturalised and normalised in the 
course of the previous century. The scientific community and aca-
demic research have not stood aside in this process of normalisa-
tion, so to speak, and the very conceptualisations that should have 
critically approached naturalised and taken-for-granted under-
standings of nation-states and their allegedly sedentary peoples 
have instead been (and to some extent continue to be) coloured 
by nation-state-centred thinking. Social scientific research on 
international migration is one field where such approaches have 
dominated conceptualisations. For instance, migration is quite 
readily understood as a term that refers to inter-national migra-
tion, to mobilities that cut through nation-states’ borders, instead 
of mobilities between regions, cities or neighbourhoods.
The tendency of researchers to adopt a nation/state/society as the 
primary unit of analysis to study migration-related phenomena 
has been named methodological nationalism. Andreas Wimmer 
and Nina Glick Schiller (2002) convincingly argue that nation-
state building processes have fundamentally shaped how migra-
tion has been perceived and reacted upon. This has also meant that 
academic studies on international migration have been coloured 
by a nation-state-centred mode of thinking and that research-
ers have treated migration-related phenomena as taking place 
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between particular nation-states. That is why, in earlier studies 
on migration and to some extent still, Kurdish migrants’ routes of 
mobility would have been approached as a departure from Turkey 
and as an arrival and settlement in France. Within this logic, it 
would be tempting to treat their stories first and foremost as ones 
of forced displacement from Turkey to the integration in France. 
However, human experiences, activities, attachments, ties and 
identities are rarely limited within the parameters of the nation-
state that we happen to inhabit or the borders across and beyond 
which we tend to move.
2.2.1 Transnationalism
Indeed, the need to move away from methodological nationalism 
and to better understand the lived experiences of people who take 
part in migration movements and what happens after migration 
prompted the emergence of a new theoretical framework in the 
early 1990s – that of transnationalism (Vertovec 2009). The emer-
gence of transnational conceptualisation took place in the con-
text of the late 20th-century globalisation, and transnationalism 
quickly became a conceptual buzzword in migration studies. The 
classical and rather general definition of transnationalism defines 
it as ‘processes by which immigrants build social fields that link 
together their country of origin and their country of settlement’ 
(Glick Schiller, Green Basch, & Szanton-Blanc 1992: 1). There-
fore, closely linked to processes of globalisation, theorisation on 
migrant transnationalism has emphasised the cross-border con-
tacts that migrants maintain even after migration processes (ibid.). 
This means that migrants are not simply seen as operating within 
one state and then moving from it to another. Instead, their social 
spaces and relations, as well as lived experiences, extend beyond 
national frontiers.
Indeed, transnational theorisation emphasises the fact that 
migrants are individuals who operate in transnational social 
spaces (Bauböck & Faist 2010) or social fields (Levitt & Glick 
Schiller 2004). This means that they ‘develop and maintain multiple 
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relations – familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, 
and political that span borders’ and that they are also actors who 
‘make decisions, and feel concerns, and develop identities within 
social networks that connect them to two or more societies simul-
taneously’ (Glick Schiller, Green Basch, & Szanton-Blanc 1992: 
1–2). In concrete terms, this can mean, for instance, keeping in 
touch with family members back home and helping them eco-
nomically, as well as following the homeland events and news, 
voting at a distance in embassies or consulates and visiting or 
even contemplating a return to the ancestral ‘homeland’. Also, it 
is not surprising as such that the transnationalist turn in social 
sciences is often associated with globalisation processes and with 
technological developments. They have been credited with hav-
ing enhanced transnational migrant connectivities via the rise of 
ICT tools and new communication technologies (ibid.; Dahinden 
2012; Candidatu, Leurs, & Ponzanesi 2019).
The transnational frame does have explanatory power in cap-
turing cross-border processes, social formations, transactions and 
flows that condition and shape individuals’ actions, relations 
and attachments. But Dahinden (2009) aptly asks: are we all 
transnationalists now? This question contains a reference to criti-
cism that has been presented towards the transnational frame for 
its overtly celebratory tones (Kivisto 2001; Harney & Baldassar 
2007). Also, Anthias (2009) warns of the risks of methodological 
transnationalism, and argues against the polarisation between 
the national and a transnational perspective. She suggests that 
a truly transnational perspective ‘needs to locate relations between 
nations and nationally based social hierarchies as well as those on 
a global level and then begin to think about how those are trans-
formed when transnational processes are at work’ (p. 5).
2.2.2 Ways forward
Indeed, there has been increasing criticism towards the nation-state- 
centred logic in migration research (Bommes & Thränhardt 2010; 
Pries 2005; Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002). I find Dahinden’s 
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(2016) suggestions to adopt three strategies to ‘de-migranticize’ 
migration research quite pertinent to remedy those risks. Firstly, 
she suggests that there is a need to distinguish between the com-
mon-sense categories and analytical categories (see Brubaker 
2002). This, she notes, is particularly significant when studying 
collective action and political mobilisation, where essentialised 
notions of ethnicity and group belonging are often instrumental-
ised. Instead, denying the significance of such essentialised claims, 
she suggests (2016: 2213) that:
Rather, the ways in which ethnicized and ‘migranticized’ world-
views – of individuals, in institutions, in politics, etc. – are cre-
ated, how they exist, change and interact with other perspectives 
of difference are themselves objects of investigation.
Secondly, she suggests that there is a need to link migration 
research to the analytical categories of social sciences more 
broadly. This, she argues, will allow for greater reflexivity con-
cerning how certain terms and concepts have been normalised. 
As one example of this, she refers to how migration scholars 
have focused on kinship and family networks, or other ethnic 
networks, without including social network structures in an 
encompassing way. This also means, according to her, that 
migration and ethnicity ‘no longer automatically enter into the 
research question and research design as categories of differ-
ence’ but come to the picture in a second step (p. 2214). Thirdly, 
she argues for a reorientation of the units of analysis from the 
migrant population towards the overall (or parts of the) popula-
tion. This means steering away from employing a migrant popu-
lation as a unit of analysis, and directing the focus towards the 
overall population, to which the migrants also belong. These 
strategies, according to Dahinden, mean that the research ques-
tions lose their migration-specific focus ‘while remaining sensi-
tive to the role of migration and ethnicity in the phenomenon 
being investigated’ (p. 2218). I will return to these strategies later 
in the analysis chapters.
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So, where does all of this leave the nation-state? Regardless of 
the relationship between the increased cross-border flows and 
globalisation, it is also hard to entirely disregard the significance 
of the nation-state and the role it plays in individuals’ lives. For 
instance, states still largely control who can cross borders and enter 
national territories and who cannot. One’s citizenship status, still 
in most cases granted by the state where one happened to be born, 
provides unequal possibilities to international mobility. Besides 
the physical borders that demarcate the national frontiers, the dis-
cursively constructed idea of a nation-state (and that of nations) 
as a naturalised entity also persists and its significance in the ever-
globalised world does not seem to wear off. On the contrary, if 
anything, we have witnessed the resurgence of nationalist senti-
ment in Europe in the new millennium that has evoked some very 
heated discussions on the ‘threats’ of migration and on the need 
to protect the ‘integrity’ of national communities. We have also 
borne witness to the claims put forth by the Scots, Catalans, Kurds 
and other ethnonational minorities who are calling for a greater 
degree of self-determination and/or organising independence ref-
erenda within the nation-states they inhabit. So, to what extent do 
nation-states still matter or are we all transnational now? What 
significance do states’ borders and national spaces have in today’s 
globalised world? These questions are particularly challenging if 
we think of the Kurdish case, and if we are to ask questions such 
as: what geographical, social and political frontiers possibly delin-
eate the limits of a Kurdish nation?
2.2.3 Kurds as a transnation
In the 20th-century nation-state-building frenzy, a number of 
peoples that had increasingly come to consider themselves nations 
were either divided by national borders or left without a state. This 
was the case for Kurds, as discussed in previous chapters. Despite 
all divisions and fragmentation, the Kurdish nation provides a very 
good example of a modern-day nation without a state and it is 
often referred to as ‘the largest nation without a state’. In this sense, 
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the Kurdish nation can to some extent be considered a transna-
tion, currently existing as minorities scattered mainly across four 
nation-states in the Middle East. In reference to the nation-state 
categorisations, Kurds have also been referred to as a ‘proto-nation’ 
(Hylland Eriksen 1993: 14), that is, a nation without a state. I find 
the term transnation a bit more apt to highlight the fact that the 
state-political division of Kurdistan does not neatly line with 
the social, familial, linguistic and cultural frontiers of its people.
In addition to the four parts that are commonly referred to as 
Kurdistan, the ‘Kurdish nation’ is said to have a ‘fifth’ part outside 
Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey. This ‘fifth’ part is the Kurdish dias-
pora that is scattered, mainly, across North America and Europe 
(Hassanpour & Mojab 2005). This means that the Kurdish nation 
is a transnation also in the sense that its members foster and main-
tain cross-border networks, linguistic and religious affiliations, 
familial ties and so forth that transcend the nation-states’ borders 
both between the Kurdish communities settled outside Kurdistan 
and between those within the geographical area of Kurdistan. 
For instance, Anne-Sofie Schøtt (2021 forthcoming) employs the 
term alter-territoriality in her study on the Kurdish mobilisation 
in Denmark. By this, she refers to diasporas having an orientation 
towards the transnational community and a reorientation towards 
the homeland, albeit a different part of it than where the diaspora 
originates. This term will be discussed in more detail in the analy-
sis chapter but suffice to say here that is important to employ the 
transnational frame broadly and not only to include the countries 
of settlement and departure but also to consider the transnational 
constellations that exist in the diaspora as well as in the sending 
region. It is also relevant to point out that the Kurdish case differs 
from other ethnonational migrant communities that have been 
exiled from within a specific nation-state, such as the Tamils, and 
whose actions and mobilities are also directed towards one spe-
cific state, in the case of Tamils towards Sri Lanka.
Accounting for transnationalism in the sending region does 
not mean entirely discounting the national context. The Kurdish 
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communities in Kurdistan are scattered across four different 
nation-states, in which they have been and continue to occupy 
a minority position. The Kurdish minorities have experienced 
quite different majority–minority relations, which have conse-
quently shaped claims made towards greater self-determination: 
they have greatly varied from territorial claims to demands for 
more linguistic and cultural rights. On the other hand, the rela-
tions between the so-called fifth column of Kurdistan, the dias-
pora, and different homeland actors are also affected by the state 
of statelessness and shaped by the different national spaces in 
which Kurdish communities form minorities. The diaspora’s 
mobilisation and participation towards the ‘homeland’ and the 
related claims-making differ in relation to which state it is tar-
geted towards and in which state such claims are presented. For 
instance, the ideologically close Kurdish movements in eastern 
Turkey and northern Syria operate in very different national 
spaces and their claims are formulated a bit differently towards 
the Turkish and Syrian political actors. Simultaneously, events 
in northern Syria (such as Kobane) can generate mobilisation 
among Kurdish communities in Turkey as well as among those 
in the diaspora, who have migrated from Turkey – thus making 
the transnational constellations of different Kurdish movements 
in that particular region, and how those play out in the related 
ideologies and actions, difficult to ignore.
Indeed, the complexity of the Kurdish issue, including the state 
of statelessness of Kurdistan, the division to different nation-states 
in the region, and the dispersal of Kurds in diaspora communi-
ties across a great variety of different states, mostly in Europe and 
North America, defies the methodologically nationalist perspec-
tive but does not comfortably sit within the transnational frame 
either. If we are to understand the mobilisation and participation 
of Kurdish diaspora(s) towards the ‘homeland’, including that of 
the second generation, a conceptual approach that moves beyond 
transnationalism and the methodologically coloured approach 
is needed.
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2.3 Diaspora Mobilisation and Transnational  
Participation
2.3.1 About ‘diaspora’
When speaking of diasporas, the classical and prototypical case of 
the Jewish diaspora comes rapidly to one’s mind, one that is exiled 
and dispersed around the globe following a traumatic event or 
events (Cohen 2008). In a sense, diaspora is very closely related 
to the notion of transnationalism: whereas transnationalism has 
been used to refer to migrants’ cross-border ties across countries, 
diaspora is employed to ‘denote religious or national groups living 
outside an (imagined) homeland’ (Bauböck & Faist 2010: 9). Cohen 
(2008) distinguishes four phases that diaspora studies have gone 
through, each having a bit different understanding and approach 
to the term. The most classical and prototypical definition of Dias-
pora (often capitalised) was that employed for the Jewish, African, 
Armenian, Irish and later Palestinian experiences of forced exile. 
The term diaspora denotes in its most classical meaning a sense 
of forced migration (displacement), a level of consciousness of the 
homeland and expressed collective memory, feelings of alienation 
in the society of settlement, feelings of longing, and eventually 
return to the imagined homeland and commitment to the resto-
ration of the original homeland (Safran 1991: 83–84, 179–180). 
The term expanded in the 1980s, to include different categories of 
people: ‘expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, 
immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities tout court’, as noted 
by Safran (1991: 83). The third phase was characterised by a social 
constructionist take on the term: it sharpened the idea of ‘home-
land’ as separate from ‘ethnic/religious community’, and (Cohen 
2008: 1–2), suggesting, similarly to the fourth phase, that identi-
ties are very much deterritorialised but that diasporas can still be 
understood as having an idea of ‘homeland’ and an orientation 
towards it. Since then, the term ‘diaspora’ has been greatly diver-
sified to include various denotations, groups, collectivities and 
social formations (Brubaker 2005; Cohen & Fischer 2019).
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What about the Kurdish communities outside Kurdistan?6 The 
Kurdish diaspora seems to tick all the boxes in terms of both 
the more classical as well as the more social constructionist 
definition of diaspora. However, Rogers Brubaker (2005) warns 
against the risk of what he calls ‘groupism’ when thinking of dias-
poras. By this, he refers to ‘the tendency to take bounded groups 
as fundamental units of analysis’ (p. 2). In other words, he sug-
gests that there is a risk to take diasporas as clearly cut, substantial 
entities, a risk of reifying ‘diaspora’ by attributing it with a certain 
list of characteristics, such as ethnicity, national origin, language, 
ancestry and so forth. So where does this leave us? What utility 
does the term ‘diaspora’ hold, then, and should it be used at all?
Wahlbeck (1999) has argued that the Kurdish communities out-
side Kurdistan constitute a diaspora not only in the descriptive 
sense of the term but also in its analytical sense. He (1999: 180) 
further observes how the social organisation of the diaspora com-
munity is characterised by transnational social relations and sug-
gests that the concept of diaspora is a useful one to understand 
the transnational social reality in which migrants are embedded. 
In other words, the concept of ‘diaspora’ can be useful to make 
sense of exiled communities’ social space and organisation, and 
how such social and transnational space in the context of diaspora 
movements can offer, assign value to, and devalue collective (iden-
tity) narratives for diaspora members and possibly inform them 
about linguistic and cultural matters related to the ‘homeland’.
For instance, concerning the Kurdish diaspora, the narrative 
of victimhood as a result of traumatic experiences back ‘home’ 
followed by exile has been suggested to shape the constructions 
of diasporic identities as well as to structure transnational action 
towards ‘homeland’ (Khayati 2008). Although Khayati (2008: 
5–6) suggests that there is a need to move beyond ‘the experience 
of pain and trauma and the sense of victimhood in order to depict 
a multitude of other diasporic situations and trajectories, such as 
institutional and transnational arrangements’, Kurdish political 
mobilisation narratives and justifications for action still reference 
the collectively experienced trauma and victimhood, if not as the 
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central then as one major component of the ‘Kurdish experience’. 
How then can we examine Kurdish diaspora mobilisation, where 
Kurdish protagonists themselves refer to Kurds as an ethnic group 
with mutual political aspirations and interests, without essential-
ising the political actions, narratives and motivations to all Kurds? 
Brubaker (2005: 12) suggests that we should think of diaspora in 
the first place as a category of practice, in other words how claims 
are made, projects articulated and loyalties evoked and mobilised 
through it, and only then think about whether and how it could 
serve as a category of analysis (see Anthias 1998; Dahinden 2016). 
He further notes that, ‘rather than speak of “a diaspora” or “the 
diaspora” as an entity, a bounded group, an ethnodemographic 
or ethnocultural fact, it may be more fruitful, and certainly more 
precise, to speak of diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, 
practices and so on’ (2005: 13). Therefore, instead of asking what 
diasporas are, perhaps the question ought to be how diasporas 
come to be. Is it diasporas who engage in mobilisation and make 
it happen, or is it through the processes of mobilisation that dias-
poras come to be?
Indeed, Sökefeld (2006) suggests that it is the latter, and posits 
that diasporas, indeed, need to be thought of as imagined trans-
national communities that come about through specific processes 
of mobilisation. Basing his argument in the literature on social 
movements, he suggests that this enables the countering of essen-
tialist understandings of diaspora (and in extension of trans-
national political action) as rooted to a sense of belonging and the 
‘roots’ migrants have in their ‘homelands’. If we are to draw from 
Sökefeld’s understanding of diasporas as specific processes of 
mobilisation, it can be concluded that the diasporas come about 
not only through exile but first and foremost through homeland 
orientation and how group solidarity is mobilised and maintained 
to such effect. With a similar approach, Brubaker (2005: 5) has 
posited that, despite the fragmentation of the term, there are 
‘three core elements that remain widely understood to be consti-
tutive of diaspora’: dispersion (either voluntary or involuntary), 
homeland orientation (whether real or imagined) and boundary 
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maintenance (how group solidarity is mobilised and maintained) 
(see also Cohen 2008: 12). In reference to the first, it can be con-
cluded that not all exiled communities are diasporas, but all dias-
poras are (at least to some extent) exiled communities that come 
about as a result of specific mobilisation processes that consist of 
‘diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices and so on’ 
(Brubaker 2005: 13).
2.3.2 Mobilising for ‘homeland’
Diasporas can play multiple roles in both the host country and 
homeland contexts (Toivanen & Baser 2020). Political activities 
that have been focused upon in previous literature can range from 
taking to the streets and organising demonstrations to circulating 
petitions, lobbying, campaigning to raise awareness, and providing 
logistic support in times of political disturbance back ‘home’, just 
to name a few examples (ibid.). For instance, the annual organised 
demonstrations in Strasbourg to call for the release of the jailed 
Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan attract thousands of Kurds from 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Finland 
and other countries to attend. Kurdish diaspora organisations and 
political actors in the diaspora have also mobilised to lobby host 
country decision makers on genocide claims (Baser & Toivanen 
2017), to raise awareness for human rights violations committed 
‘back home’ (Baser 2016), to shed light on the ongoing conflict 
(Eccarius-Kelly 2017; Karagöz 2017), and to take part in transna-
tional diaspora politics with the aim of having an impact on the 
political processes back ‘home’ (Emanuelsson 2005; Mügge 2010; 
Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).
So, how can we approach the mobilised action without essen-
tialising it simply as a manifestation of the diaspora’s nationalist 
feelings towards the ‘homeland’ or as a lack of integration in the 
host society? When examining diaspora mobilisation, there is a 
risk of not only taking the diaspora as a uniform actor but also of 
treating diaspora mobilisation as something taking place between 
the host society and the ‘homeland’. Indeed, traditionally, diaspora 
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politics have been analytically approached through the triad rela-
tionship between the ‘homeland’, the ‘hostland’ and the ‘diaspora’ 
(Demmers 2002; Vertovec 1999). However, diaspora mobilisation 
and the political and civic action that it can generate takes place in 
the transnational space. This means that the networks, affiliations, 
practices and narratives that are part of mobilisation processes are 
very transnational, and approaching them within the triangle of 
the host society, the ‘homeland’ and the diaspora can lead to disre-
garding other dynamics that might be at play. For instance, Alinia 
(2004: 211–212) in her research on the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden 
suggests that the fact that Kurdistan does not exist as a state can 
lead to feelings of ambivalence towards the societies of departure – 
and to several distinctions concerning the meanings assigned to 
‘homeland’. This can also shape different diaspora communities’ 
mobilisation towards the imagined ‘homeland’ in very different 
ways. Secondly, there is a risk of essentialising diaspora mobilisa-
tion and the related political and civic actions as a manifestation 
of diaspora members’ lingering loyalties and attachments towards 
the ancestral ‘homeland’. Alinia (2004: 330) provides another take 
on such conflation between mobilisation and loyalty by arguing 
that Kurdish diasporans’ ‘transnational networks and communi-
ties, social relations and activities regarding the politics of loca-
tion have in this process become their “home”’.
Simultaneously, diaspora mobilisation cannot be dealt with sep-
arately from ‘homeland’ events. The question on what generates 
and affects the ways in which diasporans mobilise has long puzzled 
scholars. Safran (20077) suggests that ‘diaspora consciousness may 
be revived after a special event, such as a revolutionary struggle or 
a tragic experience, that brings back the importance of the kinship 
connection’. The mobilisation can be sparked by critical events 
that touch upon the exiled diaspora community and its members, 
and, for instance, the stage of the ongoing conflict in the ‘home-
land’ can create waves of protest in the host country. Also, past 
events can be referenced upon and represented as a continuity of 
the ongoing struggles – or vice versa. Sharon Macdonald (2012: 
235) has referred to this as ‘past presencing’, in other words, how 
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the past is made relevant in different ways in the present. Orjuela 
(2018: 3) interestingly expands this approach to diaspora mobili-
sation to look at how ‘versions of the past can be represented and 
performed for instance in court rooms, demonstrations, on-line 
campaigns and at commemoration events’. This is close to Volkan’s 
idea of ‘chosen traumas’, in other words of ‘a shared mental repre-
sentation of a traumatic past event’ that over generations gradu-
ally becomes a significant group marker of identity that can then 
be reactivated by political leaders to reconfirm such identity. For 
instance, the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora’s chosen trauma has, in this 
sense, been the Anfal campaign, and diaspora actors’ initiatives to 
push for its recognition as genocide have enabled them to create 
networks both in host society political circles and with homeland 
actors (Baser & Toivanen 2017).
Little is known about why some diaspora members are more 
engaged and mobilised than others (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013). 
One explanation is that ‘homeland’ events resonate very differ-
ently between different diaspora members, for instance between 
first- and second-generation members. Individuals and mem-
bers of different generations are also socialised differently into 
the (diaspora) political cultures through their parents and their 
networks (Karagöz 2017: 91). Transnational engagements can also 
shift in time and the level of mobilisation depends on the shifting 
emotions diaspora members have towards the ‘homeland’ events 
(Mavroudi 2018). Diaspora members who have been more pas-
sive and ‘dormant transnationalists’ (see Shain & Barth 2003) can 
become activated in the aftermath of major political disturbances 
in the ‘homeland’. This was visible, for instance, in the case of the 
so-called Arab Spring, which led to political mobilisation among 
Arab diasporas in Europe (Beaugrand & Geisser 2016), or, as this 
book will show, with the events that took place in Kobane in the 
winter of 2014–2015.
Diaspora political actors can be particularly central in this 
regard. Adamson (2013: 69), who has studied the mechanisms 
of diaspora mobilisation in the case of the Turkish–Kurdish con-
flict between 1980 and 2000, refers to transnational brokerage. 
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Transnational brokers are political entrepreneurs (associations, 
individuals, political wings) who successfully connected diaspora 
populations (and their resources) in Europe to the Kurdish actors 
in Turkey, and made the Kurdish case visible to European policy-
makers. In addition to successful lobbying, they also managed to 
mobilise Kurdish community members in Europe to join politi-
cally dynamic networks of Kurdish associations (see also Baser 
2015a: 33–34). Linking this to the earlier approach of diasporas 
coming about as processes of mobilisation, Adamson (2008: 2) 
argues that diasporas ‘are best viewed as the products or outcomes 
of transnational mobilisation activities by political entrepreneurs 
engaged in strategic social identity construction’.
This also relates to Brubaker’s (2005: 30–31) observations on 
how researchers need to distinguish the ethnopolitical catego-
risations that are employed by (diaspora) political actors from 
the analytical categorisations to better understand ethnopolitics. The 
focus, therefore, needs to be more on how (diaspora) political 
actors manage to ‘reify and reproduce in a transnational and 
politicized form a particular identity category – whether that be 
national, ethnic, secretarian, or religious’ (Adamson 2008: 2), 
and how that is used to mobilise diaspora members for political 
purposes. In this sense, it is important not to take the relation-
ship between a critical event and diaspora mobilisation, or dias-
pora mobilisation and transnational participation, at face value, 
as an implication of lingering loyalties towards the ‘homeland’, as 
a manifestation of ethnic identities, or even as a lack of integra-
tion into the host society. Instead, it might be more fruitful to 
examine how some critical events become important, how they 
are portrayed, narrated and linked to past events and future 
political projects by diaspora political actors, and what meanings 
individuals assign to their transnational participation that might 
follow thereafter.
What about the national context?
Even in transnational social spaces, place continues to count.
(Kivisto 2001: 571)
Mobilising for the ‘Homeland’ 37
Going back to the question of methodological nationalism and 
transnationalism, what analytical lens would best suit to under-
stand the contextual factors that shape the mobilisation processes 
and the forms that transnational political action towards the 
‘homeland’ takes? In other words, how does the national context 
shape how diaspora members and their descendants mobilise, 
create social and political networks and maintain ties between 
different places?
As stated earlier, diasporas’ mobilisation and transnational 
political participation have been considered to be dependent on 
both the host country and the homeland context. Drawing from 
the social movements literature, one major factor structuring the 
possibilities for diasporas to mobilise and to participate in home-
land affairs is perceived to be both the ‘homeland’ and host society 
political and institutional opportunity structures (see Baser 2016: 
28–31; Koopmans & Statham 2003). They are employed to refer to 
diasporans’ legal, political and social rights, citizenship laws and 
policies concerning education, welfare, housing and labour (Ireland 
1994: 10). Later approaches have included a focus on cultural 
and institutional aspects, citizenship and discursive opportunity 
structures (Koopmans 2004). The latter refer to the possibilities of 
diasporans to diffuse their messages in the public sphere and pos-
sibly into public discourses, and to raise support for their political 
projects. Institutional (namely legal) and discursive opportunity 
structures can become quite restricted to certain political move-
ments or factions in diasporas that have become criminalised – 
quite often by the pressure exercised by the sending state (see 
Baser 2014). Relatedly, the bilateral and diplomatic relations 
between the host state and the sending state are also a factor 
shaping diaspora actors’ possibilities to engage in transnational 
political action (Baser 2014).
However, trying to capture the significance of the national con-
text is not as clear cut as the division between the host society 
and ‘homeland’ would suggest. We need to include in the anal-
ysis of diaspora mobilisations not only events that take place in 
the homeland context but also those in the host country context 
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(Baser 2014, 2015a; Baser & Swain 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen 
2001, 2003). For instance, Baser (2015a) argues that diaspora 
mobilisation can also take place as a result of political develop-
ments in the host country, not only in the ‘homeland’. One such 
example is the assassination of three Kurdish political actors in 
Paris in 2013, which generated mobilisation among the Kurdish 
communities in the country (and beyond) (Karagöz 2017). As dis-
cussed earlier, the strategic framing of certain critical events that 
resonate with diaspora members, particularly in ways that make 
reference to a sense of collective belonging or the ones that are 
emotionally laden, can be a particularly efficient means for mobi-
lisation (Adamson 2013). In other words, homeland–host country 
dynamics can become conflated via critical events that touch upon 
both the host country and the ‘homeland’, and as a result motivate 
diasporans to mobilise, and not merely towards the ‘homeland’ 
but also towards the local policymakers.
Furthermore, the national context in the sending region can 
vary greatly, as is the case with Kurdistan. The national spaces 
of different Kurdish societies offer different means (and possibly 
motivations) to take part in long-distance political projects. 
‘Homeland’–diaspora relations also shape political mobilisation 
processes and the diaspora’s possibilities to exercise an impact 
in the ‘homeland’ context. Not all diaspora contributions are 
welcomed, and they can sometimes even be met with hostility 
(Emanuelsson 2008; Hautaniemi, Juntunen, & Sato 2013). The 
‘homeland’ can also have very different policies towards different 
sections of its diaspora communities and provide different politi-
cal opportunities (partial citizenship, legal rights, incentives to 
return etc.) for diaspora members to take part in homeland affairs 
(see Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004: 1023–1024).
In a sense, there is no denying that the national context mat-
ters. The host society and ‘homeland’ institutional, discursive, 
legal and political opportunity structures, integration and citizen-
ship regimes, citizenship status, bilateral relations between them, 
and diaspora–‘homeland’ relations inform diasporas’ mobilisa-
tion processes and means to take part in the ‘homeland’ political 
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sphere. Making a clear-cut distinction between the two national 
contexts can leave significant cross-border processes unnoticed. 
But how the national context matters is a different story. The fact 
that host society and ‘homeland’ dynamics can become conflated 
through a series of events touching both argues against such an 
analytical distinction between the two national contexts. In this 
sense, it is possible to distinguish some national particularities 
and dynamics in how diasporas mobilise (Baser 2012; Østergaard-
Nielsen 2005; Mügge 2010). It is equally important to pay atten-
tion to cross-border processes and how those shape more locally 
organised political action by diaspora communities.
The transnational context
What is the role of the transnational context and what explanatory 
power can it have to understand diaspora participation towards 
the homeland and the related mobilisation processes? How can we 
account for the transnational dimension of diaspora mobilisation?
Insights from studies on social movements have been applied 
to understand diaspora mobilisations and factors shaping such 
mobilisations through three aspects. These are political opportu-
nity structures, as discussed earlier, the role of resources (organi-
sational and network structures) and the framing of mobilising 
events (Quinsaat 2013, 2019; Sökefeld 2006). All three evoke what 
scholars have named the transnational space, in which diaspo-
ras formulate and mobilise action (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). In 
terms of diaspora mobilisation, transnational space is understood 
to refer to the social space that extends across national borders, 
and which entails cross-border activities, engagements, mobility, 
social relations and emotional attachments that diaspora groups 
sustain and forge within the host country, towards the homeland 
as well as towards the same diaspora communities settled else-
where (Toivanen & Baser 2020).
The transnational space can provide diaspora members with 
mobilising structures to engage in diaspora organisations’ trans-
national activities, including the means to participate in dias-
pora politics. In this transnational character, it can be said, also 
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lies their power and potential for diasporas’ social and political 
organisation and mobilisation (Wahlbeck 1999). The transna-
tional opportunity structures play a role in ways diaspora com-
munities participate in homeland affairs and how they mobilise 
beyond national borders (Koopmans & Statham 2003; Nell 2008). 
Østergaard-Nielsen argued as early as 2003 that there is a need 
to move beyond the nation-state-centred focus of examining the 
significance of different opportunity structures to diasporas’ 
mobilisation and transnational participation. Instead, she sug-
gested looking at transnational opportunity structures to better 
reflect the transnational space in which diasporans operate.
Chaudhary and Moss (2016: 7) distinguish between three types 
of transnational political action that immigrants engage in, and 
which can be to some degree extended to diaspora members in 
a more general way (including the second generation): electoral 
(voting, campaigning, campaign fundraising), organisational 
(advocacy groups, ethnic associations, charities, hometown 
associations, ruling party/opposition organisations) and non- 
institutional (protests, demonstrations, boycotts, petitions, covert 
actions, armed conflicts, revolution). They suggest a triadic 
political opportunity approach to conceptualising how the host 
country, the home country and transnational political contexts 
shape such transnational political action, and how such spaces 
can facilitate and/or limit it. In terms of the political opportunity 
structures (POS), they distinguish between three key dimensions 
(2016: 8):
• Receiving country POS: Immigrant integration policies (residency, 
citizenship); access to receiving country local/national politics; 
co-development policies/initiatives
• Origin country POS: Governing authority type (autocracy/ 
democracy); relative stability (conflict, post-conflict, economic/
political crises, natural disasters)
• Transnational POS: Supranational organisations/institutions (UN, 
ICC etc.); international legal regimes (human rights law); origin 
and receiving country bilateral relations; foreign policy, geopolitical 
relations
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This also provides a good starting point to distinguish different 
types of transnational political action and how different trans-
national political opportunity structures shape them. Further-
more, as well as considering the transnational and more global 
context, we also need to pay attention to the more locally based 
political and social hierarchies that shape mobilisation processes 
and possibilities to engage in transnational political actions. In 
other words, whereas the national context remains significant, our 
lived experiences and possibilities for action are also shaped by 
the more locally woven set of circumstances at the level of regions, 
cities or even neighbourhoods (Anthias 2012). One example of 
this is the networks, which can be quite local, as discussed later. 
The significance of locality applies also to the sending region.
Yet, it would be misleading to consider all diasporans’ lives and 
experiences automatically to be transnational, and those of ‘natives’ 
or those left behind in the ‘homeland’ as sedentary and nationally 
focused. Diasporans take part in transnational practices to very 
different degrees and even live out different forms of transnation-
alism, as is suggested by Dahinden (2009). Also, Anthias (2012) 
observes the need to take into account that all people, regardless 
of their migration trajectories or origins, inhabit transnational 
spaces in the global world. She distinguishes between ‘trans- 
ethnic’ relations and ‘transnational’ relations, the former refer-
ring to relations between ethnically constructed groups and their 
similar experiences, goals and trajectories. I return to this dis-
cussion in the analysis chapter but, for purposes of clarity, I have 
chosen to employ the term ‘transnational’ as it is commonly 
employed in the migration literature.
In addition to looking at different opportunity structures in the 
host country, the homeland context and transnationally, it needs to 
be considered that they and the related mechanisms of inclusion/
exclusion and hierarchies also intertwine at the transnational and 
national levels. For instance, Anthias (2012) argues for adopting a 
new imaginary to study the complexity of mobilities, and she sug-
gests doing this through the translocational frame. She warns against 
polarisation between national and transnational perspectives 
42 The Kobane Generation
by suggesting that the transnational perspective ought to move 
past a focus on the relations between nations and nationally 
based social hierarchies and take into consideration social 
hierarchies on a global level. However, for Anthias (2012: 103) 
this does not entail ruling out the national lens, ‘since it pos-
sesses important affective, discursive, experiential and political 
relations within a global context’. The similar line of reasoning 
can be used to look at different social and political hierarchies 
and power structures in the form of political, institutional, 
legal and discursive opportunity structures, the mechanisms 
of inclusion and exclusion they produce and how those inter-
twine at the transnational, national and local levels, as discussed 
in Chapter 5.
2.4 The Second Generation
2.4.1 Transnational lives and participation
One of the most pertinent questions in transnational studies from 
the generational perspective seems to be whether transnational 
ties and loyalties still matter beyond the first generation, the 
actual migrants. There is an abundant literature on how migrants’ 
children engage in cross-border activities and networks that 
are directed to the sending region of their parents. Some schol-
ars have suggested that the children of first-generation migrants 
express fading interest towards their parents’ countries of depar-
ture (Kasinitz et al. 2002; Portes & Rumbaut 2001; Portes & Zhou 
1993; Waldinger 2015),8 whereas others have argued that second-
generation members continue to engage transnationally (Baser 
2012, 2014; Lee 2008, 2011; Levitt 2009; Levitt & Glick Schiller 
2004; Levitt & Jarowsky 2007; Levitt & Waters 2006; Mügge 
2010; Somerville 2008; Toivanen 2014), albeit to a lesser degree 
and possibly in different ways compared to their parents. Can 
we make sense of second-generation members’ actions, attach-
ments, identities, mobilities, relations and networks through the 
transnational frame?
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Whereas the earlier migration literature on transnationalism 
focused on the so-called first generation, later on a number of 
scholars argued that transnational theorisation can also be use-
ful to understand the lived experiences of the second generation 
(see Levitt 2009; Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004). What this means 
concretely is that second-generation members are embedded in a 
social space that includes frequent references to the ‘homeland’, 
and thus can be informed by the current events in their parents’ 
society of departure. They can also make frequent visits to their 
parents’ ‘homeland’ (Cressey 2006), maintain contacts with rela-
tives still living there, and be involved in the political and social 
organisation of the diaspora community to which they belong. 
Albeit in a different manner to their parents, second-generation 
members in this study continued to maintain transnational rela-
tions, ties and attachments towards the Kurdistan region (and 
not limited to it) and some did even opt to temporarily ‘return’ 
to Kurdistan. This transnational space shaped their everyday life, 
as they had been raised in a setting where the ‘homeland is ref-
erenced daily – ideologically, materially, and affectively’ (Levitt 
2009: 1231).
There is evidence on how diaspora mobilisation can lead to 
increased transnational mobilisation activities among the sec-
ond generation. For instance, there was increased participation in 
transnational activities among both the first and second genera-
tions in the Arab diaspora communities in Europe during the so-
called Arab Spring (see Moss 2016; Premazzi et al. 2013). Another 
example was witnessed during the Gezi Park protests that took 
place at Taksim Square, Istanbul, in May–June 2013. It soon reso-
nated among the diaspora communities settled in Europe, spark-
ing demonstrations including second-generation members in 
Sweden, the Netherlands, France and Germany (Baser 2015b). 
Similarly, Hess and Korf (2014) show how second-generation 
Tamils in Switzerland became mobilised during the final battle 
of the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2009. These studies also illustrate 
how political socialisation processes can be quite different for 
the first and second generations. The first-generation members 
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can have more direct links to ‘homeland’ political actors and dias-
pora organisations that are directly affiliated to them, whereas the 
second-generation members can be more familiar with local activ-
ist spheres and movements (Karagöz 2017). Compared to their 
parents, they are also most likely more familiar with the political, 
institutional and other opportunity structures (and their limits) in 
the host society, through their citizenship status and socialisation 
within their societies of birth (Baser 2016).
Second-generation members’ transnational political participa-
tion can be located and directed at the host society, the ‘homeland’, 
simultaneously to both or even towards the transnational diaspora 
community. The transnational space, to some extent, provides 
second-generation members with mobilising structures to engage in 
diaspora organisations’ transnational activities, including the 
means to participate in diaspora politics, but it can have more 
local manifestations concerning the second generation. Hess and 
Korf ’s (2014) study on second-generation Tamils shows that they 
became sensitised to the conflict in Sri Lanka through direct con-
tact with relatives and (diaspora) political discourses of suffering 
circulating in the transnational space. However, the authors argue 
that their activism was located in and directed towards the host 
society, with the aim of raising awareness of the plight of Tamils 
back ‘home’ and of prompting Switzerland to take action at the 
international level.
One line of discussion on diasporas’ transnationalism has 
been the need to incorporate a focus on the virtual dimension 
of diasporans’ and diaspora organisations’ transnational political 
involvement (Bailey, Georgiou, & Harindranath 2007; Brinkerhoff 
2009; Candidatu, Leurs, & Ponzanesi 2019; Kissau 2012; Kissau & 
Hunger 2010). Examples of diaspora members’ online activism 
have become visible in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring and 
in the aftermath of the political upheavals that have occurred in 
Cairo, Tunis, Beirut, Erbil and Istanbul, among other cities (Baser 
2015a; Beaugrand & Geisser 2016; Premazzi et al. 2013). Scholars 
in media studies have also increasingly paid attention to the sec-
ond generation (Georgiou & Ponte 2013). However, the emphasis 
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has been more on transnational cultural or familial ties instead of 
politically orientated engagement, with a few exceptions (Costa & 
Alinejad 2020; Müller-Funk 2020).
Also, focusing on the virtual dimension of diaspora transna-
tionalism does not mean ignoring the national context altogether. 
Indeed, Van de Bos and Nell (2006) show in their study how 
the Internet usage of Iranian and Turkish Kurdish migrants in the 
Netherlands is shaped by offline community networks and states’ 
borders. In other words, they conclude that the new media and 
transnationalism do not automatically ‘broaden or dissolve geo-
graphical identity and connectivity, but may reinforce it’ (p. 201) 
and that territoriality continues to play a role in digital practices. 
Furthermore, their study shows that, whereas the first-generation 
migrants’ online practices reflect their offline networks, the sec-
ond generation forms more sovereign online communities that 
pivot on their hyphenated identities.
The technological developments have opened new venues for 
mobilising practices and for participation in homeland devel-
opment. This is particularly visible in terms of economic remit-
tances, that is, money transfers to the sending region, but also 
in terms of what has been named social remittances (transfer of 
ideas and practices) and political remittances (long-distance vot-
ing, for instance). Also, well-settled members of the second gener-
ation in their societies of birth can resort to technological means 
to be(come) active through different forms of transnational politi-
cal activities ‘at distance’ – both physically and virtually. Keeping 
in touch with relatives back home and following the ‘homeland’ 
events, for instance via Facebook and Twitter feeds, has never 
been easier.
Acknowledging the transnational diaspora space is important to 
defy more methodologically nationalist interpretations of ‘return’ 
migration between the host society and ‘homeland’. At times, 
diasporans’ return migration can be motivated to take part in the 
societal development in the sending state and a form of diasporic 
homecoming, or they can be motivated by strategic reasons, 
for the accumulation of educational or professional skills or for 
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investment purposes (Baser & Toivanen 2018a). More recent stud-
ies have shown that members of the second generation may also 
‘return’ to their parents’ country of departure (King & Christou 
2014; Potter 2005; Teerling 2011). However, second-generation 
return seems to be more often approached from the perspective 
of identity and belonging, and more rarely in terms of diaspora 
contributions. This is also more generally the case with the sec-
ond generation’s transnational participation towards the ancestral 
‘homeland’ through various forms of (transnational) offline and 
online activities that aim to contribute to or have an impact on 
their parents’ society of departure. Relatedly, diaspora politics, 
that is, long-distance political transnational ties and engagements 
towards the ‘homeland’, have been signed off as something that 
concerns diaspora communities’ second generation less than their 
parents. This has also been the assumption with mobilisation pro-
cesses. True, the second generation might be less inclined to take 
part in ‘homeland’–diaspora politics – at least in a manner similar 
to their parents. Also, their lived experiences – potentially very 
different from those of their parents – shape their transnational 
(political) ties and actions, and what kind of identities and politics 
of belonging are related to such engagements.
Indeed, the observations on second-generation members’ trans-
national ties have been accompanied by calls to incorporate a 
focus on the generational dynamics of diaspora experiences and 
more specifically on transnational diaspora politics (Alinia & 
Eliassi 2014; Baser 2015a; Emanuelsson 2008). Alinia and Eliassi 
(2014) suggest that there are significant differences between the 
Kurdish first and second generations that require adopting dif-
ferent theoretical and analytical conceptualisations – for instance 
in terms of transnational political participation. In other words, 
this does not automatically mean that the members of the sec-
ond generation would be less political per se but that their (trans-
national) political participation might manifest itself in different 
ways compared to that of their parents. Perhaps the question that 
would need to be asked is: how can second-generation members’ 
mobilisation and transnational participation be conceptualised so 
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that the analytical concepts would reflect their experiences and 
meaning-making processes, without the residual meanings of 
earlier conceptualisations employed to understand their parents’ 
transnational (political) participation? For instance, what exactly 
is diasporic in second-generation transnationalism?
2.4.2 Beyond diasporic?
Diasporic circulation
There is no denying that the transnational frame can allow a better 
understanding of the political and social organisation of migrant 
communities and the cross-border relations, ties and activities 
of their members towards the sending region – provided that 
the communities are not understood as homogeneous and static 
entities (Brubaker 2002). Also, the transnational social space in 
the context of diaspora movements can offer, assign value to, and 
devalue collective narratives for the younger generations and pos-
sibly inform them about linguistic and cultural matters related 
to the societies of departure. However, whether subsequent gen-
erations can be considered and even conceptualised within the 
more classical understanding of diaspora is highly debatable. Or, 
as Wahlbeck (1999) notes, Kurdish communities in exile can, 
indeed, be considered to constitute a diaspora, but whether this 
is going to remain the case for subsequent generations of Kurds 
remains an open question.
So, in the light of these reflections, what are we to make of second- 
generation members’ stories in this study? We can approach 
their transnational engagements and actions as well as mobilities 
as diasporic in the sense that they – at least to some extent – are 
connected to them having been raised in the transnational Kurd-
ish diaspora space. Drawing from the same material as for this 
study, I have discussed the resources that are available to second- 
generation Kurds as a result of their parents’ migration process and 
transnational ties elsewhere (Toivanen 2019). That article focused 
on the role of mobilisable resources and concluded that they were 
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capitalised upon by second-generation members for two, albeit 
interrelated, aims: to advance one’s educational and professional 
advantages and to contribute to the development of Kurdistan.
In terms of activities, I suggest that second-generation mem-
bers can take part in what could be called diasporic circulation. 
By ‘diasporic circulation’ I refer to transnational engagements and 
actions through which individuals aim to improve the conditions 
in the sending region either at distance (both online and offline) 
or en lieu. Such actions can take place via institutional or non-
institutional means, and include temporal migration and short-
term visits; economic, social and ‘political’ remittances (such as 
long-distance voting); lobbying; providing logistical support in 
times of political disturbance; and online political activism such as 
blogging, campaigns to raise awareness and so forth. For instance, 
respondents took part in diasporic circulation towards the Kurdish 
regions as outlined above, in a way that was underlined by their 
motivation to transmit knowledge and immaterial sources towards 
the region. Some also engaged in transnational circular mobility 
between France and Kurdistan, which can be understood as part 
of their diasporic circulation, in contrast to others’ ‘voluntary 
immobility’ to stay put in France (see de Haas & Rodríguez 2010). 
The actions are specifically enabled by pre-existing networks, 
family ties or associative structures that second-generation mem-
bers have access to as a result of their parents’ migration, hence 
the attribute diasporic. The transnational actions and engagements 
can also be approached as a form of diasporic circulation, particu-
larly when they aim at improving the conditions in the sending 
region. However, it would be too straightforward to conclude that 
the meanings attached to such transnational activities are also – 
and only – by definition diasporic.
On identity
In particular, there is risk of reducing and essentialising second-
generation members’ transnational participation, including that 
of political character (and mobilisation that might precede it) and 
to treat it automatically as an indicator of diasporic belonging, 
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or as a reflection of their assumed ‘ethnic’ identity. Approaching 
transnationalism and mobilisations merely as identity-driven phe-
nomena would mean failing to acknowledge the heterogeneity of 
individuals’ motivations to engage in ‘homeland’ affairs, but also to 
increase the risk of falling into methodologically nationalist inter-
pretations of such motivations. Second-generation transnational 
engagements can also have a strategic and practical dimension 
and be more a question of access than of having emotional sig-
nificance. For instance, Santelli and colleagues’ study on second- 
generation Algerians in France (1999) show that investment 
opportunities can motivate the sustaining of transnational ties 
to the homeland without such activities necessarily being rooted to 
lingering attachments and loyalties towards the homeland. I have 
also discussed the professional and educational reasons under-
lying second-generation Kurds’ temporary ‘return’ motivations 
elsewhere (Toivanen 2019).
On the other hand, the identity component should not be alto-
gether dismissed. The question is how to account for it. As Hess 
and Korf (2014) show in their study on second-generation Tamils 
in Switzerland, their mobilisation took place in relation to their 
identities as Swiss, not as Tamils. They suggest that it was also 
the second-generation’s identity as Swiss that became mobilised 
against the perceived passivity and ignorance of the Swiss govern-
ment to act in the crisis facing the Tamils. Also, the reasons for 
mobilisation and the motivations to engage in transnational par-
ticipation are not necessarily a question of either/or for all mem-
bers of the same generation. Fokkema and colleagues (2013) have 
shown that second-generation members whose parents came 
from Morocco, the former Yugoslavia and Turkey engage in send-
ing economic remittances to their parents’ societies of departure 
for two main reasons – either for the emotional attachments that 
they foster towards their parents’ countries of origin or for rea-
sons of self-interest, for instance to ensure the managing of their 
investments and material assets in the event of ‘return’. This also 
speaks volumes of the heterogeneity within diaspora communities 
(namely in terms of age, gender, class, generation, sociopolitical 
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status and so forth) and of the need to account for such factors 
when looking at why some individuals become mobilised and 
transnationally engaged towards the ‘homeland’ whereas others 
do not (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013).
The complexity of the identity question was also illustrated in 
respondents’ stories. We can see how the transnational space had 
shaped their lived experiences and decision-making processes 
about transnational participation. In this sense, the diaspora con-
text, if approached in the sense of a transnational social space that 
informs, facilitates and shapes mobilities, engagements, participa-
tion, action and possibly even attachments, is relevant to consider 
even beyond the first generation. What is more, not only did some 
plan to return to Kurdistan by employing the existing diaspora 
networks they had but in some cases those led to the creation of 
new networks. In that sense, their transnational mobility did not 
only lean on the pre-existing (diaspora) networks or institutional 
structures but instead led to a creation of a new one that was not 
diasporic per se (Toivanen 2019). Discerning what is diasporic in 
second-generation mobilisation processes and transnational par-
ticipation towards the ancestral ‘homeland’ opens unavoidably 
the question of what is not. This urges us to ask: can we deduct 
second-generation transnationalism and mobilisation as being 
automatically and only as diasporic or is it also something else? 
This question is tackled in Chapters 6 and 7.
PART I I






Descriptions of Kurdistan and the Kurds quite often begin with 
the observation that the Kurds are the world’s biggest nation 
without a state. To date, no state of Kurdistan with internation-
ally recognised borders has existed. So where is Kurdistan located, 
then, and who are the Kurds, the world’s largest people without a 
state? How have the histories of Kurdish societies been shaped in 
Iraq, Turkey and Syria? And how does the historical division of 
Kurdistan affect the current state of affairs in the region? This 
part of the book consists of a brief overview and contextualisation 
of the historical background of Kurdistan and the Kurds in the 
Middle East. This chapter focuses on the situation of Kurds in Iraq, 
Syria and Turkey (with the exception of Iran), since the research 
participants originate from these regions.9
3.2 Who Are the Kurds?
The region of Kurdistan is usually employed to refer to a land area 
with large Kurdish-speaking populations stretching over Turkey, 
Iraq, Iran and Syria, mainly, and with smaller territories in west-
ern and central Asia, as shown in Map 1. The land area comprises 
approximately 518,000 square kilometres, which is roughly equiv-
alent to the area of France. More precisely, the Kurdish populations 
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reside in quite extensive areas of eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, 
western Iran and northern Syria, and they form the fourth largest 
ethnic group in the region after Arabs, Persians, and Turks, conse-
quently constituting rather sizeable ethnic and linguistic minori-
ties within these four states. The estimated number of Kurds varies 
between 25 and 30 million (Gunter 2011: 3–4; Hassanpour & 
Mojab 2005: 214; McDowall 1996), and the numbers are une-
qually divided, with Turkey having the largest Kurdish-speaking 
population, followed by Iran, Iraq and Syria. In addition, many 
Kurds have settled outside Kurdistan. For instance, Istanbul hosts 
Map 1: The Kurdish-inhabited area. Source: Library of Congress, 
Geography and Map Division.
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approximately three million Kurds and therefore can be said to be 
‘the biggest Kurdish city’.10
Who, then, are the Kurds? Tracing the history of the Kurds is a 
fairly complex matter. It is suggested that the majority of Kurds are 
most likely descended from heterogeneous Indo-European tribes 
that moved westward across Iran around the middle of the second 
millennium bc (McDowall 1996: 8). The first historical references 
to ‘Kurdistan’ as a geographical term date back to the 12th century 
(ibid., 6, 13). During the Ottoman period, ‘Kurdistan’ was used to 
name the province of Diyarbakir, in today’s eastern Turkey, and a 
province called Kordestan still exists in today’s Iran (van Bruinessen 
1992: 11). Kurdistan, ‘the land of the Kurds’, nowadays refers to a 
land area of mountainous and plateau regions that consists of the 
north-west Zagros and the eastern Taurus mountain ranges.
Today Kurds form a rather diverse group in terms of language, 
religion and political affiliation. They live in both urban and rural 
areas, either in the Kurdistan region, outside it in Istanbul, Baghdad 
or even Teheran, or in diaspora communities outside the Middle 
East (Taucher, Vogl, & Webinger 2015). The Kurdish language can 
be considered one distinctive feature of ‘Kurdishness’, although it 
is not a straightforward issue. The Kurdish language belongs to 
the Indo-Iranian group of Indo-European languages and is related 
to neither Arabic nor Turkish. However, the language has four 
dialect groups (Kurmanji, Sorani, Zaza/Dimili, and Hawrami/
Gorani), which can be quite different one from another. Unlike 
the case with most nation-states around the globe, there exists no 
clear Kurdish language or dialect boundaries that would follow 
any state’s borders.11 However, the two most commonly used dia-
lects of Kurdish are Kurmanji and Sorani, in that order. Kurmanji 
is mostly spoken in Turkish Kurdistan (with Zaza too being spoken 
in this region) and Sorani in Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan (where 
the Gorani dialect is also widely spoken). The two main dialects 
also differ in their alphabets, Kurmanji using the Latin script and 
Sorani the Arabic script, with minor modifications (Sheyholis-
lami 2010). As a matter of fact, it has been said that Kurmanji and 
Sorani are grammatically as different as the English and German 
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languages are and that the differences in vocabulary are compara-
ble to those between Dutch and German (McDowall 1996: 9).
To make matters more complex, the Kurds, who live in Syria, 
Iraq, Iran and Turkey, tend to be at least bilingual, speaking Kurdish 
and the official language of the country they live in. This is per-
haps most noticeable in Turkey, where, because of strict assimi-
lation policies and the prohibition of the Kurdish language until 
the 1990s, many Kurds nowadays speak mostly Turkish. In Iran, the 
situation is a bit different. The official language, Farsi, is used in 
public, while Kurdish seems to be spoken mostly in the private 
sphere. The Kurdish language and its usage, in contrast to Turkey, 
has never been criminalised in the country, but it does not enjoy any 
minority language status either. The situation in Iraqi Kurdistan 
is by far the best when it comes to Kurdish language rights. In 
fact, for some time now, there has been a lively debate on the 
standardisation of Kurdish and whether the official version of 
Kurdish should be the Sorani or instead the Kurmanji dialect 
(see Hassanpour 2012).12 In Syrian Kurdistan, Kurdish, alongside 
Arabic and Assyrian, has been the language of education since 
2016.13 During the latter part of the 20th century and the Ba’athist 
rule, the language education was in Arabic and Kurdish-language 
education was often carried out secretly in private homes.
Religion is another element that highlights Kurds’ heterogeneity. 
Martin van Bruinessen (1999a) has suggested that Islam has 
greatly influenced the Kurdish societies and that it has a distinctive 
character in Kurdistan. However, religion has almost never been a 
common denominator for identification as Kurds, and a collective 
sense of ‘Kurdishness’ does not seem to have its basis in shared reli-
gion (ibid.). Religious minorities among Kurds include Fayli, Jew-
ish, Christian and Alevi, as well as the Yezidi Kurds, who became 
sadly famous after the Sinjar massacre and the abduction of Yezidi 
women, who were then sold into slavery in 2014. Van Bruinessen 
also argues that the Kurdish politics and societies have become 
more Islamic, although simultaneously the ethnonational senti-
ments have brought about distinctive Kurdish identities within 
the Islamic movements. Religious affiliations (and ethnicity) 
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have also structured the political memberships for Kurdish-
speaking minorities in Turkey, Iran and Iraq, as I will discuss later.
The ‘Kurdish issue’ has since the very beginning of the 20th cen-
tury been a cross-border issue, and it remains so. The cross-border 
character of the ‘Kurdish issue’ and the formation of Kurdish iden-
tities both in Kurdistan and in diaspora continue to be informed 
by the ‘state of statelessness’ of Kurdistan. This transnational or 
cross-border nature of Kurdistan is reflected in the understand-
ings of ‘Kurdishness’. Or, as Kerim Yildiz (2007: 82) puts it,
There is no single Kurdish identity, but there are Kurdish identities 
that defy or transcend borders. Pan-regional relations between 
the Kurds have always been complex and intimate. The mountain 
ranges that mark frontiers between nations do not mark breaks  
in linguistic, cultural or familial continuity.
In sum, we can say that, regardless of the nation-states’ frontiers 
that cut across Kurdistan, Kurdish identities are rooted to attrib-
utes such as the Kurdish language (see Kreyenbroek 1991), shared 
ancestry and myths of origin and the common land of Kurdistan 
(McDowall 1996: 4–5). On the other hand, there are quite consid-
erable differences in the idea of a pan-Kurdish nation and clear 
differences in attachments to tribal, national and religious identi-
ties above one’s ethnic identity as Kurdish (ibid.: 1).14
Kurdish ethnic identities and a sense of ‘Kurdishness’, or Kurdayetî, 
have been formed in relation to various nation-states’ political 
spaces and the minority–majority relations within such states. 
Denise Natali (2005, xviii) suggests that being ‘Kurdish’ ought to 
be considered in relation to what it means to be a citizen of Iraq, 
Turkey or Iran. Abbas Vali (1998: 84) further argues that the Kurds 
share mutual experiences of ‘otherness’ within various nation-
states, which has become a shared attribute to understandings of 
‘Kurdishness’ across the region. Meanwhile, the new emerging 
societal and political constellations in the Kurdish societies in 
Syria, Iraq and Turkey, specifically, are introducing new dynamics 
to the construction of Kurdish identities. Before discussing the 
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current situation, I will first take a closer look at the division of 
Kurdistan into Iraq, Syria and Turkey from a historical perspec-
tive and the related majority–minority relations in these respective 
countries. The following section offers an overview of how 
Kurdish identities and politics have been formulated within the 
nation-states of Iraq, Turkey and Syria in the 20th century.
3.3 Kurdistan Divided – Historical Tour d’Horizon
The state of statelessness of Kurdistan is a major factor structuring 
Kurdish politics both in Kurdistan and in diaspora. Two major his-
torical developments have been particularly significant in terms of 
the division of Kurdish lands. The first dates back centuries to the 
Ottoman and Persian empires. Indeed, the borders between Iran, 
Turkey and Iraq, where large Kurdish majorities today reside, are 
roughly consistent with the treaty between the Ottoman and Per-
sian empires in 1639, which divided Kurdistan into Ottoman and 
Iranian zones. The region of Kurdistan was situated between the 
Ottoman and the Persian empires from the 17th century till 
the early 20th century, when it, alongside Armenia, was the empires’ 
battlefield until the First World War (Hassanpour & Mojab 2005: 
215–216).
However, the border that had lain between the two empires 
became officially fixed only in the early 20th century. This was 
the time when modernist Western ideas of ‘territorial integrity’, 
that is, the indivisibility of the nation-states, and colonial desires 
swooped over the region. The subjects of pre-modern states, 
including the Kurds, had remained more or less attached to 
the land and tribal affiliations (ibid.), before ideas of a Kurdish 
state and ‘homeland’ started to emerge in the early 20th century. 
In the wake of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and in con-
sequence of the treaties signed by colonial powers, Kurdistan was 
allocated to the political spaces of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. 
This division was in a sense ‘cemented’ by a series of treaties in 
the early 20th century that set the nation-states’ boundaries in the 
Middle East for the decades to come.
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After the fall of the Ottoman Empire during the First World 
War, the French and the British negotiated a secret document, 
now known as the Sykes–Picot Agreement, to divide the Levant 
region into two spheres of influence (Gunter 2009: 196). Build-
ing new political entities on the carcass of the Ottoman Empire, 
the treaty gave birth to modern Middle Eastern states as they are 
more or less known today. The agreement was signed into law by 
the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. As a matter of fact, it included a pro-
vision for a Kurdish state, which, to the widespread disappoint-
ment of the Kurds, was soon replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of 
Lausanne. This was based on an agreement between the Allied 
forces and the Turkish state. The former recognised the Turkish 
state sovereignty and its borders, thus cementing the notion of 
Turkey as an indivisible state and Turkey renounced any claims it 
had to the remainder of the Ottoman Empire (ibid.: 125). Hence, 
the treaty established the borders of modern-day Turkey and 
left the Kurds with a minority status in their respective countries 
for decades to come.
These two treaties are frequently mentioned as the sources 
of disappointment and sentiment of betrayal of Kurds by the 
Western powers, and still referenced today by Kurdish politi-
cians (namely in Iraqi Kurdistan) as well as political activists 
in diaspora. As a result of these treaties, the unofficial borders 
of Kurdistan still cut through the middle of geopolitical power 
centres, where the borders of the current nation-states of Iraq, 
Iran, Turkey and Syria meet (McDowall 1996: 5–6). The forma-
tion of Kurdish societies and the related identities in the region 
have since the very beginning of the 20th century been informed 
by multiple political spaces and the related forms of inclusion/
exclusion that have been formulated within those spaces. The his-
torical division of Kurdish-inhabited regions and the continuous 
state of statelessness today continue to shape and inform Kurdish 
politics, both in Kurdistan and in the diaspora. The history of 
majority–minority relations concerning Kurds in three national 
contexts, Turkey, Syria and Iraq, will therefore be the focus of the 
next sections.
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3.3.1 Kurds in Turkey
The Kurds were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire as early 
as the 16th century. As Klein (2015: 9) notes, the notion of Kurds as 
‘a people divided and Kurdistan as the battleground on which the 
wars between others were fought, with Kurds caught in the mid-
dle’ was cemented in the subsequent centuries. The 19th century 
saw the emergence of national thinking and the concept of state-
lessness gradually shaped the understanding of Kurdish identity 
that also became more clearly distinguished from Armenian and 
Turkish national identities (ibid.: 15–16). A major event shaping 
minority–majority relations in Turkey was the establishment of 
the Turkish republic in 1923, when the Turkish provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire became independent and formed the Turkish 
state. In the Ottoman Empire before the First World War, Islam 
was considered the primary component of Turkish national 
identity (Ergil 2007: 265–269), which meant that expressions of 
Kurdish ethnic identity were more or less tolerated. This was also 
partially the case during the transition era in Turkey’s journey 
toward becoming a modern state.
This gradually changed in the new republican period. The 
Kemalist project of nation-building was led by Mustafa Kemal, or 
Atatürk, as he became known in 1934. It aimed to centralise power 
and to unify various provinces by bringing the diverse populations 
together through secularised, modern and unified state national-
ism (Insel 2007). The political space of the Kemalist Turkey did 
not accommodate ethnic minority identities or the expression 
of them, and the republican state had clear boundaries of ethnic 
belonging based on common ‘Turkishness’. During the republi-
can period, the Kurdish regions were militarised, the Kurdish lan-
guage prohibited, Kurdish cultural activities banned, Kurdish 
activists arrested and deported, and several Kurdish deputies were 
replaced (Natali 2005: 82–83). These drastic nation-state-building 
measures resulted in the ethnicisation of the political space, 
and subsequently to the growth of Kurdish national movements 
in the decades to follow. Atatürk’s harsh policies of secularising 
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Turkish society led to a construction of otherness that was 
based on both ethnicity and religion,15 and, consequently, some 
Kurdish nationalists resorted to forms of ethno-religious nation-
alism (ibid.).
As the 1970s were ushered in, the emergence of legal left-wing 
organisations affected the ‘leftisation’ of Kurdish identity, but, 
towards the end of the decade, Kurds started to move away from 
the Turkish leftist parties and join nationalist Kurdish groups, 
which became criminalised (Gunes & Zeydanlioǧlu 2014: 
1–6). The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is probably 
the best-known Kurdish political movement, was established 
in 1974. This brought more instability to the border regions as 
the state embarked on scorch-and-burn tactics that left Kurdish 
villages and populations seriously harmed (Human Rights 
Watch 1991).
Finally, the coup d’état in 1980 by Turkish military officers brought 
Turkish nationalists into power and closed the political space to 
opposition groups (Ergil 2007: 270). Denying the existence of 
its Kurdish population, the Turkish state went beyond refusing the 
Kurds their cultural and linguistic rights. For instance, General 
Kenan Evren famously stated after the military coup:
There is no such thing as Kurd. They are mountain Turks. It is a 
concept derived from the ‘kart-kurt- sounds coming out while 
our citizens in the southeast are walking on snow. That’s why they 
were referred with that name.
This was the backdrop for the mobilisation of Kurds in Turkey in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Gunes 2017). Also, the foundational philos-
ophy of the PKK was laid during the previous decade. In 1984 the 
bloody civil war started between the PKK and the Turkish state 
that has to date taken the lives of around 30,000 people (UCDP 
Conflict Encyclopedia16). The political space and Turkish nation-
alism were re-Islamised, thus providing more political space to 
Sunni communities. Nonetheless, the understanding of ‘Turkish-
ness’ still had its foundations in ethnic premises. For instance, 
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questions related to the Kurdish regions were discussed as the 
‘eastern problem’ and Kurds referred to as the ‘mountain Turks’. 
For instance, Welat Zeydanlıoğlu (2008, 2012) has argued that the 
Kemalist project aimed at linguistically and culturally ‘civilising’ 
and unifying the various minorities by decreasing the influence of 
religion and primordial identities. He aptly calls this the Turkish 
version of the ‘white man’s burden’. The suppression of the Kurdish 
language has played a key role in this process of ‘Turkification’ of 
those perceived as ‘backward, tribal Kurds’ (ibid.: Uçarlar 2009).
Kurdish identity had become salient in the wake of the govern-
ment’s refusal to grant the Kurds linguistic and cultural rights, 
while promoting their assimilation to the Turkish state and alto-
gether denying the existence of its Kurdish population. Written 
and spoken Kurdish was banned, and Kurdish cultural activities 
were prohibited as early as in 1924. The new constitution in 1982 
reinforced the ban on minority languages and prohibited giving 
one’s children Kurdish names. The ban on the Kurdish language 
was lifted in 1991, but on the same day the Anti-Terror Law (Law 
3713) was introduced. That law defined ‘terrorism’ rather vaguely, 
thereby allowing the prosecution of individuals who engaged in 
‘verbal and written propaganda [that] aims to destroy the national 
unity and the indivisibility of the Turkish Republic’ (Zeydanlıoğlu 
2012: 112). With this, alongside the penal code, which crimi-
nalises ‘the denigration of Turkishness’ (Article 301), both legal 
definitions were and continue to be employed against (Kurdish) 
politicians, journalists, authors, researchers and political activ-
ists (Freedomhouse 2008: 16–18). The Turkish state rhetoric con-
structed the ‘Kurdish question’ as a case of ‘terrorism’ in legalistic 
as well as in other official contexts, which still resonates today.
The end of the last millennium witnessed an event that would 
shape Kurdish–Turkish relations for years to come. In 1999, one of 
the founding members of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, was arrested 
by the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MİT) in Nairobi, 
Kenya. He had lived in Syria for almost 20 years till 1998, when 
the regime forced him out under the pressure it received from 
Turkey. Öcalan has ever since remained imprisoned on Imralı 
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island, near Istanbul. Following this, the PKK underwent a profound 
transformation in the 2000s. Their calls have shifted from estab-
lishing a state to demanding a non-state solution, and from engag-
ing in a military struggle towards emphasising a political solution 
to the decades-long civil war (Akkaya & Jongerden 2011: 2013). 
However, in recent years, the situation in Northern Kurdistan 
has deteriorated at the rupture of the fragile peace negotiations 
between the PKK and the Turkish state, as I will discuss later.
3.3.2 Kurds in Syria
Syria as a political entity came into existence as a result of the 
Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, when it was allocated to French rule. 
Historically, the Kurds in Syria have lived in the northern parts of 
the country, in the border region with Turkey and Iraq. However, 
they have been fragmented into three principal areas (Kurd Dagh, 
Kobane and Jazira), a characteristic that is still visible in the form 
of the three cantons that make up Rojava (Schøtt 2017). This has 
meant that different Kurdish areas within Syria have also to some 
extent experienced different minority policies by the Syrian state. 
Kurdish nationalism was shaped in terms of the creation of the 
Turkish state, for instance leading to the emergence of the Khoybun 
League in 1927, which consisted of Kurdish tribal leaders, sheiks 
and intellectuals (Tejel 2009) protesting the Kemalist rule. The 
border between Turkey and Syria was not yet officialised and 
following the Ararat revolt in 1930, led by Kurdish leaders 
and suppressed by the Turkish military, the Khoybun League 
turned towards linguistic and cultural activities (ibid.).
The Syrian Republic became independent in 1946, after the Sec-
ond World War. Soon after, the country ‘fell into a period of great 
political instability and was swung between martial and parlia-
mentary rule by successive coups’, as Allsopp notes (2015: 20). 
In the decades to come, Arab nationalism became the most 
influential ideology, particularly following the Arab–Israeli War 
in 1948, the Suez War in 1956 and the Cold War (Tejel 2009). 
The Kurdish nationalist movement grew again in the 1950s in 
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the Jazira region, and Kurdish parties started to be created. 
Amid the rising Kurdish nationalist movement in a political 
environment dominated by Arab nationalism, Damascus passed 
a governmental decree in 1962 that led around 20% of Syrian 
Kurds (mainly in Jazira) to lose their citizenship rights (Tejel 
2009: 50–51). Defined as aliens, they were deprived of their 
rights to education, marriage, property ownership and political 
participation. This also meant that their lands could be handed 
down to loyal Arabs (Schøtt 2017: 9).
The following year, in 1963, the Ba’athist party came to power 
through a coup d’état, one month after a similar coup in Iraq. After 
this, attempts to ‘Arabise’ the Kurdish population were intensi-
fied, with the interdictions to publish, teach or speak Kurdish in 
schools and workplaces. The regime also Arabised Kurdish 
place names, conducted arbitrary arrests on Kurdish figures and 
deleted references to Kurds in history books. Kurdish parties, 
which had grown out of the first one established in Syria, the 
Democratic Party of Kurds in Syria (DPKS) in 1957, had internal 
disagreements over whether the Kurds were a nation or a minor-
ity and on what attitude to adopt towards the regime (Allsopp 
2015: 84). This changed in the 1980s with the arrival of a new 
political player.
In the late 1970s, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party was established 
just on the other side of the border. After the 1980 coup d’état in 
Turkey, the PKK leadership was offered refuge in Syria, where 
one of its founding members, Abdullah Öcalan, had already 
been based since 1979. The party gained popular support among 
young Kurds in Syria (Allsopp 2015: 103), partially because the 
regime allowed the PKK to mobilise freely, the situation being 
the exact opposite for old parties. For instance, Tejel (2009: 104–
105) writes that ‘the PKK took over the cultural framing of the 
Syrian Kurds’ as they managed to politicise the expressions of 
the Kurdish culture, as long as their actions were directed towards 
Turkey. The PKK has significant presence over Kurdish culture 
in Syria, particularly in Kobane and Kurd Dagh (Allsopp 2015: 
103). The PKK’s presence in Syria ended in 1998 when it expelled 
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Öcalan out of the country. He was then arrested in Nairobi the 
following year.
3.3.3 Kurds in Iraq
The Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Allied Powers and the Ottoman 
government, separated Syria and Iraq from the Ottoman Empire 
(McDowall 1996: 13). Iraq was actually established by the British 
from three provinces (vilayets) – Basra, Baghdad and Mosul – putting 
the Kurdish popula tions in a state inhabited mainly by Arabic 
speakers. The treaty that was supposed to grant Kurdistan state-
hood after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire never actually 
materialised and was instead replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne 
in 1942. The British did give Kurdistan semi-legal political status, 
and the provisional 1921 Iraqi Constitution stated that two eth-
nic groups, the Arabs and the Kurds, constituted the state of Iraq 
(Natali 2005: 27). After 1925, the British attempted to unite the 
various Iraqi populations (Shi’a Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Sunni Kurds, 
Shi’a Kurds, Shi’a Persians, Jews, Turkomans and Christians) by 
constructing a national Iraqi identity based on secular values and 
a sense of unity. Formal British rule came to an end when Iraq 
gained quasi-independence from the British crown in 1932. In a 
similar way to Syria, Arab nationalism emerged, with the promo-
tion of ethnicised pan-Arab identity and Iraqi patriotism.
Most members of the Iraq Renaissance Socialist Party (Ba’athists) 
aligned themselves with the notion of ethnicised nationalism that 
diminished the political space for Kurds (Natali 2005: 34–36). 
From the 1950s onwards, there existed competing forms of Arab 
nationalism. The inclusion ary discourses of Iraqi identity that 
were based on the Arab–Kurd relationship provided Kurds with 
more political space to claim ethnocultural rights. However, 
in the midst of the Cold War and the fear of communists, Arab 
nationalists gained more power and began to plan new projects of 
assimilation and control of Kurdish populations. The Iraqi iden-
tity thereby became entirely ‘Arabised’, as in Syria. In 1963, the 
Ba’athists staged a coup and took power. Once firmly in place, 
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their policies were directed at Sunni-Arabising, militarising and 
Ba’athicising the state of Iraq. In tandem with the petrolisation 
of Iraq, the state elite began a project to ‘re-ethnicise’ the Kurdish 
regions through major population relocations of Arabic speakers. 
The Kurdish areas, which were rich in oil, most notably the city 
of Kirkuk, became subject to disputes that continue today (Yildiz 
2007: 17).
After 1980, Iraqi garrisons were transferred to the Iranian front, 
which allowed the Kurdish military forces (peshmerga), to gain 
influence in the region. In 1983, the Kurdish Democratic Party 
(KDP) – founded in 1946 and led by the Barzani family – allied 
with Teheran, which angered the then head of the Iraqi state, 
Saddam Hussein. This was followed by a swift operation by Iraqi 
troops to abduct between 5,000 and 8,000 men belonging to the 
Barzani tribe, who were never seen again. The situation of Kurds 
in the north of the country grew rapidly worse. Between 1987 
and 1988, Hassan al-Majid, Saddam Hussein’s cousin who later 
became known as ‘Chemical Ali’, organised systematic chemical 
attacks on Kurdish villages located in northern Iraq. These attacks 
were part of a campaign named the Anfal17 and included eight 
military offensives, physically destroying around 3,000 villages 
and killing approximately 150,000–180,000 people. More than 
180,000 people were left missing (Chaliand 1994; McDowall 1996: 
359; Middle East Watch 1993; Yildiz 2007: 25).
As the Middle East Watch report puts it, ‘the 1983 Barzani oper-
ation foreshadowed the techniques that would be used on a much 
larger scale during the Anfal campaign’ (Middle East Watch 1993: 
6–7). For instance, the first campaign, in February 1988, began 
with attacks on the headquarters of the other Kurdish party, the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the villages nearby. 
The massacre of Halabja is often referenced as a reaction of the Hus-
sein’s regime to the Kurdish peshmerga’s attempt to take control of 
the city in March 1988 (Middle East Watch 1993: 26–27). Hassan 
al-Majid organised systematic chemical attacks as well as forced 
deportations of Kurdish villages located in northern Iraq, acting 
on the command of his cousin, resulting in some 1.5 million Kurds 
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being ‘resettled’. The campaigns are said to have destroyed ‘the entire 
social and economic texture of the affected regions’ (Mlodoch 
2012: 213), with effects of the atrocities still visible today.
The Anfal campaigns took place in three consecutive phases, the 
last of which included a chemical attack on the city of Halabja in 
1988, where approximately 7,000–8,000 people perished in a single 
day (Middle East Watch 1993: 102–108). The most horrific event 
of the Anfal campaigns, Halabja became profoundly emblem-
atic in the collective memory of Kurds and an important memo-
rial site (Khayati 2008: 243). Local policymakers quickly placed 
Halabja in the centre of the framing of the Anfal campaigns as 
genocide. Immediately after the Halabja massacre, during a visit 
to the United States, Jalal Talabani (then the Iraqi Kurdish leader, 
who later became the president of Iraq), referred to Halabja to 
ground claims for Kurdish self-rule.18
After the Gulf War, in 1991, an autonomous safe haven and a no-fly 
zone was created in the north of Iraq by the coalition forces to 
protect the civilian population. A year later, the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) was founded with the first democratically 
elected parliament. Under pressure from the United States, the 
Iraqi government withdrew its political and military presence 
from the KRI. This allowed the regional government to establish 
a semi-autonomous Kurdish state in northern Iraq, although the 
economic and political situation has varied from more or less 
stable to at times quite volatile. I will further discuss the current 
situation in the KRI in the next sections.
3.3.4 Stateless and divided
As mentioned earlier, the Kurds have never had an officially rec-
ognised state. They are not the only ethnonational minority in the 
world to make claims for one – several others have voiced sepa-
ratist aspirations including the Tamils, Kashmiris, Sikhs, Tibetans 
and, more recently, Catalans and Scots, who also organised inde-
pendence referenda in 2017 and 2014, respectively. The Kurdish 
case is a bit more complex in the sense that the land area of 
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Kurdistan is divided into several nation-states and the claims for 
Kurdish rights, autonomy or independence differ in terms of the 
political organisation of Kurds in different countries as well as in 
their relation to the dominant political power in their respective 
states. Whereas we can say that the state of statelessness does bear 
an influence on Kurdish politics in Turkey, Syria and Iraq – as well 
as in the diaspora – the political claims concerning autonomy and 
independence are formulated quite differently.
For instance, the KRG in Iraqi Kurdistan clearly has separatist 
aspirations, as the 2017 independence referendum showed. How-
ever, this is not necessarily the case for the political leadership 
in Syrian Kurdistan, which has rejected a state-centred democ-
racy and nation-state model altogether. Over the last decades, the 
emphasis in Turkish Kurdistan has also shifted from demand-
ing independence towards an emphasis on cultural and linguis-
tic rights, and a certain level of regional autonomy. This means 
that it is not only the causes of ethnic separatism and whether it 
is successful that need to be understood in relation to geopoliti-
cal, socio-economic and historical-cultural conditions in specific 
nation-states but also the lack of such separatism in other parts 
of Kurdistan.
How this state of statelessness plays out in the case of Kurdish 
politics – as well as in diaspora politics – is, therefore, more complex 
than among other stateless ethnonational minorities. Kurdistan 
is currently divided across four nation-states with historically 
very different policies and approaches to their Kurdish minorities. 
Yet, simultaneously, the Kurdish issue, political parties and their 
historical developments in the region have been transnational and 
not only confined within the borders of these nation-states. For 
instance, Syrian Kurds have participated both in the Iraqi Kurdish 
military troops (peshmerga) in the 1970s and 1980s and in 
the PKK, operating in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s (Tejel 
2014: 73–76). The influence of the PKK in some Kurdish 
regions in Syria has been more significant than in others, and 
some Kurdish political sections in Syria are supported by Iraqi 
Kurdish parties.
The Kurdish Case 69
However, what is common is the fact that, across their respec-
tive states, the Kurds have been portrayed and constructed as the 
national ‘others’ in the context of nation-state-building processes 
of the 20th century. Emerging from the ruins of major empires, 
Turkey, Iraq and Syria adopted political projects of nationhood 
that shaped notions of citizenship and belonging for decades 
to come. These nationalist projects created different notions of 
exclusion and inclusion and consequently on several occasions 
constructed the Kurds as not only the ‘other’ but also ‘the national 
other’ that needed to be assimilated or even exterminated. As a 
result, the Kurdish minorities became objects of diverse assimi-
lation policies and even genocidal measures throughout the 
20th century.
Naturally, it would be simplistic to reduce the formation and 
development of Kurdish politics to a reaction towards national 
policies and minority treatment in these countries. But how 
Kurdish politics and agendas of different political factions are 
formulated in today’s Kurdistan do stem from the historical treat-
ment of Kurds in each nation-state. The development and emer-
gence of these Kurdish political movements and parties, and their 
claims-making towards greater self-determination, can – at least in 
part – be seen as a response to different state policies and emerg-
ing in specific political spaces. The Kurdish political divisions 
and constellations of the ‘homeland’, including mobilisations, are 
also reflected in the diaspora. I will next provide a brief overview 
of the current state of affairs in Kurdistan in the new millennium.
3.4 Kurdistan in the New Millennium
The year 2011 was a historical one in the Arab world. It witnessed 
a series of popular uprisings and protests that started late 2010 and 
spread from the North African countries to the Middle East. This 
series of events became known as ‘Arab Spring’, and it eventually 
reached Syria in March 2011. In the following years, the instability 
created by the Syrian civil war spilled over to Iraq and Turkey. It 
has particularly touched Kurdistan, which lies at the heart of these 
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geopolitical powers. The mounting violence in eastern Turkey 
since summer 2015 followed the collapse of the peace negotia-
tions between the PKK and the Turkish state. The expansion of 
ISIS to large land areas in Iraq and Syria threatened the Kurdish 
areas and both the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish troops engaged in 
combat with ISIS. More recently, in 2019, Turkey launched a 
cross-border operation against the Kurdish-led forces in Syria to 
invade Afrin, before Kurds agreed a deal with the Syrian govern-
ment.19 It is difficult to say what the political configuration and 
structuration of the region will look like in the next decade, but 
the first decades of this millennium were quite turbulent for the 
Kurdish regions in the Middle East and Turkey. Such ‘homeland’ 
events have also been reflected in Kurdish diaspora’s mobilisation 
and involvement towards the region.
3.4.1 The ‘forgotten Kurds’ of Syria  
in international spotlight
The Syrian Kurds have been referred to as the ‘forgotten Kurds’ as 
they have received little attention from the media and research-
ers (Gunter 2014; Tejel 2009), particularly compared to Kurds 
from Iraq and Turkey. The situation in Syrian Kurdistan drasti-
cally changed after the first decade of this millennium, when 
the Syrian civil war broke out in March 2011. Rapidly escalating 
after the regime arrested and tortured a group of teenagers in 
Deraa, protests quickly spread across Syrian cities, with young 
people calling for democratic reforms and regime change.
In the beginning, the Kurdish political parties remained somewhat 
divided on whether or not to voice support for anti-government 
protests. This was also sensed by the regime, who during spring 
2011 established citizenship rights for more than 100,000 Kurds, 
who had lost them as a result of the 1962 decree (Gunther 2014: 
2; Schøtt 2017). In October 2011, however, the Kurdish parties 
established the Kurdish National Council (KNC), sponsored by 
the KRI’s president, Massoud Barzani (Carnegie Middle East 
Center 201220). The KNC managed to unite most of the Syrian 
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Kurdish parties, but a few left the council, including the Demo-
cratic Union Party (PYD).
The PYD had been established in 2003. After the withdrawal of 
the Syrian government forces in 2012, it quickly filled the power 
vacuum and declared three Kurdish cantons located in the region 
of Rojava – Efrin, Ciziri and Kobane – autonomous. The tensions 
between the KNC and PYD grew rapidly, and in 2012 they formed 
the Kurdish Supreme Committee, which then became the ruling 
body in the Kurdish cantons in northern Syria. The following year, 
the PYD took over control and proclaimed the implementation of 
the ‘Social Contract of Rojava’ along the ideas of Abdullah Öcalan 
(Schøtt 2017). The Rojava model put forth a federal political sys-
tem with local, self-governed administrative units. Based on the 
idea of democratic confederalism developed by Öcalan, the model 
emphasised bottom-up democracy, active citizenship participa-
tion, and the equal representation of men and women (Colasanti 
et al. 2018). This also applied to the military organisation, which 
became a considerable asset for the PYD in securing control over 
the Kurdish regions (Knapp, Flach, & Ayboga 2016).
Kurdish military troops, namely the People’s Protections Units 
(Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) have operated as the security 
forces of Rojava since 2012. They have engaged in armed battle 
against ISIS in the outskirts of the de facto autonomous region 
of Rojava in northern Syria since 2013 (see Jongerden & Akkaya 
2013). The YPG is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK), although this relationship is 
often contested since the latter features on the EU’s and United 
States’ lists of terrorist organisations. For instance, the YPG 
received combatants from the ranks of the PKK after attacks on 
Kobane following the call by the jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah 
Öcalan, regardless of Turkish border control authorities aiming to 
block their access to northern Syria.
Currently, the YPG troops include an estimated 30,000–35,000 
combatants, of whom approximately 20–40% belong to the 
female battalion, Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (YPJ).21 The Women’s 
Protection Units have equally taken part in the armed conflict. 
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The Syrian civil war has been without doubt the war most widely 
covered by the international media in this millennium. While 
the gruesome acts committed by the ‘Islamic State’ (ISIS) have 
attracted considerable media coverage, there has simultaneously 
been a sharp increase in interest towards the Kurdish combatants 
and their armed battle. The Kurdish Protection Units, particu-
larly the female battalion, have enjoyed quite remarkable media 
visibility since the siege of Kobane. Numerous international 
media outlets, including the BBC, NBC News and CNN,22 as well 
as social media platforms, have provided a close-up perspective 
of the armed conflict by focusing on female combatants and their 
military action.
The current situation of Kurds in Syria stands in stark contrast 
to the situation in earlier decades. From the 1950s onwards, the 
Kurdish language and cultural rights were harshly repressed, in a 
similar way as in Turkey, and various bans and restrictions on lan-
guage, publications, teaching and political participation contin-
ued till the first decade of this millennium (Sheyholislami 2015). 
After 40 years of dictatorship and political marginalisation, the 
Kurds currently enjoy an unprecedented level of autonomy in 
northern Syria, although the continuity of their Rojava experi-
ment is far from being secure for years to come, as was shown 
by the military offensive launched by Turkey in 2019. Further-
more, the Kurds in northern Syria are hardly a united front. One 
internal division between the Kurds concerns that between the 
KNC and PYD. As Schøtt (2017: 17) formulates it,
The KNC is accusing the PYD of being lap dogs of the Assad 
regime, while the PYD is accusing the KNC of being a help-
less mouthpiece of the Barzani regime and, subsequently, in the 
pocket of Turkey.
Two major events have played in favour of the Syrian Kurds, which 
also made them a more visible actor in the ongoing conflict. The 
first was the retreat of the Syrian regime from the Kurdish areas, 
which left the area under the control of the PYD. The second was 
the emergence of ISIS, which to the Kurds’ fortune became the 
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common enemy for them and the international coalition (Schøtt 
2017). However, Turkey has been dead set against having a PYD-
led self-government on the other side of the border, as it considers 
PYD to be the Syrian branch of the PKK, a terrorist organisation 
that is illegal in the country. This has prompted Turkey to increase 
its involvement in the Syrian civil war. In 2015, it joined the inter-
national coalition in the fight against ISIS, but it seems that this 
was mostly with the aim of attacking the PKK and PYD in the 
border region and to stop the latter from acquiring the stretch of 
land along the Turkish–Syrian border. This was also considered to 
be the motivation behind the military offence against the Kurdish- 
led troops in 2019, when Turkey and Turkish-backed militias 
invaded the city of Afrin after American troops withdrew from 
the region. The animosity towards the Syrian Kurdish political 
leadership stems from the four-decade-long conflict between the 
PKK and the Turkish state, and from the idea that the PKK/PYD 
is possibly threatening the territorial integrity of the Turkish state 
as guaranteed by the almost-century-old Treaty of Lausanne.
3.4.2 End of the peace process and amounting  
state violence in eastern Turkey
In Turkey, the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state has 
lasted for almost four decades. The conflict developed from a low-
intensity war to a full-fledged one in the 1990s. According to the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, it has resulted in almost 30,000 
deaths and numerous forced disappearances. The 1990s were defi-
nitely the bloodiest years of the conflict, until the PKK called a 
unilateral ceasefire in 1999. The first decade of the millennium 
witnessed a relatively peaceful period in Kurdish–Turkish rela-
tions, especially compared to the previous decade.
After the decades-long conflict between the PKK and the Turkish 
state, the Turkish–Kurdish reconciliation process started with the 
‘democratic opening’ and secret negotiations in Oslo in 2009. In 
2009, then Prime Minister, now President, Erdoğan, launched 
what was soon named the ‘Kurdish opening’, in other words 
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an approach to end the decades-long conflict. As fragile as the 
peace process was, the negotiations were effectively pursued till 
2013. The Kobane siege also became visible on the Turkish side 
of the border, as thousands of people took to the streets to protest 
the siege in an international day of solidarity for Kobane in 
February 2015. The demonstrations were called by the pro-Kurdish 
party Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP).23 Indeed, Ciordia (2018) 
suggests that the Kobane siege and the victory by Syrian Kurds 
over ISIS could be considered a ‘transformative moment’ in the 
recent development of the Kurdish–Turkish conflict in Turkey.
The fragile peace negotiations finally collapsed in June 2015. 
Subsequently, both sides resumed the armed conflict and the 
escalating violence spread to the country’s political sphere. 
The imposition of curfews on Kurdish cities, state-inflicted vio-
lence and the arbitrary arrests of Kurds, and court sentences under 
the premises of antiterrorism legislation have become frequent 
from 2015 onwards. Simultaneously, the situation for Kurdish 
journalists, academics and political activists, but not limited to 
them, has turned more precarious again in recent years.24 In com-
parison to the 1990s, the methods and dynamics of the conflict 
differ drastically from those previously between the state and the 
PKK. The Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H), 
the youth branch of the PKK, declared a ‘people’s revolutionary war’ 
against the Turkish military forces and took upon itself the role of 
a paramilitary force in several Kurdish neighbourhoods (Cizre, 
Şırnak, Sur and so forth) in south-eastern Turkey. This irregularly 
armed group constructed trenches and barricades in cities, along-
side armed checkpoints and patrols, whereas the state imposed a 
number of curfews on the Kurdish neighbourhoods, thus bring-
ing the conflict to an urban context. The civilian populations were 
trapped in local neighbourhoods under curfews that become the 
central scene of this renewed armed dispute (Yanmis 2016).
In March 2017, the UN Human Rights Office published a report 
depicting how this armed dispute and state violence had led to the 
destruction of urban infrastructure, sporadic killings and serious 
human rights violations unforeseen in the post-1990s period in 
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Turkey. It concluded that, between July 2015 and December 2016, 
more than 30 towns had been affected by the curfews and violent 
clashes, and that between 335,000 and half a million people had 
been displaced in south-eastern Turkey.
Alongside academics, the crackdown on journalists, public fig-
ures, politicians or anyone voicing criticism and dissent towards 
the government measures has been intensifying (Tekdemir, 
Toivanen, & Baser 2018). The putsch in the summer of 2016 
provided grounds for widescale purges of military personnel, 
politicians, journalists, academics and others who were deemed a 
threat to national security under the declared state of emergency. 
For instance, a number of Kurdish MPs together with both co-
leaders of the pro-Kurdish HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen 
Yüksekdağ, were arrested in late 2016 and the elected Kurd-
ish municipality leaders belonging to the HDP or pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Regions Party (DBP) were replaced by decree of the 
Interior Ministry on the grounds that they allegedly provided sup-
port for ‘terrorism’.
The current situation stands in stark contrast to the beginning 
of the decade, when the country experienced a rather open politi-
cal atmosphere for peace negotiations until the conflict resumed 
in 2015. For instance, the pro-Kurdish and pro-minority People’s 
Democratic Party (HDP) managed to bypass the 10% election 
threshold in the 2015 general elections to have representatives in 
the National Grand Assembly (Çiçek 2017). Between 2013 and 
2015 it took part in peace negotiations with the Turkish govern-
ment on behalf of the PKK. However, there is now growing 
evidence of the undemocratic direction the country is steering 
towards and of the eventuality of the peace process fading further 
away (Baser & Özturk 2017).
3.4.3 The failing Iraqi state leading  
to Kurdish independence?
Iraqi Kurdish society looks drastically different from how it did in 
the 1990s. The Kurds in Iraq have had a semi-autonomous region 
76 The Kobane Generation
ruled by the Kurdish Regional Government since 1992. The 
opportunities for Iraqi Kurds further expanded in the aftermath 
of Saddam Hussein’s defeat in 2003 by Anglo-American forces. 
These developments have encouraged the development of more 
localised and territorial Kurdish identity, separate from Baghdad 
(Bengio 2005: 176–179). Since 2003, the region has witnessed 
unprecedented societal stability and economic wealth, partially 
in the form of foreign investment. The 2005 constitution paved 
the way for guaranteed federalism for Iraqi Kurdistan and the fol-
lowing year the two main competing parties, the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), 
signed an accord to reunify the Kurdish provinces under one 
administration (Mohammed 2016). This was also historical in the 
sense that the KDP and PUK had not been on good terms and in 
the 1990s even engaged in a civil war (Yildiz 2007: 28–49).
Overall, compared to the rest of Iraq, the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq (KRI) has been politically stable and relatively prosperous. 
Ever since 1991, the Kurds in Iraq have had administrative control 
of their area’s language education and today the language is used 
widely across the administration, education and other sectors of 
society. Prior to that, all education was given in Arabic (Skutnabb-
Kangas & Fernandes 2008: 50). As Hautaniemi and colleagues 
(2013: 81) observe, the last decade has seen ‘Kurdish society 
[transform] extremely rapidly from a largely agrarian-based, 
highly regulated, and state-owned economy to a market economy’. 
For instance, the burgeoning autonomous region of Iraqi Kurd-
istan has recently attracted foreign, mainly Turkish, investment 
and made progress in several sectors of society, although devel-
opments in civil society have only occurred slowly (see Gunter 
2007). Since 2008, economic and diplomatic relations between the 
KRG and the Turkish state have become closer, attracting criti-
cism particularly from the Kurds in Syria and Turkey.
Also, the disputes between the parties continue to simmer. The 
political divisions that cut through the region are quite tangible, 
and the political landscape was slightly diversified as a result of 
the Gorran (Movement for Change), which emerged in 2010 and 
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challenged the dominant position of the two political parties. The 
political divisions in Iraqi Kurdistan have long been character-
ised by divisions between the KDP, headed by Massoud Barzani, 
the current president of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the PUK, headed 
by Jalal Talabani, who was the president of Iraq till he passed 
away in 2017. More recently, however, the neoliberal transfor-
mation of the Iraqi Kurdish economy and the related investment 
boom have been weakened by the endemic corruption and the 
war against ISIS. Also, relations with the Baghdad government 
remain fragile, especially after the independence referendum 
in 2017.
Indeed, in spring 2014, the war being waged in Syria was start-
ing to show spillover effects on Iraq, particularly with the takeover 
of Iraqi cities by ISIS. Also, in November 2014, some 150 Iraqi 
Kurdish peshmerga fighters joined the Syrian Kurdish troops to 
fend off attempts by ISIS to seize Kobane.25 The rise of ISIS shook 
the societal stability of the de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq, 
but also provided the KRG with an opportunity to push forward 
claims for independence. The KRI has clearly been in the process 
of nation-building after a long period of experiencing contested 
sovereignty (Mohammed 2016). Not only does it have a national 
anthem and a Kurdish-speaking majority with a common history; 
it has also managed to gain significant autonomy from the central 
government. Despite the ongoing crises and the permanent state 
of emergency in the region, the battle against ISIS and conflicts 
with the central government of Iraq, the commitment of the KRG 
to nation-building has not diminished.
The eventuality of an independent Kurdish state since the dec-
laration of the de facto Kurdish state in 1991 seems to never have 
been as topical as it is now, with the failing state of Iraq (Bengio 
2012; Aziz 2011; Leezenberg 2005). The KRG held a referen-
dum for independence in September 2017, evoking reactions 
from its neighbours Turkey, Iran and Syria, as well as from the 
central Iraqi government. This will surely affect the KRG’s politi-
cal and economic situation in the long run, as independence 
claims might destabilise even further the political dynamics 
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in the region (Kaya & Whiting 2017). The current situation of 
Iraqi Kurdistan still presents challenges, particularly due to the 
regional pressures and cross-border activities of the PKK, radical 
Islamic parties, Iranian Kurdistan opposition groups and because 
Kurdish nationalism in Iraqi Kurdistan seems to be dictated by 
two identities and parties in power (the KDP and PUK) (Bengio 
2012: 179–181).
3.5 Kurdish Nationalism(s) in the 21st Century
This chapter has offered a contextualisation with respect to how 
the Kurdish minorities have been positioned within individual 
nation-states and how Kurdish identities, nationalism and politics 
have been shaped differently within the political spaces of Turkey, 
Iraq and Syria. However, several elements of commonality in 
understandings of Kurdish identities and nationalism remain. 
Vali (1998: 82) has convincingly argued that Kurdish national-
ism is strongly rooted in the ‘dialectic of denial and resistance’ – 
in other words, in opposing the denial of Kurdish identities and 
resisting the dominant national identities in the nation-states in 
which Kurdish minorities reside. Such national identities have at 
times been drawn from religious and/or ethnic premises, depend-
ing on the political spaces and notions of inclusion and exclusion 
in the respective states.
On the other hand, Kurdish nationalism in the region has not 
developed and taken shape in a vacuum, but it has been affected 
by political developments and significant events concerning the 
Kurdish populations taking place in neighbouring countries 
(Barkey & Fuller 1998: 49–53; White 2000: 129–134). It has been 
suggested that the Kobane siege and the victory over ISIS that fol-
lowed represented a ‘transformative event’ not only in terms of the 
recent development of the Kurdish–Turkish conflict in Turkey but 
also ‘in the evolution of the Kurdish movement’s collective action 
frames’ (Ciordia 2018: 774). Ciordia (2018: 777) speaks of trans-
formative events that can lead to cross-national diffusion, mean-
ing that ‘material and organizational tools, demands or episodes 
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of collective action’ but also ‘symbolic elements such as collective 
identities, solidarity networks, values and ideological or cogni-
tive frames’ become diffused across borders (see Della Porta & 
Diani 2006: 186–188). This was particularly visible on the side of 
Turkey, how the Kobane siege triggered mobilisations and affected 
the dynamics of the Kurdish–Turkish conflict.
We can say that the Kobane siege and the Syrian Kurds’ combat 
against ISIS constituted transformative events that changed the 
manifestations of Kurdish nationalism in the Kurdish territories. 
For instance, Gourlay (2018) analyses the surge of pan-Kurdish 
solidarity in Turkey following the Kurds’ combat against ISIS, sug-
gesting that Kurdayetî, pan-Kurdish identity and solidarity, has 
grown significantly in the Kurdish regions in Turkey, Syria and 
Iraq via Kurdish communities’ cooperation to fight ISIS. Thus, the 
current manifestations of Kurdish nationalism(s) in the Kurdish 
territories and in states with significant Kurdish communities 
reflect the transnational constellations of the Kurdish demograph-
ics, identities and politics.
What about the diaspora, then? The political events taking place 
in Kurdistan and how the local politics in different Kurdish regions 
look today inform Kurdish diaspora communities’ participation 
and motivations to take part in homeland affairs. This is also the 
case with Kurdish nationalism(s) and Kurdish identities as they 
play out in the Kurdish territories, although the development of 
Kurdish nationalism(s) and identities in the diaspora context are 
not – and should not be considered – an exact reflection of those 
in Kurdistan. ‘Kurdish national identity’ in Kurdistan has been 
said to be based on living in a common territory – in other words, 
Kurdish national identity draws from a ‘sense of place’ and ‘home-
land’ rather than from a ‘sense of tribe and blood’ (Aziz 2011: 
45–46). The state of exile and displacement – whether it is forced or 
voluntary – is bound to affect the notions of Kurdish identity and 
‘homeland’. Sometimes, the nationalist feelings can even become 
more accentuated in diaspora after exile from the ‘homeland’. 
In the case of Kurds, the large-scale displacement of Kurds and 
the formation of diaspora communities have created conditions 
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for the spread of Kurdish nationalism, of whatever sort(s), and 
shaped the ways in which ‘Kurdishness’ and Kurdish identities 
are understood (see Alinia 2004; Eliassi 2010; Khayati 2008). 
Indeed, van Bruinessen (2000) has examined the relationship 
between exile and Kurdish nationalism and stated that ‘it was exile 
that transformed Kurdistan from a vaguely defined geographical 
entity into a political idea’.
The more recent political dynamics and ‘transformative events’ 
are also shaping how Kurdish identities in the diaspora take 
shape, as later discussed. The argument that I will develop further 
in the analysis chapters is that the Kobane siege allowed, albeit 
only momentarily, to overcome the pluralities and divisions that 
exist within the Kurdish diaspora communities. This included ref-
erences to common Kurdish identity, Kurdayetî, following similar 
dynamics to those observed by Gourlay (2018). How this political 
idea has further developed and how it motivates both the Kurdish 
diaspora’s mobilisation and ‘homeland’ participation will be 
the focus in the following chapter. It provides an overview of the 
Kurdish diaspora formation, particularly focusing on the case of 
France. It also discusses how, in addition to ‘homeland’ events, 
the experiences of displacement and the state of exile, host society 
experiences, and transnational connections, mobilities, ties and 
attachments towards ‘homeland’ all shape what forms diaspora 
mobilisation and participation towards the ancestral ‘homeland’ 
take. The analysis chapters that follow thereafter will then dis-
cuss how Kurdish nationalism(s) and identities are changing in 
the 2010s as a result of ‘transformative events’, including the siege 
of Kobane.
CHAPTER 4
How the Kurdish Diaspora(s) Came to Be
4.1 Introduction
Migration from countries in the Middle East to Europe is neither a 
new nor an isolated phenomenon but closely linked to economic, 
political and social transformations that took place across the 
world in the 20th century and hence to processes of global inte-
gration. Whereas 19th-century international migration was fairly 
uncontrolled and unregulated by any legislation, and characterised 
by mass migrations from Europe to North and South America, 
the beginning of the 20th century witnessed the introduction of 
legislative measures curtailing migrants’ free movement. In the 
early post-Second World War period, offering asylum became a 
way to address labour shortages and to help recovering economies 
in Western Europe, and this practice gradually evolved into migra-
tion policies that aimed to actively recruit migrants from devel-
oping countries. Therefore, international migration to Western 
Europe took place within the framework of labour migration till 
the 1970s, when in response to the worsening economic situation, 
particularly after the oil crisis in 1973, immigration became more 
restricted. Also, as a consequence of political turmoil, the number 
of political asylum-seekers and refugees globally increased more 
than tenfold towards the end of the century: in the period between 
1975 and 1995, the number of refugees rose from 2.4 million to 27 
million (Castles, de Haas, & Miller 2014; Schindlmayr 2003: 116).
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The scope and the intensity of migration from Turkey, Lebanon, 
Iraq, Iran and Palestine and more recently from Syria towards 
Europe have also been tightly linked with the societal, economic 
and political developments taking place within these countries. 
Therefore, the formation of Middle Eastern diasporas in Europe 
have come together as something of an amalgam of more vol-
untary, labour-induced migration and of involuntary conflict-
generated, forced migration, depending also on the receiving 
countries’ migration regimes. The formation of Middle Eastern 
diaspora communities has been shaped not only by the political 
and societal changes in the ancestral homeland but also by the 
conditions in the societies of settlement, including the humani-
tarian and labour policies installed at the time of migration. Fur-
thermore, the formation of diaspora communities has also been 
shaped by different integration regimes, institutional structures 
and discursive practices in the receiving society. In other words, 
how the newcomers have been received, how they have been able 
to establish associations and to maintain contacts and ties to their 
closest circles back home, and what institutional measures con-
cerning education, work, accommodation and so forth have been 
in place upon arrival have all affected the formation of Middle 
Eastern diaspora communities in Europe (Baser & Halperin 2019; 
Baser & Toivanen 2018a).
The formation of Kurdish diaspora communities across Europe 
(and beyond), and more specifically in France, is no exception to 
this. In this chapter, I wish to examine, however briefly, the char-
acteristics of the formation of the Kurdish diaspora communities 
in Europe, before moving to discuss it in more detail in France. 
The formation of Kurdish diaspora communities in France does 
have several specificities that are due not only to differing insti-
tutional or political contexts but also to different constellations 
of Kurdish migration. However, at the same time the formation of 
Kurdish diaspora communities in the latter part of the 20th cen-
tury is inscribed into larger economic migrations from the region, 
but also into experiences of forced migration, dispersal, exile and, 
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specifically in the Kurdish case, statelessness. It is imperative to 
discuss these dimensions if we are to understand the life trajec-
tories and experiences of Kurdish diaspora members. For this 
reason, I have employed narrative accounts of Kurdish migrants 
and their descendants to show how individual life stories intersect 
with major historical events.
4.2 The Dispersal and Exile
Interviewee: So I was born in 1977 in Kurdistan and completed 
my studies in journalism there. I worked for a TV channel,  
but then I was discussing Kurdish history in a live show and  
I was put aside and forced to quit the job before the channel  
had any troubles. So, I arrived in France in 2002 and started 
study ing French.
MT: Is that the reason you came to France?
Interviewee: In part, yes. When you talk about France, you talk 
about democracy. There are many things to criticize about France, 




So, my father was born in Erzerum, a Kurd from Turkey. He went 
to high school, then to university, and had to complete the man-
datory military service. After three years of university studies, he 
was forced to leave the country following the oppression of the 
80s. So he arrived in Europe, through Greece, then via southern 
France to Germany, before landing in Brittany and later in Paris 
with fellow comrades. He barely had anything, and he had to 
work hard and learn French. He is resourceful, so it was fine. He 
opened his business at the age of 30, so when he arrived he was 
about my age, a bit over 20 years old … He adopted well to the 
French way of life, and he met my mother here.
Berivan
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Azad belongs to the first generation, as he arrived in France at an 
adult age. He tells of the difficulties he experienced in his profes-
sion in Turkey, due to the sensitivity of the Kurdish issue, and of 
the reasons for migrating to France. At the time of the interview, 
he was working in the construction business, contrary to his edu-
cation in journalism. Berivan, on the other hand, belongs to the 
so-called second generation. She recounts her father’s motivations 
to leave Turkey in the 1980s and how he ended up leaving the 
country and moving to France. Both accounts offer an example of 
the challenges of sorting individual life stories into neat catego-
ries, classifications or types of migration. For instance, whereas 
on the basis of Berivan’s account her father’s migration would 
more traditionally be considered and interpreted as an example of 
labour migration from Turkey to France (regardless of the under-
lying political reasons), Azad’s migration story would fall into the 
frame of politically motivated migration from Turkey to France.
However, what was common to both of the stories was the very 
human desire of Azad and Berivan’s father to find both financial 
and societal security, and eventually the possibility to provide for 
a better life for themselves and their offspring. This, one might 
argue, is a commonality shared by a large majority of people on 
the move, and for people permanently settled in one place, for that 
matter. But what also makes both stories similar was how these 
two individuals recounted the feelings of injustice towards what 
was considered historical wrongdoing by the Turkish state against 
the Kurds, which then led to an exile from Kurdistan. For both, 
this was counted as part of their life story, a reason why they lived 
at that particular moment in France. One could also notice some 
resemblance in how Azad and Berivan described their experi-
ences and daily lives in the Kurdish diaspora community. To put 
this in theoretical jargon, their lived experiences could be char-
acterised as transnational and inscribed in the Kurdish diaspora 
space, where references to understandings of ‘Kurdishness’ and to 
Kurdistan as the ‘homeland’ were frequent. In that way, the his-
torical dispersal and migration of Kurds, and even exile, consti-
tuted integral parts of their life stories and how they made sense of 
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their current lives. However, Azad had directly experienced dis-
placement himself, unlike Berivan, for whom it was a ‘transmitted 
experience’ in the sense that it had become part of how she nar-
rated on her life and on the reasons she was born in France and 
not in Kurdistan. I will discuss such generational differences in 
more detail later.
So, let us now move to the historical events that shaped the for-
mation of Kurdish diaspora communities in Europe in the lat-
ter part of the 20th century.26 The literature teaches us that two 
major developments led to the resettlement of Kurds in diaspora 
communities around the globe in the 20th century (Hassan-
pour & Mojab 2005: 218). The first has been traced back to the 
economic boom witnessed by Western Europe since the 1960s. 
For instance, the guest worker programmes initiated between 
Germany and Turkey attracted a great number of Kurdish 
migrants from Turkey, who settled mainly in Germany but also 
on a smaller scale in Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, France 
and Sweden. This meant that, by the 1990s, the largest Kurdish 
population in Europe lived in Germany, accounting for roughly 
half a million Kurds, most of whom had migrated from Turkey 
(ibid.). This pattern of labour migration started to shift towards 
the end of the century, as migration policies focalising on bringing 
in foreign labour became more restricted and complemented to 
some extent by policies opening venues for migration on the basis 
of humanitarian reasons. In other words, the general patterns of 
Kurdish migration to Europe follow those in international migra-
tion to the continent.
Secondly, the unstable political situation in the Kurdistan 
region was a major factor that led to the formation of Kurdish 
diaspora communities across Europe, including also in the north-
ern parts of Europe. Various state policies, including assimilation 
measures constituting part of the nation-state-building strate-
gies as described in Chapter 3, led to increased tensions between 
the Kurdish populations and the state in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and 
Syria. Armed conflicts between the Kurdish factions and the state 
that occasionally involved international forces were a frequent 
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characteristic of the interethnic relations in Iraq (1961–2003), 
Iran (1967–1968 and 1979 to today), and Turkey (1984 to the pre-
sent) (Hassanpour & Mojab 2005: 218). Although there had been 
a few Kurdish scholars, journalists and nobility living in Europe 
in the early 20th century (some in exilic conditions too), the new 
Kurdish diasporas in the latter part of the century emerged in the 
context of armed conflict, state oppression and coercive assimila-
tion measures (ibid.).
To make matters a bit more complex, there were not only 
regional differences as to the dispersal of Kurds from the Kurdish 
heartlands but also variations in migration waves, particularly in 
the case of forced migration, traceable to different political distur-
bances. For instance, in the case of Iraq, the forced displacement 
since the 1970s has taken place in several stages. One of the major 
waves occurred in the aftermath of the Gulf War (1990–1991) and 
after the Kurdish uprising in 1991. Although it was encouraged by 
the United States and its allies, the Kurdish uprising was not mili-
tarily backed by the international forces and it was quickly crushed 
by Saddam Hussein’s forces. The end result was 20,000 being killed 
and a vast mass migration towards Turkey and Iran taking place, 
with a total of a million people on the move (McDowall 1996: 372; 
Yildiz 2007: 36). Also, many people fled to the mountains, in a sad 
echo of the well-known Kurdish saying ‘Kurds have no friends but 
the mountains’. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR) has described this as the ‘highest rate of influx’ in 
the 40-year history of that office (Yildiz 2007: 36–37).
This was followed by further forced displacement of Kurds in 
the course of the 1990s due to political instabilities in the region 
(Hassanpour & Mojab 2005: 217–219; Human Rights Watch 
2004). For instance, the 1994–1997 civil war between the Kurdish 
parties in Iraq created instability, and by the late 1990s thousands 
of refugees from Iraqi Kurdistan had migrated to the neighbour-
ing countries and Europe (McDowall 1996: 372–373, 387–388). 
Furthermore, when looking at particular political events, one can 
see that the Kurdish migration towards Europe was fuelled by the 
Iraqi state’s deliberate destruction of thousands of Kurdish villages 
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between 1975 and 1991. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
these included the notorious Anfal campaigns, with gas bombings 
specifically targeting Kurdish villages.
In those years, numerous families left Iraqi Kurdistan for Turkey 
and later, after having lived there for some years, received asy-
lum in European countries. The internal displacement of Kurds in 
Iraq but also in Iran led to migration trajectories of Kurdish refu-
gees passing through Turkey, Jordan and other countries before 
some of the families ended up migrating, most often via Turkey, to 
Europe. Migration trajectories often passed through several coun-
tries, even across Kurdish regions situated in different nation-
states. For instance, after 1979 the armed conflict between the 
Kurds and the Iranian state sent flows of migrants from Iranian 
Kurdistan to Iraq: between 1979 and the 1990s, several thousand 
Iranian Kurds and members of Iranian Kurdish political groups 
were fleeing the Iranian government and heading for Iraq, includ-
ing to Iraqi Kurdistan. Some also settled in the Al-Tash refugee 
camp, in Al-Rumadi, a town next to the Iraqi–Jordanian border. 
After spending several years in the camp, some families were relo-
cated to northern European countries by means of the UNHCR 
settlement measures (see Khayati 2008: 215).
Turkey played a role as both a transition country and a coun-
try of departure in Kurdish migration. Besides Iraqi and Iranian 
Kurds who passed through Turkey to Europe in the late 1980s, 
there was an increase in the number of Kurds migrating from 
Turkey to Europe. This was partially due to the violent conflict 
between the PKK and the Turkish state, as set out in the previous 
chapter. Furthermore, the state’s so-called ‘forced urbanisa tion’ 
programmes implemented in eastern Turkey destroyed thousands 
of Kurdish villages and consequently led to forced displacement. 
Estimates of the internally displaced populations vary, depending 
on the source. The number of internal displacements of individu-
als resulting from ‘terrorism’ and from conflict-induced displace-
ment alongside forced urbanisation amounts to between 353,000 
(by government authorities’ estimates) and 2.5 to 3 million 
(according to various NGOs).27 It has been said that eastern Turkey, 
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which is inhabited mainly by Kurdish populations, became a 
sort of concentration camp by the late 1980s, ‘where every citizen 
[was] treated as a suspect and where oppression, torture and insult 
by the military [were] the rule rather than the exception’ (van 
Bruinessen 198828). In practice, for the local populations this 
meant living at a pressure point between the PKK and the state 
in their ongoing fights and also in fear of arbitrary abduction, 
imprisonment, killing or other violent methods to settle the 
so-called ‘eastern issue’ (Zeydanlıoğlu 2009).
Indeed, thousands of people went missing in the 1990s and 
2000s in police custody in eastern Turkey, with some still remain-
ing unfound. Between 1994 and 2003, there were 800–900 cases 
reported of enforced disappearances in Turkey (Human Rights 
Watch 2012).29 Since 2009, excavation of mass graves has been 
under way in eastern Turkey, with the purpose of locating some 
of the individuals who went missing in the 1980s and 1990s.30 
Since 1995, some family members of the missing persons have 
gathered in Istanbul for a silent protest of the fate of their rela-
tives. This protest movement, called Saturday Mothers (Cumar-
tesi anneleri in Turkish), displays mostly female family members 
holding pictures of their missing relatives (Ayyildiz 2007: 333–
334). I witnessed and attended one such event, organised in Paris 
in 2016.31
Not only have such political developments and upheavals pro-
foundly transformed the Kurdish societies and led to mass migra-
tion of Kurds within the Middle East and beyond. They also 
resonate in the diaspora and in its members’ understandings of 
Kurdistan and ‘Kurdishness’. And not surprisingly so since the for-
mation of the Kurdish diaspora across the world can be traceable, 
at least to some extent, back to nationalist policies and majority– 
minority relations discussed in the previous chapter. There, I 
raised two dimensions in particular, the ‘state of statelessness’ and 
the division of Kurdish lands dating back to the early 20th century 
as things that even today continue to shape the Kurdish politics, as 
well as the meaning-making processes regarding Kurdish identi-
ties and understandings of home(land).
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These dimensions are also relevant in understanding the for-
mation of the Kurdish diaspora communities outside Kurdistan. 
Firstly, Kurdish migration from the region needs to be understood 
not only as the coming together of a different set of economic, 
social and political circumstances in the sending region at the time 
of migration but also against the historical context of the divided 
and stateless Kurdistan, which events have led to it and how that 
has led to the formation of Kurdish diaspora communities around 
the globe. In other words, the ‘fifth part’ of Kurdistan, referring to 
the Kurdish diaspora, could look quite different today if the other 
‘four parts’, in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria, did not exist.
Secondly, the state of statelessness, division of Kurdish lands, 
and, relatedly, the dispersal and exile have all informed the for-
mation of transnational Kurdish diaspora communities and, with 
it, also the formation of the Kurdish diaspora space, in the sense 
of transnational social space as discussed in Chapter 2. How 
Kurdistan is being referenced, what understandings Kurdish 
identities entail, and how this ‘transnation’ maintains and fos-
ters cross-border networks, affiliations and ties relates closely to 
how diaspora members make sense of their personal stories and 
experiences. As relevant as it is to understand the current state 
ramifications of this division and statelessness from a historical 
perspective, it is equally important to see how individual stories 
are situated within and draw from collective memories, histo-
ries, narratives and experiences of exile and statelessness. Indeed, 
the transnational space of Kurdish diaspora communities shows 
particular dynamics in terms of exile and the sense of ‘otherness’ 
that continue to be informed by the ongoing situation of Kurdish 
minorities in the Kurdistan region as well as ingrained into the 
collective memory of the past.
4.2.1 The Kurdish diaspora(s) in numbers
What is the size of the Kurdish diaspora outside the region of 
Kurdistan? The question is as difficult to answer in detail as it 
was to estimate the total number of Kurds living in the Kurdistan 
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region in Chapter 3. There are several reasons for this, some 
more generally applicable to diaspora groups dispersed in sev-
eral nation-states, and others more specifically touching upon the 
Kurdish communities.
Collecting information from several different sources that have 
aimed to pinpoint the number of Kurds living in Europe, the 
estimates move around 1.7 million and 1.943 million individu-
als (Kurdish Institute32). It is considered that the great majority of 
this number is Kurds from Turkey who are residing in Germany – 
some estimates going up to 85% (European Commission 2006; 
Institut kurde de Paris;33 Wahlbeck 2019). Furthermore, there 
are sizeable Kurdish populations in France, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, ranging from some 
100,000 Kurds in Sweden to over 200,000 Kurds in France. The 
formation of the Kurdish diaspora community in France is dis-
cussed in more detailed in the following section.
Firstly, it is difficult to cite accurate figures with respect to the 
numbers of Kurds living in Europe, because data-collection pro-
cedures differ between national censuses. The number of Kurds 
cannot be listed solely based on the country of origin or by citi-
zenship statistics, as the first-generation Kurds in the diaspora can 
be citizens of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, or even non-citizens in 
some cases. This is less true for other diaspora groups, although 
the issue is not that clear cut for all. For instance, in Germany, the 
statistics are collected on the basis of citizenship or the country of 
birth, for which reason Kurdish-speaking migrants with Turkish 
citizenship tend to be invisible in the official figures and regis-
tered as Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian or Syrian citizens. This also seems 
to be the case in several other countries that collect population 
data related to such variables as citizenship and country of birth 
instead of ethnicity or language. There, too, individuals with a 
Kurdish background are invisible in the statistics. Furthermore, 
it is likely that thousands of undocumented Kurdish migrants not 
visible in national statistics reside in Europe (Baser 2011: 8). On 
the other hand, language-based statistics would be one way to col-
lect data on different ethnic groups, but this is not done in most 
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European countries, with a few exceptions. Then again, this would 
not necessarily allow factoring in the second-generation members 
or their offspring, who are not Kurdish speakers but might still 
identify themselves as ‘Kurdish’, at least to some extent.
This moves us to the second issue. Even if we were able to provide 
accurate estimates of the Kurdish populations outside the Kurdish 
regions, how would we draw the criteria for a diaspora and who 
is considered to belong to it? For instance, the city that hosts the 
largest Kurdish population outside the realms of Kurdistan is 
Istanbul in Turkey. Owing to internal migration of Kurds from the 
eastern parts of the country starting from the late 1980s till 
the 1990s, it has been estimated that the city hosts approximately 
three million Kurds,34 depending on the definitions used (Houston 
2005). This comes back to the question raised in Chapter 3 
as to who the Kurds are and how to provide accurate figures of 
Kurdish populations scattered across four nation-states. It also 
touches upon the theoretical question raised in the previous chap-
ter, as to what actually constitutes a diaspora: which different com-
munities or individuals belong to it and which do not. It is a valid 
question as it allows us to ponder to what extent we can consider 
Kurdish communities that are exiled from the region of Kurdis-
tan, yet not necessarily internationally displaced, a diaspora. And 
do the internally displaced communities constitute diaspora com-
munities that are radically different from internationally displaced 
communities? Both questions – the one concerning the accurate 
number of Kurds in Kurdistan and the other on internally dis-
placed diasporas – however relevant to reflect upon, remain nev-
ertheless outside the focus of this particular study.
Regardless, I reference them briefly here to discuss the need 
to be wary of how information is gathered and used on different 
‘ethnic’ and language groups. Producing research knowledge, for 
instance in the form of gathering statistics, not only continues to 
be shaped and structured according to a nation-state-centred logic 
(Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002) but it can also reflect the histori-
cally uneven power relations. In other words, knowledge can be 
selectively employed by those in power to justify governance and 
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maintenance of power hierarchies. In this sense, knowledge pro-
duction is in many ways linked to power, control and recognition, 
concerning Kurdish populations not only in the Kurdish regions 
(see Toivanen & Baser 2018) but also in the receiving societies 
(Pratsinakis 2017). Therefore, when discussing numbers concern-
ing Kurdish populations, they should be taken with a pinch of salt.
4.3 Organised and Active:  
Kurdish Diaspora Online and Offline
In addition to more familial ties and networks, Kurdish diaspora 
communities have over time created non-territory-based net-
works and contacts, and established political, cultural, social and 
educational organisations and institutions. Kurdish associations 
in Europe today are numerous and characterised by a great diver-
sity in terms of ideological and political orientations, even though 
a great number of associations that were created in the 1970s and 
1980s did not last more than five years.
For instance, the Kurdish Institute in Paris was created in 1983 
by Kurdish intellectuals living in different European countries. 
Founded with the support of Mitterrand’s government, it defines 
itself as ‘an independent, non-political, secular organisation, 
embracing Kurdish intellectuals and artists from different hori-
zons as well as Western specialists on Kurdish Studies’.35 On the 
other hand, the Kurdish Parliament in Exile and the Kurdistan 
National Congress (KNK) were exemplary cases of multinational 
and non-territory-based platforms (van Bruinessen 2000). The 
KNK was established in 1999 in order to create an organisation 
that would be more representative of Kurds than had been the 
Kurdish Parliament in Exile, which later became part of the KNK. 
The KNK groups several Kurdish groups and parties, and calls 
for the self-determination for Kurds. However, it has struggled to 
attract wider participation among Kurds, as it has been consid-
ered to be too close to the PKK (Gunter 2011: 180–181).
The best-known Kurdish organisation is the PKK, originating 
from the left in Turkey and founded in 1978 (Jongerden & Akkaya 
How the Kurdish Diaspora(s) Came to Be 93
2011). It was known for the strategic use of violence, although it 
has been suggested that this use of violence was instrumental and 
rational, owing to the narrow political space in Turkey and lack of 
alternative platform for political expression (Bozarslan 2004: 23). 
However, the organisation has gone through a significant change 
in the new millennium (Akkaya & Jongerden 2012; Casier & 
Jongerden 2012; Grojean 2008). Indeed, Akkaya and Jongerden 
(2011) suggest that the PKK has reinvented itself in the 2000s, 
from a ‘national liberation struggle’ to a project of radical democ-
racy, based on the rejection of the state. Gradually, the organisa-
tion has become a political and social movement with extensive 
transnational networks and connections (Akkaya & Jongerden 
2012; Jongerden & Akkaya 2016). One first-generation inter-
viewee active in a pro-PKK organisation reported how the move-
ment had changed over the years:
Before, it was the operation of Kurdish cultural centres, before 
2007, and now, today, there has been gradually put in place a sys-
tem that we call a democratic centre that are popular assemblies 
uniting the diaspora and that creates different commissions to 
serve the needs of the diaspora.
The interviewee made reference to the ‘cultural centres’, which 
are basically pro-PKK diaspora organisations. Indeed, the PKK 
founded several transnational associations in Europe in the 1980s, 
many focusing on women and youth.36 In the 1980s and 1990s, 
it worked particularly towards the institutionalisation of ties and 
activities in the diaspora, with the ‘Europe Bureau’ recruiting 
highly skilled second-generation members and young labourers 
(Argun 2003: 123; Mügge 2010: 181–192). Adamson (2019: 223) 
notes how Kurdish political exiles from Turkey set out a ‘diaspora 
engagement policy’, managed largely via the PKK and linked to 
the ongoing conflict in south-eastern Turkey, in order to politicise 
segments of migrants who had arrived from Turkey.
In fact, it was not until the arrival of more politicised Kurds from 
Turkey that the previously arrived economic migrants started to 
identify themselves as ‘Kurdish’. The violent conflict between the 
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Turkish state and the Kurdish movement in the 1980s was one of 
the main migration motivations of Kurds to Europe (Hassanpour 
& Mojab 2005) and has been considered one of the reasons for the 
high level of politicisation of the Kurdish community in France 
(Khayati 2008). Also, studies conducted in Germany show that 
the identification as Kurdish became more pronounced in the 
1980s and 1990s, partially due to the arrival of political refugees 
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; van Bruinessen 1998) but also due to 
the experienced discrimination and exclusion in the host society. 
Wahlbeck (2019) also notes that, although labour migration from 
Turkey has been the single most significant factor to account for 
the size of the Kurdish communities in Europe, the more recently 
arrived Kurdish refugees have had a great social, cultural and 
political impact on the existing Kurdish communities in Europe.
Today, the largest organisation of diaspora Kurds is the KCD-E 
(European Kurdish Democratic-Societies Congress, before 2013 
known as KON-Kurd). It groups 12 federations and 165 associa-
tions in the Western world (Dryaz 2015: 452–453) and is con-
sidered to have close ties to the PKK. One such federation is 
the CDK-F (Conseil démocratique kurde en France, formerly 
FEYKA), consisting mainly of Kurds from Turkey and grouping 
24 associations across France.37 The pro-PKK associations con-
tinue to have a strong standing in France, although there is evi-
dence of the emergence of second-generation associations that are 
less political in nature (Karagöz 2017), following a similar trend 
witnessed elsewhere (Schøtt 2021 forthcoming).
There is long history of Kurdish political activism in France, 
going back to the 1970s and 1980s (Bonzon 2015;38 Werdî 200639). 
The Kurdish actors have quite successfully established connec-
tions with the French Socialist Party and the local representatives 
in Brittany region, which have then been highly instrumental in 
raising awareness and lobbying policymakers, for instance dur-
ing the plight of Kurds in Iraq in the early 1990s.40 For instance, 
Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of François Mitterrand (president 
1981–1995), was named the ‘Mother of Kurds’ for her active role 
in support of the Kurdish cause. Also, President Hollande knew 
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one of the killed activists (Marchand 2017: 30). More specifically, 
in Paris, Rémi Féraud, the mayor of the 10th arrondissement in 
Paris, which hosts the Kurdish Institute, the Ahmet Kaya Center 
and many Kurdish (and Turkish) businesses (Petek & Poinsot 
2015), has been very vocal about the situation of Kurds in the 
Middle East and Turkey in the Senate. Another pro-Kurdish poli-
tician who needs to be mentioned is the mayor of Paris, Anne 
Hidalgo. For instance, in 2014 during her visit to the Kurdish Insti-
tute in Paris, she announced humanitarian aid worth €160,000 
granted by the city hall of Paris to three NGOs and directed to 
Kurdish civilians who were victims of war.41 Overall, Kurdish dias-
pora associations have played a key role in the social and political 
organisation of the Kurdish communities in France.
Grojean (2015: 53) observes that the majority of Kurdish diaspora 
mobilisations taking place in Europe are originally by dias-
pora Kurds from Turkey. One major example of that is the 
political demonstrations organised simultaneously by Kurdish 
organisations in Europe, including the one that followed the 
arrest of the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999. Since then, 
thousands of Kurds gather every year, notably from France and 
Germany, in Strasbourg, where the European Parliament is located, 
to protest for his release. In 2017, between 12,000 and 15,000 pro-
testers attended the Strasbourg demonstration, including dias-
pora Kurds from France. Some of them walked to Strasbourg from 
their cities of residence.42 Till today, the pro-PKK organisations in 
Europe hold a significant power of mobilisation in the aftermath 
of events taking place in Kurdistan.43
Overall, the Kurdish diaspora associations continue to play 
an important role concerning the mobilising power of Kurds in 
the transnational space. Besides political activities, associations 
are also centred on cultural and social events. The main event of 
the year is the Newroz party, the traditional new year celebration, 
organised in late March. It has been suggested, in fact, that the 
celebration of Newroz is a political manifestation to show support 
for the Kurdish cause and to celebrate Kurdish identity (Wahlbeck 
1999: 170–171). In earlier years, the emergence of a number of 
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Kurdish newspapers, magazines, publishing houses and television 
channels informed the diaspora Kurds of the events taking place 
in Kurdistan. They have led to the creation of a Kurdish-speaking 
space. One of the clearest examples of this is the role Kurds in 
Sweden have played in the creation of standardised, written 
Kurmanji. Also, the international journal Kurdish Studies and the 
academic network Kurdish Studies Network were founded by a 
Sweden-based Kurdish scholar, Welat Zeydanlioğlu, some years 
ago.44 The last decades have also witnessed the emergence of the 
Kurdish cinema, literature and arts that have found means to 
flourish in the diaspora via Kurdish film festivals, art exhibitions 
and published work by Kurdish authors (Galip 2015; Koçer 2014; 
Smets & Sengul 2016).
The online space and the role of ICT tools has been particularly 
significant in forging the transnational space of Kurdish diasporas 
(Hassanpour 1998; Sheyholislami 2010, 2011; Smets 2016). One 
particularly noteworthy example of this is the large number of 
Kurdish-language periodicals published in the diaspora, relative 
to the number of such publications in Turkey. There is also a large 
number of broadcasting channels in the diaspora: for instance, 
in 2010 there were around 15 channels broad casting in Kurdish 
(Sheyholislami 2010). Indeed, the continuous political develop-
ments in the Middle East are lived among the diaspora Kurds, who 
stay connected to Kurdistan through satellite channels, ICT tools, 
social networking sites and long-distance telephone calls (ibid.). 
This is visible in the immediate reactions to significant political 
events in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, which prompt demonstrations, 
lobbying, distribution of petitions and other political activities in 
the diaspora.
The ‘Kurdish issue’ has received particular inter national atten-
tion in the aftermath of events such as the atrocities committed 
by Saddam Hussein against Iraq’s Kurdish populations, the 1999 
arrest of the leading figure of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, and more 
recently during the Syrian Kurds’ combat against ISIS. The role of 
Kurdish diaspora organisations and their efforts in lobbying and 
awareness-raising initiatives have been important in this regard. 
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Thus, in conjunction with the virtualisation of the ‘Kurdish issue’, 
another remarkable development has been its internationalisation 
and deterritorialisation (Hassanpour 1998; van Bruinessen 1999b), 
thanks to increased media coverage of Kurdish-related news and the 
emergence of cross-border Kurdish institutions. Van Bruinessen 
(2000) suggests that Kurdish nationalism has greatly benefited 
from the Kurdish diaspora and the emergence of Kurdish institu-
tions, associations, lobbying groups, media and networks in the 
said diaspora. Such diversity of political, social and cultural activi-
ties within the Kurdish diaspora space has given a new dimension 
to Kurdish nationalism, including in the 2010s. However, these 
activities have not always been without contestation.
4.3.1 Contestations and struggles for recognition
The PKK is considered a terrorist organisation in Turkey, and has 
been strongly criminalised for several decades. In fact, the threat 
posed by the PKK in Turkey has been recognised as the most seri-
ous one faced by the country since its foundation in 1923 (Özdag 
2003: preface). Turkey has also pressured other countries to crim-
inalise pro-PKK activities outside Turkish territory, namely in the 
diaspora. Since the 1990s, the Kurdish–Turkish conflict has to 
some extent extended to the European space and the impact of the 
Turkish state’s pressure have been visible in a number of arrests 
orchestrated by Turkey (Rigoni 1998, 2000), targeted at certain 
Kurdish associations and their members. One result of such pres-
sure has been the addition of the PKK to the list of terrorist organ-
isations by the United States in 1997 and by the Council of the 
European Union in 2002 (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015).
The criminalisation of some pro-PKK activities and associa-
tions also needs to be understood in the context of intensifying 
securitisation in Europe, particularly after 9/11. The European 
Commission declared in 2001 that its main objective was the 
‘war on terror’. This consequently modified its approach vis-à-vis 
the Kurdish question, with the addition of the PKK to the list of 
terrorist organisations (Kurban 2014). The aim of this listing was 
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to prevent and freeze funding of the organisation, which has since 
resulted in the prosecutions of several Kurds for financing and 
supporting the PKK in Germany, France, Belgium, Denmark 
and Italy (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015: 119–120).
Different EU states have put in place and reinforced the existing 
security measures in the context of the ‘war on terror’. The EU 
has adopted a particularly active role in reinforcing pre-emptive 
security measures instead of relying on the rule of law (De Goede 
2008). Different EU countries charged politically active diaspora 
members for pro-PKK activities in the 2010s, although there exist 
significant differences between EU countries in this. For instance, 
Sentas (2015) notes that the criminalisation of Kurdish organisa-
tions in the United Kingdom has intensified since 2009. The Kurdish 
communities have drawn attention to the harassment, intimida-
tion and detention orders by the British authorities towards polit-
ically active diaspora members. Numerous examples show how 
Kurds have been the object of control and stop-and-search under 
the auspices of antiterrorist legislation (Sentas 2015).
Also, in 2008 a case was opened in Belgium charging 36 persons 
for their alleged participation in the activities of a ‘terrorist organ-
isation’. Finally, in 2020, the Judge’s Council Chamber decided 
not to charge the accused, ruling that the national law on terror-
ism was not applicable considering the nature of the Turkish– 
Kurdish conflict. This decision was met with fierce reaction in 
Turkey.45 In Germany, the organisation was criminalised as early 
as the late 1980s and forbidden immediately afterwards. In 2008, 
Germany took the decision to forbid the Kurdish channel Roj-TV, 
considered to be the mouthpiece of the PKK. Germany also inten-
sified their surveillance of the PKK’s activities in the country 
in 2008, after the organisation abducted three German hikers in 
Turkey, demanding that ‘Berlin stop its hostile politics towards 
the Kurds and the PKK in Germany’. The hikers were released 
12 days later (Eccarius-Kelly 2008: 10). Today the protest activities 
and events organised by Kurdish communities in Germany aim 
at the removal of the PKK from the list of terrorist organisations 
(Baser 2015a).
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This took another turn with the Kurdish combat against ISIS that 
attracted fighters from abroad joining both sides. For instance, in 
March 2015, a young British woman of Kurdish background was 
charged in court for having joined the Kurdish military brigade in 
northern Syria. This brought about a lot of media attention, espe-
cially since the YPJ (and its masculine counterpart, YPG) were 
not listed as terrorist organisations in Britain.46 Also, Schøtt (2021 
forthcoming: 150–153) discusses at length in her upcoming book 
courtroom activism by Kurdish diaspora members in Denmark. 
She opens in detail the cases of Joanna Palani and Martin from Esb-
jerg, both of whom faced the confiscation of their passports and a 
travel ban due to their military engagement in Kurdish forces. Both 
actually argued that they had not been part of the Syrian Kurdish 
YPG/YPJ troops but instead the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga troops. 
The court case against Martin was found in his favour, as ‘he only 
fought for the Peshermerga, a Western and thus Danish allied in the 
battle against Islamic State’ (Schøtt 2021 forthcoming: 162). In 
the case of Palani, the court confirmed the charges for breach of the 
travel ban and sentenced her to nine months in prison (ibid.: 
162–163). I will discuss the situation of the PKK and court cases 
that have been opened in France in more detail in later chapters.
Whereas the Kurdish associations and their members have been 
the object of judicial processes in France, Germany, Belgium and 
Great Britain, the Nordic countries have been less inclined to pur-
sue them in court. Pro-PKK diaspora activities have been more 
tolerated, although to a lesser degree in Denmark. One notable 
case is that of Roj-TV, where the channel was charged in 2010 
for its alleged support of terrorism. The channel appealed to the 
European Court of Human Rights, which backed the domestic 
courts in Denmark and rejected the case in 201847 (see Schøtt 2021 
forthcoming). Since 2004, the Turkish state has sent more than 
20 appeals concerning the channel to Danish authorities, accus-
ing it of being connected to the PKK and calling for its closure 
(Ayata 2011). In Sweden, some activists suspected of belonging to 
the PKK have even been deported after two assassinations com-
mitted by members of the organisation in the 1980s. Regardless 
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of this case, the Swedish state’s attitude has remained quite toler-
ant towards the Kurdish organisations and their members (Baser, 
Ahmedi, & Toivanen 2017). In a similar way, Kurdish associations 
have not faced judicial processes in Finland or in Norway.
Securitisation, as understood in the research literature (Buzan, 
Wæver & de Wilde 1998), applies not only to security measures 
and policies but also to how potential security threats are con-
structed via political discourses. In Turkey, the construction of 
the Kurdish movement as an imminent threat to national unity 
has enabled a strong criminalisation of activities by individuals 
suspected of belonging to Kurdish organisations. The political dis-
courses concerning the Kurdish question in Turkey, including the 
vocabulary used to refer to the PKK, have contributed to a strong 
association of the Kurdish question as a security concern and a 
problem of ‘terrorism’ (Martin 2018). Such securitising discourses 
also have a transnational dimension. For instance, Baser (2015a) 
has noted how the political discourses in Germany concerning 
the PKK have been greatly influenced by the discourses designat-
ing the organisation as ‘terrorist’ in Turkey. However, in 2016 the 
EU demanded that Turkey check the legal definition of ‘terror-
ism’ in its antiterrorist legislation, which the EU considered not 
to conform to democratic principles and which is currently being 
used to charge political actors (including Kurds) in Turkey.48
Such discourses on ‘terrorism’ should be understood in the con-
text of larger discursive frames and politics of governmentality, 
particularly in relation to discourses on the securitisation of bor-
ders and the ‘war against terrorism’ (Squire 2009). For instance, the 
documentary filmmaker Kevin McKiernan49 has argued that 
the US State Department draws a distinction between ‘good 
Kurds’ and ‘bad Kurds’. The ‘good Kurds’ are the Kurds of Iraq, 
who suffered under the regime of Saddam Hussein and have 
fought for themselves in the years since for an autonomous region 
in northern Iraq, while the ‘bad Kurds’ are Kurds in Turkey, who 
seek cultural and linguistic rights and even autonomy within the 
Turkish state, thereby possibly threatening its territorial integrity. 
Also, the international media refer to the PKK/Turkey conflict 
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varyingly as a fight between terrorists/guerrillas/freedom- 
fighters/insurgents and the Turkish state. The media plays a sig-
nificant role in the reproduction of this discursive frame.50
The exceptional measures concerning the ‘war on terror’ were nor-
malised in the political declarations that appeared in the French, 
Italian and British press after 9/11 (Tsoukala 2006). These exam-
ples show how the securitisation of immigration and of terrorism is 
not merely limited to security measures; securitisation discourses 
constitute an integral part of them. It also needs to be mentioned 
that, as a result of the Kurds’ central role in combat against ISIS, 
the media images and discourses have greatly changed during 
recent years. One manifestation of this is the positive media 
visibility that Kurdish (female) fighters have received about their 
military combat against ISIS (Buffon & Allison 2016; Shahvisi 
2018; Şimşek & Jongerden 2018; Toivanen & Baser 2016). This 
will be discussed in more detail in later chapters.
The online space is significant for diaspora communities 
(Candidatu, Leurs & Ponzanesi 2019), but it is also the place 
where contestations take place. One example of the contested 
diaspora activities is the case of the first Kurdish satellite televi-
sion station, MED-TV. It was launched in 1995 by diaspora Kurds 
in Britain, rather than in Kurdish regions of the Middle East. The 
chain was granted the right to broadcast by the United Kingdom, 
and, although based in London, it also had offices in Brussels, 
Berlin and Stockholm. However, Turkey did attempt to silence 
the channel and accused it of being a mouthpiece for the PKK 
(Hassanpour 1998; Hassanpour, Sheyholislami & Skutnabb-Kangas 
2012). The EU closed the channel in 1996, claiming that it cooper-
ated with the ‘terrorist organisation’ PKK. In the following years, 
several countries withdrew broadcasting rights from MED-TV 
(and its successors, Medya-TV and Roj-TV) under diplomatic 
pressure from Turkey (Hassanpour 1998; Sinclair & Mets 2014).
Hassanpour (1998: 53) has argued that the launching of the first 
Kurdish satellite television channel ‘opened a new site of con-
flict between the Kurds and the Middle Eastern states that rule 
over Kurdistan’ and ‘changed the theatre of war in favour of the 
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Kurds’. The online space still continues to be central in how con-
testations play out. Romano (2002) has examined ways that Kurds 
living in the diaspora have been able to organise demonstrations, 
discuss politically sensitive topics and distribute banned publica-
tions in Turkey. The new technologies have been significant in this 
regard, as they have helped diaspora members to overcome barri-
ers otherwise existing in different parts of Kurdistan. At the same 
time, it has become easier to track politically active members via 
new technologies.
4.4 Kurds in France
Immigration to France rapidly increased in the post-Second 
World War years, namely from its (former) colonies, includ-
ing Algeria and Vietnam. Over the next decades, the country 
actively recruited labour migrants from North African countries 
(Morocco, Tunisia), Portugal, Spain and Turkey (including persons 
of Kurdish background), aiming to meet the growing demands on 
the labour market. The country also became the destination for 
refugees fleeing from Hungary and Eastern Europe. The so-called 
trente glorieuses (glorious 30 years), extending from 1946 till the 
mid-1970s, witnessed significant economic growth and increase 
in the number of foreign nationals in France, until the oil crisis 
slowed immigration influx considerably in 1973 (Khayati 2008: 
118; see also Castles, de Haas & Miller 2014; Van Mol & de Valk 
2016: 32–36).
In contrast, the 1980s and 1990s were marked by family reunifi-
cation and the arrival of an increasing number of forced migrants. 
Although the number of migrants of the total population remained 
around 5% from 1970 till 2000, the new migration waves brought 
about ethnic diversification of the immigrant population as well 
as, through family reunification, the arrival of an increasing num-
ber of women (Khayati 2008: 119). In 2016, the largest migrant 
groups by country of birth came from Portugal, Italy, Spain, 
other EU countries, other countries of Europe, Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia, other countries of Africa, and Turkey (Insee Population 
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Census 201651). In 2018, the percentage of individuals who were 
born outside France (including French nationals) amounted to 
12.3% of the entire population (Insee 201852). In 2015, the size of 
the second generation (defined as having at least one parent born 
outside France) was 7.3 million individuals, representing 11% of 
the total population.53
The Kurdish community in France is among the largest in 
Europe, after Germany. Based on the estimate by the Kurdish Insti-
tute in Paris, some 230,000–250,000 Kurds lived in the country in 
2016, although it is hard to estimate their accurate number as the 
French state does not collect statistics based on mother language 
or ‘ethnicity’. It is also estimated that approximately 80% of Kurds 
in France originally come from Turkey, with smaller communities 
originating from Iraq, Iran and Syria (Kurdish Institute 201654). 
The generational dynamics of the Kurdish diaspora in France 
has been discussed in few studies (Karagöz 2017; Mohseni 1999, 
2003), including in master’s theses (Adam 2017; Karim 2016). 
The Kurdish population in France is mostly concentrated in the 
Île-de-France (Paris region), in Alsace, Lorraine and Bouches-du- 
Rhône, with smaller communities across the country. Kurdish 
labour migrants started arriving in France in the late 1950s and 
in increasing numbers in the 1960s, when France and Turkey 
signed a deal for labour migration in 1965. The 1970s witnessed 
the migration of Kurdish families to France, which then increas-
ingly turned into the migration of asylum-seekers in the 1980s, 
thus following the general migration trends towards the continent 
(Werdî 200655).
Indeed, before the 1980s, Kurdish migration was mainly char-
acterised by labour and family migration. The 1980 coup d’état 
in Turkey was followed by harsh repression towards the leftist 
groups, including the Kurdish movement, which led to many 
politically active Kurds exiling the country and finding refuge 
in European countries. Although the increase in the number of 
asylum-seekers was partially due to the instabilities in the region 
of Kurdistan, Wahlbeck (2007: 444) also states that the increase in 
the number of refugees can be largely traced back to the changing 
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immigration policies in European countries. Kurds who now 
arrived as asylum-seekers would have previously been able to 
arrive as labour migrants. This means that the underlying motiva-
tions to leave Turkey, for instance, do not necessarily reflect the 
official status with which Kurdish migrants arrived in France.
The participants and their families in this study had mostly 
arrived during the 1980s and their migration motivations were 
traced back to the political circumstances in Turkey. For instance, 
the violent conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish 
movement in the 1980s was stated as one of the main migration 
motivations (Hassanpour & Mojab 2005). Few family members 
had arrived for economic reasons, although in many cases these 
two aspects were not easily distinguishable from one another. 
As Wahlbeck (2007: 444) notes concerning Kurdish migrants, 
‘[e]conomic and political factors are always intertwined, and both 
factors have influenced both the early labor migrants, as well as 
the later asylum-seekers’.
This also means that the reception and the settlement take 
place in different legal and political frameworks vis-à-vis the state 
depending on whether the family members arrived with the status 
of asylum-seekers or as labour migrants. State policies regarding 
migration and integration, and notions of citizenship and national 
belonging, shape migrants’ experiences of settlement and the for-
mation of diaspora communities. In the following sections, I will 
briefly discuss French integration policies and how those relate to 
the understanding of national belonging and to the notion of citi-
zenship. Following that discussion, I will discuss the ambivalence 
towards pro-PKK activism in the French context.
4.4.1 Becoming citizens of the republic
The integration governance structures have changed significantly 
over the past decades in France. From 1965 till 2007, integration 
programmes were under the responsibility of the Social Affairs 
Ministry. Since 2007, integration policies have been led by the 
Interior Ministry, and since 2009 by the OFII, the French Office 
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of Immigration and Integration (Office français de l’immigration 
et l’intégration), which operates within the Ministry. Before 2009, 
immigrant integration policies were limited to five years after a 
migrant’s arrival, after which integration was addressed by the 
Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity (l’Agence 
pour la cohésion sociale et l’égalité des chances, Acsé) via area-
based general policies that targeted disadvantaged neighbour-
hoods. Also, from 2007 till 2010, the Ministry of Immigration and 
National Identity took charge of immigrant integration, before it 
became the competence of the Interior Ministry. In 2007, along-
side the establishment of a new ministry, President Sarkozy also 
introduced a Reception and Integration Contract, CAI (Contrat 
d’accueil et d’intégration), which immigrants sign upon their 
arrival. It strongly links integration to reception as it establishes 
a contract between the French authorities and the newly arrived 
migrant. This contract still exists and is managed by the OFII.
French politics during the post-Second World War decades 
towards ‘managing diversity’ have been long characterised by a 
toleration of difference or even political indifference that has 
emphasised migrants’ assimilation in France (Brubaker 2001: 
535–537; Kastoryano 2002). In this sense, France has often been 
contrasted with its neighbour, the United Kingdom, where poli-
tics of cultural pluralism (or multiculturalism) have been based 
on the recognition of minority cultures and communities. In con-
trast, on the other side of the Channel, the concept of minority is 
completely missing from French law. For instance, France collects 
national statistics on the basis of citizenship, not ethnicity, lan-
guage or place of birth,56 unlike several other countries in Europe. 
There is, indeed, a legal impediment against the collection of data 
on the basis of one’s ethnicity.
Since the 1980s, the policy attitudes in France have gradually 
shifted towards ‘the right to be different’, as put by Kastoryano 
(2002: 4) and particularly towards the institutionalisation and 
management of difference. One example of this is the relaxation 
of laws by the Socialist government in 1981 that gave foreigners’ 
associations the right to organise on the same basis as French 
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associations, via simple declaration (Geddes 2003: 69). Escafré-
Dublet (2014) notes that French integration policy continues to 
be largely based on private initiatives, including NGOs that are 
involved in humanitarian relief and those that specifically focus 
on immigrants. She further states: ‘However, the French institu-
tional structure greatly influences the work of associations and the 
ability of immigrant-based organisations to defend their interests’ 
(p. 5; see Ireland 1994). Concerning migrant organisations, the 
discussion has mainly drawn from the perceived incompatibility 
between, on the one hand, the French nationhood and republic, 
considered indivisible and united, and, on the other hand, the 
existence of linguistic, ethnic, religious and other communities 
within its political body. Indeed, the suspicion towards multiple 
allegiances and towards participation in ethnic-identity-based 
political action have coloured the French debates on citizenship 
and immigration since the 1980s (Brubaker 1992; Kastoryano 
2002; Silverman 1992).
What stands out in the French case is how citizenship domi-
nates over the ethnonationally premised notion of nationality. 
This emphasis on civic belonging is manifested in the dis-
courses and emphasis put on integration, that is, on assimi-
lating migrants into the political body of the French nation. 
The notions of nationhood, citizenship and belonging are also 
closely intertwined and manifested in national institutions such 
as schools and administration. For instance, language instruc-
tion is provided for newly arrived migrants’ children through 
initiation classes for them to be able to join mainstream classes 
as quickly as possible, but the authorities are usually reluctant 
to offer minority language education to migrants’ descendants 
(Escafré-Dublet 2014: 1). The French republican idea of nation 
considers education to be at the forefront of making French 
citizens, with school being the prime site of integration. For 
instance, Freedman (2004: 131) observes that:
State schools have always played a role as both instrument and 
expression of a politics of national identity which aim to detach 
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individuals from their particular community or group of belong-
ing and to assimilate to the vast collective community which is 
the French nation.
During recent decades, the growing number of Muslim popu-
lations in France and the debate on the ‘problem’ of integrating 
them into French society has brought the issue of religion into 
public discussion. In particular, the discussion on Muslim women 
and their wearing headscarves (hijabs) in public institutions, 
namely at schools that according to republican principles ought 
to remain secular, has been quite heated in recent years (Lettinga 
& Shaharso 2009). Secularism and the removal of all religious 
observances are at the heart of this state-led approach, which also 
reflects the notions of citizenship, nationhood and belonging that 
have long-standing historical roots traceable back to the French 
Revolution and even before (Asad 2006; Brubaker 1992: 35–49).
Going back to the period of Enlightenment, the French Revolu-
tion constituted a major event towards the institutionalisation of 
modern citizenship as we know it today, as it became attached to a 
nation-state and to common (political) rights. The understanding of 
citizenship in France is based on a universalist understanding 
of membership to the French state. This goes hand in hand with 
the understandings of nationhood, which is state-centred and 
assimilationist in nature. This means, in other words, that belong-
ing to the French nationhood is based on belonging to a politi-
cal community that is enforced through culturally assimilationist 
measures and policies. For instance, Brubaker (1992: 1) states that: 
‘Yet while French nationhood is constituted by political unity, it is 
centrally expressed in the striving of cultural unity. Political inclu-
sion has entailed cultural assimilation, for regional minorities and 
immigrants alike.’ In short, the understanding of French nation-
hood and citizenship is strongly based on unitarist, universalist 
and secular elements.
French nationhood and notions of citizenship differ from the 
case of Germany, for instance in the sense that it has a strong ter-
ritorial component, visible in the country’s naturalisation laws. 
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The French notion of citizenship includes very strong compo-
nents of jus solis, that is, citizenship determined by the ‘right of 
soil’, which automatically provides individuals born on French 
soil with French citizenship (Brubaker 1992: 75–84). This is often 
contrasted with the principle of jus sanguinis (‘right of blood’), 
meaning that citizenship is acquired through the nationality or 
ethnicity of one or both parents, as has long been the case in 
Germany, for instance. Brubaker (1992: 3) mentions that ‘the state- 
centered, assimilationist understanding of nationhood in France 
is embodied and expressed in an expansive definition of citizen-
ship, one that automatically transforms second-generation immi-
grants into citizens, assimilating them – legally – to other French 
men and women’. Indeed, France has long traditions of citizenship 
based on territorial belonging, as it has for more than a century 
now defined second-generation members automatically as citizens.
4.4.2 The ambivalence towards  
Kurdish diaspora politics
There has been a growing ambivalence concerning pro-PKK 
political activism in France, which can be understood – at least 
partially – against the backdrop of French state’s suspicion towards 
migrants’ political action, as previously discussed (see Silverstein 
2004). In the mid-1990s, the organisation’s members completed 
a series of coordinated attacks on Turkish consulates, including a 
hostage situation in the Turkish consulate in Marseille (Mickolus 
& Simmons 1997: 427), leading the country to close the organisa-
tion’s branches in its territory. However, it was not until 2002, in 
the wake of 9/11, that the organisation was designated an inter-
national terrorist organisation by the US and the EU. As Casier 
(2010) describes, ever since its designation as a terrorist organisa-
tion, the PKK has struggled to gain political legitimacy as a repre-
sentative of Turkey’s Kurds.
The discussion on terrorism has been long present in French 
society, but it took another turn in the 2010s with the rise of ISIS 
in the Middle East and particularly after the attacks in France. 
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Shortly after the terrorist attacks by members of Al Qaeda against 
the newspaper Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, the prime minis-
ter, Manuel Valls, declared that France ‘was in war against terror-
ism’ (Le Monde 201557). However, the security measures that were 
reinforced after his declaration had already been in place for dec-
ades. One of them concerned the famous ‘fiche S’ (security file), 
which makes reference to individuals who potentially represent a 
threat to the ‘state’s security’.58 After the attacks of November 2015, 
Valls confirmed that in total 20,000 individuals had a ‘fiche S’, 
of whom some 10,500 had connections to Islamic movements 
and other organisations considered terrorist, including members 
belonging to the PKK (Le Figaro 201659).
As far as Kurdish associations and their members in France are 
concerned, after 2008 and until 2014–2015 the security measures 
were more forcibly applied. A lawyer who works at the bar in Paris 
on cases of PKK activists who have been prosecuted on terrorism 
charges60 noted that after 2008 such measures have included at 
least 22 police operations against Kurdish individuals and Kurdish 
associations as well as 256 arrests, including dozens of indict-
ments and prosecutions. Most of these cases seem to concern 
‘the participation to a terrorist organisation and funding of such’. The 
same lawyer also suggested that there is a policy of mistrust visi-
ble in the rejection of citizenship requests and in the reluctance of 
prefectures to renew residence permits of politically active Kurds. 
The reason for this in the official papers is cited to be: ‘your loyal-
ism towards our institutions and our country is not guaranteed’.61
One notable case took place in early 2015, when 10 Kurds were 
accused of having financed the PKK and were condemned under 
antiterrorist legislation. The Court of Appeal also condemned 
the Kurdish People’s House (la Maison du peuple kurde) in 
Marseille for collecting funding (Le Monde 201562). In 2012, Adem 
Uzun, a member of the National Congress of Kurdistan’s execu-
tive board, was placed under arrest for the ‘financing of terrorism’. 
Shortly after, he was charged with trafficking of arms, before the 
charges were withdrawn in 2014 following a decision by the Court 
of Appeal (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015). His lawyer, Antoine Comte, 
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declared in the French press that ‘It was also a worrying proce-
dure where the French police succumbed to the political pressure 
by the Turkish services’63 (20 Minutes 201664). Another example of 
the intrusion of Turkish sovereignty into Europe was the case 
of the French operator Eutelsat, which suspended the broadcast of 
two Kurdish channels following a request by the Turkish author-
ity, RTÜK. After a loud reaction by the Kurdish community, this 
decision was overturned by a decision made by the Commercial 
Court in Paris in November 2016 (Le Monde 201665). The role of 
the Turkish secret services was also invoked by a French inves-
tigation concerning the assassination of the three Kurdish activ-
ists affiliated in Paris in 2013 (Marchand 2017), as later discussed. 
Overall, the judicial cases and police operations against the 
Kurdish associations and their members have spurred lively reac-
tions on behalf of the Kurdish communities in France and taken 
the form of petitions, political action and calls for authorities.
This chapter has provided contextualisation for the Kurdish 
diasporic mobilisations in Paris in the 2010s and will hopefully 
allow a better understanding of the context in which diasporic 
claims were made, to whom they were potentially addressed, and 
what narratives and discourses were employed to that effect. That 
will be the focus of the next chapter.
PART I I I






The 2010s were characterised by increasing political instability 
in the Kurdish regions in the Middle East and Turkey. The out-
break of the Syrian civil war in 2011 was followed by the rise of 
ISIS, namely in Iraq and Syria, where it unsuccessfully attempted 
to invade the renowned Kurdish city Kobane in 2014. In Turkey, 
the fragile peace negotiations between the state and the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) were interrupted in 2015, and political ten-
sions mounted in the Kurdish regions, leading to sporadic armed 
clashes between the two protagonists. Outside the Kurdish terri-
tories, the assassination of three Kurdish activists in Paris in 2013 
by a perpetrator allegedly affiliated with the Turkish secret ser-
vices sent waves of shock across the Kurdish community in Paris 
and beyond.
This chapter provides an analysis of the mobilisation by the 
Kurdish diaspora community in Paris in the 2010s following these 
events. Firstly, it discusses two major events that became visible in 
the diasporic mobilisation and examines the nature and means for 
transnational actions that followed those events. The latter part 
of this chapter discusses the context of political ambivalence in 
which the diasporic mobilisation took place. This ‘ambivalence’ is 
rooted in the simultaneous listing of the PKK as a ‘terrorist organi-
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sation’ and the cooperation between the Western allies and the 
Syrian democratic forces, closely affiliated with the PKK, against 
ISIS. As discussed in more detail later, these events also resonated 
among second-generation members previously more detached 
from ‘homeland’ realities and events.
How did the Kurdish diaspora communities in Paris mobilise 
in the 2010s? What events sparked mobilisation and what rep-
ertoires of local and transnational action did they entail? The 
three analysis chapters that follow are based on the collected 
material, including interviews with first- and second-generation 
diaspora members and non-diaspora activists, observation in 
diaspora activities (political meetings, demonstrations, informal 
get-togethers and cultural events) in Paris, and the related online 
material (see Appendix: Methodology).
5.2 Violence Far and Close
In the 2010s, the Syrian civil war spilled over the state borders 
into Iraq and led to an increasing instability in the region. Simul-
taneously, Turkey witnessed growing political unrest and spiral-
ling violence, further destabilising the geopolitical situation in 
the region. The Kurdish-speaking population, dispersed between 
Iraq, Turkey and Syria, was touched by the ongoing conflict on 
several fronts. The Kurdish combatants of the Iraqi Kurdish semi-
autonomous region in northern Iraq (peshmergas) participated in 
the battle against ISIS with a coalition of international troops. The 
Kurdish military troops in northern Syria (YPG) and its female 
battalion (YPJ) combatted the organisation in the outskirts of 
the territories controlled by the Syrian Kurdish forces. The latter 
also managed to carve out a de facto autonomous region for itself 
in northern Syria, called Rojava. On the other side of the Syrian– 
Turkish border, the end of peace negotiations in June 2015 between 
the PKK66 and the Turkish state marked the beginning of a new 
cycle of violence in south-eastern Turkey. In Paris, three Kurdish 
activists were assassinated in January 2013, suddenly bringing 
the ‘homeland’ conflict closer. These events fed into the ongoing 
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mobilisations that were already under way, as described by one 
interviewee active in the PKK movement:
The mobilisation was already taking place. There were a lot of 
students who joined us after the assassination of our three com-
rades. It really created a shock and they realised the importance 
of being involved.
In the 2010s, Kurdish diaspora communities in France were mobi-
lised and diaspora members descended onto the streets follow-
ing events taking place in Kurdistan and in France. For instance, 
Karagöz (2017) describes the Kurdish diaspora mobilisation and 
the evolving forms and strategies undertaken by diaspora actors 
in Marseille in the early 2010s. Similarly, Kurdish diaspora actors in 
Paris engaged in several initiatives and activities that attracted 
and were targeted at both diaspora members and non-Kurdish 
audiences. Some were part of a series of activities that are 
organised regularly, usually annually. One such activity was the 
demonstration to call for the liberation of the Kurdish leader, 
Abdullah Öcalan, organised for mid-February, around the date 
he was arrested in 1999. However, new activities have also seen 
daylight, including World Kobane Day or the commemoration 
event for the three assassinated Kurdish activists. I will examine 
these activities in detail in the following section, after having dis-
cussed a series of different critical events around which many of 
the new activities focused.
Indeed, a series of different events fed into the waves of 
diaspora mobilisation within a relatively short period of time in 
the 2010s. When discussing mobilisations with research partici-
pants and what had spurred them to engage in different activities, 
certain events were often mentioned as significant ones spark-
ing mobilisation. Table 1 below shows a chronological timeline 
of different events that were referenced in the material. I will 
not go through each of these events in detail, as more infor-
mation can easily be found on them from several sources.67 
Suffice to say that these events are inscribed in the political 
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instabilities in Turkey (Gezi protests, curfews in Kurdish 
cities, suicide bombings in Suruç and Ankara, general elections), 
the Syrian civil war (creation of Rojava, siege of Kobane) and the 
situation in the Kurdish regions in Iraq (genocide of Yezidis, 
rise of ISIS). Furthermore, the list includes events that had 
taken place or were at the time happening in France (assassina-
tion of three activists, attacks in Paris by ISIS, founding of Rojava 
Bureau of Representation, death of the assumed perpetrator in 
a Parisian hospital, and court cases against Kurdish activists). 
These events were referenced in relation to the ongoing situa-
tion in Kurdistan, particularly in the Kurdish regions in Syria 
and Turkey.
Table 1: Chronological timeline of events referenced in the material.
Year Event
2011 Creation of the autonomous region of Rojava in 
northern Syria
2013 Assassinations of three Kurdish activists in Paris
2013 May–June Gezi protests in Istanbul
2014 August Massacre of Yezidi Kurds by ISIS at the Şengal 
Mountain in Iraq
2014 September – 
2015 January
Siege of Kobane by ISIS
2015 June General elections in Turkey
2015 July Bombing in Suruç, city in south-eastern Turkey, 
by ISIS members
2015 summer Curfews in Kurdish cities in Turkey
2015 October Ankara bombings by ISIS members
2015 November General elections in Turkey
2015 November Paris attacks by ISIS members
2016 summer Rojava Bureau of Representation is founded in 
Paris
2016 November The presumed killer of the 2013 assassinations 
dies in a Parisian hospital; case declared closed in 
January 2017
Ongoing Court cases against Kurdish activists in France
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The fact that Kurdish diaspora communities have mobilised 
around certain issues and in the aftermath of violent events tak-
ing place in Kurdistan is nothing new. Indeed, there is a long 
history and tradition of political mobilisation in the Kurdish 
diaspora to draw attention to the situation of Kurds in their 
homeland (Baser 2015a; Wahlbeck 1999; Sökefeld 2006; 
Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), including in France (see Khayati 
2008; Rigoni 1998). Concerning the long history of conflicts in 
the Kurdish regions and how they sparked mobilisations in the 
diaspora, one interviewee observed that:
Unfortunately, the Kurds are mobilised when there’s blood … In 
times of peace it’s hard to mobilise people but in times of war 
people are present. The blood mobilises people, unfortunately so.
This resonates with Gourlay’s (2018: 26) argument on how, in 
times of trauma, Kurdish identity (Kurdayetî) becomes more pro-
nounced. Although focusing on the manifestations of pan-Kurdish 
identity in the Kurdish territories, his observations are also valid in 
the diaspora context. He also notes that this has been particularly 
true in recent years, when ISIS has aimed to conquer Kurdish-held 
territories. However, certain aspects set the 2010s mobilisations 
qualitatively apart from previous ones. The first was the fact that 
the mobilising events took place both in Kurdistan and in the host 
society, and the second that these events received unprecedented 
international media attention. Also, this time the Kurdish troops 
fought against a common enemy, which increased the level of 
international solidarity and political legitimacy for Kurdish politi-
cal actors, compared, for instance, to the international response 
to Turkey’s invasion of Afrin in 2019. One first-generation inter-
viewee mentioned how the events that followed one another in 
the 2010s, especially in the context of the Syrian civil war, had an 
impact on the public opinion in an unprecedented manner:
Kobane had a huge impact, the war in Syria had a huge impact, 
the events in Turkey had a lot of impact among the Kurdish pop-
ulation. Concerning public opinion, this war had more impact 
than all the wars that Kurdistan has known.
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It is also good to bear in mind the demographic composition of 
the Kurdish communities in Europe, meaning that it mainly orig-
inates from Turkey. This is particularly the case with the Kurdish 
community in France, where around 80% of Kurds migrated 
from Turkey. Indeed, Grojean (2015: 53) has pointed out that the 
majority of Kurdish diaspora mobilisations in Europe are initi-
ated by Kurdish diaspora communities from Turkey. One rea-
son for this, as will be discussed later on, is the dominance of 
pro-PKK associations and networks that hold a significant power 
of mobilisation.
At the same time, it seems important not to analyse mobili-
sations and diaspora activism as taking place in one particular 
national context but to see how their dynamics play out in the 
transnational space. For instance, the transnational dimension of 
the Kurdish diaspora space was evidenced by the statement 
of one interviewee, who said that the demonstrations for Kobane 
were organised and attended by Kurds coming from Turkey, 
with only some tens of Kurds from Syria participating in them. 
He concluded that it was ironically the Kurds of Syria who had 
made the ‘Kurdish cause’ visible, whereas those who mobilised in 
France (and elsewhere in Europe) were the Kurds from Turkey. 
Another example illustrating this transnational dimension of 
the conflict was how the events listed above were seen as being the 
result of the same geopolitical struggles and conflicts across 
the Kurdish regions regardless of the fact that they were taking 
place within the boundaries of different nation-states, including 
in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and France. This also resonates in Anne-
Sofie Schøtt’s (2021 forthcoming: 226–228) study on the Kurdish 
mobilisation in Denmark. She observes that, for Kurds who are 
not originally from Syrian Kurdistan, the Kobane siege gave birth 
to ‘alter-territorial identification’. This, she suggests, is based on 
deterritorial solidarity with the transnational Kurdish commu-
nity and a reorientation towards another part of homeland from 
which diaspora members originate from. She concludes that 
the political visions of Rojava revolution and of an independent 
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Kurdistan in northern Iraq have provided basis for such alter-
territorial identification.
This speaks volumes to the transnational dimension of the Kurd-
ish territories in the Middle East, as well as that of the Kurdish 
diaspora communities outside it. As said in the previous chap-
ter, the Kurdish nation is a transnation in the sense that its mem-
bers foster and maintain cross-border networks, linguistic and 
religious affiliations, familial ties and so forth that transcend the 
nation-states’ borders both between the Kurdish communities 
settled outside Kurdistan and between those within the geograph-
ical area of Kurdistan. The mobilisations that came about as reac-
tions to the events taking place in Kurdistan and in the diaspora 
highlight the significance of the transnational social field in which 
diaspora members are actors who ‘make decisions, and feel con-
cerns, and develop identities within social networks that connect 
them to two or more societies simultaneously’ (Glick Schiller, 
Green Basch & Szanton-Blanc 1992: 1–2).
At the same time, we need to be wary of approaching mobili-
sations as being undertaken by an allegedly uniform and homo-
geneous diaspora community. For instance, the Kurdish diaspora 
communities are heterogeneous and numerous political divisions 
are a structuring factor in Kurdish diaspora politics. Instead, it 
seems more fruitful to pay attention to how diasporic practices, 
claims and initiatives come about in the transnational space, 
and what sort of events trigger and inspire the formulation of 
such. This allows an analysis of how diaspora actors articulate 
claims to specific audiences and what narratives and discourses 
are employed to frame such claims. It also allows the identifica-
tion of particular moments when the existing political divisions 
and pluralities are overcome – albeit only momentarily so. Before 
delving into such dynamics of mobilisation, I will focus on two 
main events that were most often referenced upon in the material. 
These are namely the siege of Kobane in 2014–2015, which took 
place in the context of the Syrian civil war, and the assassination 
of the three Kurdish activists, which happened in Paris in 2013.
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5.2.1 Kobane momentum
Kobane is one of the three cantons in northern Syria that were 
established in 2003 and that were at the time ruled by the Demo-
cratic Union Party (PYD). Since the withdrawal of the Syrian gov-
ernment forces in 2012, the PYD filled the power vacuum and 
declared these three cantons (Efrin, Ciziri and Kobane), located 
in the region of Rojava, autonomous. Since 2012, the People’s Pro-
tection Units (YPG and the female battalion, YPJ) have operated 
as the security forces of Rojava, which is mainly inhabited by a 
Kurdish population but also includes several ethnic and religious 
minorities (Schøtt 2017).
In the background of the Kobane siege, which started in 
September 2014, was the rise of ISIS, first in Iraq and then 
in Syria. The organisation managed to invade large territories 
before it experienced its first major defeat in Kobane. The territo-
rial expansion of ISIS in Iraq and Syria threatened the Kurdish-
controlled territories and both the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish troops 
engaged in combat with the organisation. Then, in August 2014, 
the world learned about the genocidal attacks that ISIS committed 
against Yezidi Kurds and other religious minorities in northern 
Iraq. Considering Yezidis pagans, ISIS slaughtered, abducted and 
sold into slavery some 10,000 members of the Yezidi community 
(Amnesty International report 201468). Approximately 40,000 to 
50,000 Yezidis managed to escape ISIS troops to a mountain pla-
teau, where the Kurdish peshmerga forces of northern Iraq, the 
YPG and the PKK secured a safe corridor to Syria and other parts 
of Iraqi Kurdistan (Eccarius-Kelly 2017: 40).
As Eccarius-Kelly notes, this mobilised Kurdish diaspora com-
munities in Europe to collect funds for the victims of this mas-
sacre and to raise awareness of the Yezidis’ situation to a larger 
public (see Schøtt 2021 forthcoming). Then, about five weeks after 
the attack on the Yezidis, in September 2014, Kobane happened. 
Located on the Turkish–Syrian border in northern Syria, the city 
was besieged by ISIS in September 2014 and subsequently liberated 
by the YPG/YPJ in spring 2015. The Kurdish troops also included 
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PKK combatants who crossed the border from the Turkish 
side, defying attempts by the Turkish military to stop them.
The significance of Kobane siege can hardly be understated. 
It was a significant event, a turning point for the Kurdish battle 
against ISIS in Syria. It was the first time that ISIS experienced a 
major defeat and had to withdraw from previously occupied terri-
tories. It also resonated strongly in the Kurdish diaspora commu-
nities that mobilised and took to the streets of European capitals. 
As Eccarius-Kelly (2017: 41) observes (italics added),
Kurds in Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, the UK 
and many other countries sponsored large-scale publicity events, 
pushed for the collection of funds to aid victims of violence, 
and initiated extensive lobbying efforts. The rescue of Kobane, 
or what in the end turned out to be an act of wrenching neigh-
bourhoods of rubble from the control of ISIS, became a highly 
symbolic moment for Kurds worldwide … Despite the prolonged 
trauma and devastation, Kurds worldwide celebrated a rare and 
deeply symbolic victory in Kobane.
Similarly, in an interview, the representative of Rojava in Paris, 
Khaled Issa, stated that Kobane had become a date of reference 
that marked the rebirth of resistance and the willingness to resist 
with confidence. Furthermore, the siege of Kobane seemed to 
speak particularly to second-generation Kurds, as will be dis-
cussed later. It led to expressions of solidarity and support both 
among the Kurdish diaspora members and among local and inter-
national NGOs, other civil society actors and host society political 
actors. It also gave away to a wide range of activities, as detailed in 
the following section.
There was quickly a wide acknowledgement, support and visi-
bility concerning the Kobane siege in Europe, compared to other 
battles that had been fought by Kurdish troops in the context of 
the Syrian civil war or even before. For instance, seminars on 
the situation of Kurds were organised at the European Parlia-
ment, and TV channels allocated a significant amount of time to 
expert interviewees discussing the siege. Several demonstrations 
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took place in European capitals, drawing thousands of protest-
ers to the streets of Berlin, London, Stockholm and so forth. In 
October 2014, about a hundred Kurdish protesters broke into the 
European Parliament in Brussels to demand international support 
for Kobane, following a partial occupation of the Dutch parlia-
ment in The Hague some days earlier (BBC News69). In November 
2014, World Kobane Day was organised for the first time, and it 
has been organised in November ever since. Also, a number of 
awareness-raising events and lobbying of local policymakers 
undertaken by diaspora communities in Europe influenced the 
visibility of the Kurds’ plight in northern Syria. One interviewee 
described the unity brought about by the collective action:
MT: So, did you notice any mobilisation among the Kurds in the 
diaspora here?
Interviewee: Of course! For instance, what I witnessed was 
that the demonstrations really created a unity and a mobilisa-
tion that went beyond politics. I remember being there and you 
could really see people that had never before been in demonstra-
tions, you could see them there. I saw Kurds who had voted for 
the AK Party, the party in power, for the past 10 years. So, you 
really could see an enhancement for the Kurdish identity at that 
moment. I really think that it is a new era, a magical moment 
for the Kurds and that the entire world must have also seen and 
understood that.
The interviewee referred to people who had not previously 
attended demonstrations now being there, as well as to the vis-
ibility the siege received by the international press. Indeed, the 
siege received considerable international media visibility by major 
news outlets, among whom many picked up the central role of 
the Kurdish female battalion in the fight against ISIS (Toivanen 
& Baser 2016). Kobane became referenced as the ‘Stalingrad for 
Kurds’, referring to the well-known battle of the Russian city dur-
ing the Second World War.70 The Kobane siege was also widely 
mediatised because the international media had access to follow 
the siege right from the Turkish border, where the city is situated. 
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Situated in the border zone between Turkey and Syria, a large 
number of journalists and photographers could follow and deliver 
up-to-date news on the ongoing battle, visible from the hilltops 
located on the Turkish side. The world witnessed the siege in real 
time via the substantial video and photographic material that 
the army of journalists produced during the four-month siege 
(Toivanen & Baser 2016).
The mobilisation for Kobane in France followed quite closely 
similar trends in other European countries with major Kurdish 
communities from Turkey. However, one symbolically significant 
moment increasing the visibility and the legitimacy of the Syrian 
Kurdish political cause in France took place in February 2015, 
immediately after the liberation of Kobane. The French president, 
François Hollande, invited three Syrian Kurdish leaders from the 
Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) to the Elysée Pal-
ace to discuss the future of the Syrian Kurdish region, Rojava. Nat-
urally, Turkey objected to this strongly and criticised the French 
government of welcoming members representing a ‘terrorist 
organisation’. In an interview with the journal Al-Monitor, Zuhat 
Kobani, the PYD foreign relations official, said the following:
The visit was made at the official invitation of the French presi-
dent. All facilities were provided for the delegation to come to 
Paris. Our representatives told Hollande that the Kobani victory 
is not a success only for the Kurds but for all of Syria. They told 
him, ‘We are also fighting against those who attacked Charlie 
Hebdo. Our resistance is your resistance. We must move this 
struggle forward. The YPG and the PYD are your friendly forces 
… France wants to lead the war against IS and is seeking ways to 
cooperate with Rojava actors in that framework.’71
Kobani referred to the attacks on the French newspaper Charlie 
Hebdo that had taken place a month earlier by ISIS-affiliated 
members, thus underlining the common enemy that France and 
the Syrian Kurdish forces shared. Furthermore, the meeting at the 
Elysée was photographed and these photos were disseminated to 
the media. Eccarius-Kelly (2017: 43) writes that the series of photos 
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were also a message to the wider European Kurdish communities 
signalling that the French government was appalled by the assas-
sinations of three Kurdish activists that had taken place in Paris 
in 2013. She also suggests that it was also a message to Turkey 
as the possible involvement of its secret services in the assassina-
tions that took place two years earlier had been invoked.
5.2.2 The assassinations in Paris
On 9 January 2013, three Kurdish female activists were shot 
dead at the Kurdish Information Center (147, rue La Fayette) in 
the city centre of Paris.72 One of them was the co-founder of the 
PKK, Sakine Cansız, and the two other activists, Fidan Doğan 
and Leyla Saylemez, were part of the local diaspora organisa-
tion. Fidan and Leyla were both second-generation Kurds, Fidan 
having arrived in France at the age of eight and Leyla having 
been born in Germany. Sakine arrived in France in 1998 and 
received refugee status. The French investigation suggested that 
the assumed killer, Omar Güney, had infiltrated the organisa-
tion two years earlier, and pointed to traces going back to the 
Turkish Intelligence Service (MİT). Laure Marchand (2017) 
provides a detailed description of the assassinations and the 
events that followed them, also shedding more light on the pos-
sible involvement of the MİT in the killings. The judicial process 
against Güney was supposed to resume in January 2017, but the 
assumed perpetrator died of a brain tumour in a Parisian hospi-
tal in December 2016,73 leaving family members calling for jus-
tice in an unresolved case.
As Baser (2016) writes, this was a seminal moment for the 
Kurdish diaspora across Europe, but particularly for the diaspora 
community in France. The assassinations took place in the context 
of peace negotiations between the PKK and Turkey (Marchand 
2017), thus generating an outburst of protests. The demonstra-
tions that followed the assassinations in Paris were attended by 
diaspora Kurds from Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and 
other French cities, but also by local policymakers, leftist groups, 
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human rights actors and other advocacy groups. Three days after 
the assassinations, an estimated 15,000 protesters from France, 
but also from Germany and other European countries, gathered 
in Bastille Square in Paris, following calls from several diaspora 
associations. For instance, the CDK-F (formerly FEYKA) declared 
in the call to protest:
This aggression took place at a moment when discussions to find 
a solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey are ongoing … The 
French state bears a part of responsibility. If the perpetrators of these 
crimes are not found, France will be considered an accomplice.74
As was later learned, the assumed perpetrator also took part in 
this demonstration before he was arrested on 17 January 2013 
(Marchand 2017: 55). The assassinations generated a shock in 
France. Seminars to claim justice for the victims were rapidly 
organised, including in the National Assembly. During one such 
event, an invited speaker mentioned that the last bullet was shot 
into the mouth of one of the victims, who worked as a spokesper-
son for the movement.75 This was interpreted as a message sent 
to the Kurdish communities in diaspora to keep quiet. Marchand 
(2017: 160–162) also describes how the address where the assas-
sinations took place was under surveillance by the French secret 
service. As one interviewee said,
It was also a shock for the international opinion, for public opin-
ion and in France, because it was after all a breach of security at 
the national level, not only concerning us that you could murder 
three people in the city centre of Paris, in an office that is moni-
tored 24/7 by the [French] secret services.
The assassinations increased mobilisation among members who 
had been less active before and received quite a lot of international 
visibility. The assassinations also evoked strong feelings among the 
interviewees who had taken part in the demonstrations following 
them: ‘When the assassination took place, I also went to the big 
demonstration. There were tens of thousands of people, so many, 
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from the suburbs.’ Some preferred not to discuss it at all, and 
others shed light on the impact it had on the Kurdish community 
in Paris. One interviewee, who had indeed worked closely with 
the assassinated women, said the following:
The events, the assassination of my colleagues some years ago 
shocked many people, especially within the community, since it 
had been such a long time that such things hadn’t taken place, 
and nobody expected to be killed in a European capital. So, eve-
rybody was very shocked, very sad, and the younger ones were 
angry. It evoked a lot of questions, within the community, con-
cerning the security, preventive measures and shortcomings that  
had been put in place with time, because nobody thought  
that we are going to get killed in France. It’s not Turkey or the 
Middle East, where preventive measures are taken.
The significance of assassinations taking place in a European capi-
tal, and at the heart of Paris, was emphasised. The father of one 
of the victims deplored, in a seminar organised to claim justice 
for the assassinations, that the crimes had taken place in France, 
of all countries, meaning that the perpetrator knew it was pos-
sible to commit them there. Indeed, the assassinations generated 
a shock in the Kurdish community in Paris, because the diaspora 
members were not used to such a threat of violence in the host 
society and since ‘nobody thought that we are going to get killed 
in France’, as explained by the interviewee above. As Marchand 
(2017: 153) notes, for Kurds 9 January 2013 signified the death 
of a certain France, because the country symbolised an asylum 
land (terre d’asile) and represented freedom to organise political 
activities, such as lobbying activities that were coordinated from 
the office at the address 147, rue La Fayette in Paris. Such feelings 
were visible in interviewees’ accounts, such as in this one:
The case of our comrade who fell as a martyr here, it summarizes 
the Kurds’ situation. It’s exactly the same, we are not in peace here 
either, we are not left in peace, so we need to get involved. At least 
that’s how I see it.
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Critical events fostering unity
Studies on diaspora mobilisation show how diaspora commu-
nities have initiated activities as a response to a series of critical 
events that have taken place in the homeland context (Koinova 
2018; Safran 2007). Scholars have also argued that the analysis 
of diaspora mobilisations needs to include not only those events 
that take place in the homeland context but also those in the 
host country context (Baser 2014, 2015a; Baser & Swain 2011; 
Østergaard-Nielsen 2001, 2003). For instance, Baser (2015a) 
shows in her study on Kurdish and Turkish diaspora communi-
ties in Germany and Sweden that diaspora mobilisation can also 
take place as a result of political developments in the hostland. 
This was also the case with the 2013 assassinations, representing 
at the same time an extreme example of how events in host society 
context can generate diaspora mobilisations. Based on the mate-
rial, I suggest that homeland–host country dynamics can become 
conflated via critical events that touch upon both settings, and 
consequently shape how diasporic claims become formulated.
What is reflective of the transnational reality in which the dias-
pora members are embedded is the way they made sense of major 
events that had taken place both in the host society and in the 
homeland, yet which were to some extent linked to the larger geo-
political struggles concerning the Kurdish people. The fact that 
both the Kobane siege and the assassinations were related to the 
ongoing conflicts in the Kurdish territories made them all 
the more tangible in contrast of having been completely unrelated 
to the situation in Kurdistan. The social movement literature has 
suggested that some events are more critical than others in increas-
ing or decreasing the levels of mobilisation. Indeed, such events 
have been approached as ‘transformative events’ that shape col-
lective action and that can produce radical turning points in such 
action (Della Porta 2008; Hess & Martin 2006; Morris 2000). One 
interviewee referred to the cyclical nature of mobilisations that 
preceded Kobane, also making reference to how certain ‘events’ 
allow the diaspora actors to ‘mobilise a segment of the population’ 
(italics added):
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Politically, ideologically, we could say that the combats are cycli-
cal. So, I think that, in the capacity to mobilise a population, we 
always have cyclical periods of time that are repeated. There is 
always an event that allows us to channel or not, but at least to 
mobilise a segment of the population that is ready to get organised 
and to engage in the battle.
In that sense, I suggest that both the Kobane siege and the assas-
sinations can be considered ‘transformative events’, turning points 
that increased the diaspora mobilisation and led to expressions 
of unity and solidarity that exceeded – albeit momentarily – the 
existing lines of divisions within the Kurdish communities. This, 
in turn, had a multiplying effect on the cycle of mobilisations by 
mobilising previously ‘dormant’ diaspora members. Shain and 
Barth (2003) employ the term ‘dormant transnationalists’ to refer 
to diaspora members who can become activated in the aftermath 
of major political disturbances in the homeland context. They cat-
egorise (2003: 452) members of mobilised diasporas into three 
categories on the basis of their level of engagement. Core members 
are the organising elites, passive members are available for mobi-
lisation when the core members call upon them, and silent mem-
bers refer to the larger pool of individuals who are not engaged in 
the political or institutional life of diaspora organisations but who 
can mobilise in the aftermath of critical events. Although this cat-
egorisation has been criticised for being too rigid and assuming 
that mobilisations occur in a predictable way (Mavroudi 2018), 
the bourgeoning research literature on the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring shows that it has to some extent led to mobilisation and 
increased participation in transnational activities among different 
Arab diasporas in Europe – even among the ‘dormant’ diaspora 
members (Beaugrand & Geisser 2016; Moss 2016). Furthermore, 
if we are to understand this categorisation as concerning (core, 
passive and silent) modes of mobilisation between which different 
individuals can move and not individuals per se, we can say that 
the siege of Kobane and the assassinations of the three Kurdish 
activists were transformative events76 that increased passive and 
silent modes of mobilisation among diaspora members.
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I argue that something else also changed with these events, par-
ticularly with the Kobane siege. Besides drawing huge masses of 
demonstrators to the streets of European capitals, as had happened 
with previous mobilisations, something qualitatively different hap-
pened during and after the battle of Kobane in terms of the spatial 
dynamics of these mobilisations. As discussed at length earlier, the 
Kurdish diaspora actors have fostered dense networks and linkages 
across the transnational social field, and Kurdish diaspora actors 
have been strategically present in Brussels to lobby European insti-
tutions. For instance, Casier (2011) has examined how the Kurdish 
political activists have staged demands at the level of European 
Parliament, and argues that the extent to which the Kurdish issue 
has been addressed within the European Parliament is the result of 
diaspora Kurds’ efforts and their cooperation with Kurdish politi-
cians in Turkey. As observed in this case too, the diasporic claims 
were directed at the European Union, evidenced for instance by the 
political action taking place in the European Parliament in 
Brussels.77 This observation also follows that of Eccarius-Kelly 
(2017: 44), who notes that, during the battle of Kobane, Kurdish 
activism tended to engage even more with European publics, 
calling for the recognition of Kurdish identity and right to self- 
determination. Indeed, she (2017: 44; see Euronews 201478) 
observes the following change in diaspora activism:
Kurdish activism in the diaspora reached far beyond the cus-
tomary and recognizable street-level solidarity marches and 
occasional military protests. Increasing number of Kurds made 
use of their advanced degrees to formulate online petitions that 
requested donations and collected funds, organized caravans of 
aid supplies in support of vulnerable refugees and wrote compel-
ling op-eds or online exposés.
In other words, there seemed to be a broader change in Kurdish 
diaspora activism across Europe in the sense that diasporic claims 
were increasingly made to the European policymakers, building 
on the already-existing alliances and networks that Kurdish politi-
cal actors had in Brussels. Indeed, new nodes of solidarity and 
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feelings of unity were born out of the observation that the ongo-
ing combat against ISIS concerned Kurds beyond the borders of 
Syrian Kurdistan. The combat was also framed in the media, as 
well as by the Kurdish political actors, as Kurds fighting against 
a common enemy, the latter with the aim of increasing the legiti-
macy of Syrian Kurdish actors in the international political scene.
At the same time, Kurdish diaspora actors were also increasingly 
vocal towards the national actors, particularly in the French case 
and, it seems, also in the Danish case (Schøtt 2021 forthcoming). 
What was visible in the collected material was that the diaspora 
actors also increasingly addressed national actors in France, par-
ticularly after the ISIS attacks that touched France in 2015, which 
presumably made the national interlocutors seem more receptive 
to diasporic claims concerning the Kurds’ combat against ISIS. 
Indeed, diaspora actors simultaneously addressed EU-level inter-
locutors as well as local actors to raise awareness of the ongoing 
conflict. This was also visible in how diasporic claims and reper-
toires of action were formulated. For instance, a number of ini-
tiatives and activities attracted and were targeted at both Kurdish 
diaspora members and, significantly, also at non-Kurdish audi-
ences in Europe, as in the case of assassinations (see Demir 2015). 
I will next discuss the observed activities undertaken by Kurdish 
diaspora organisations and actors in Paris, organised particularly 
between 2015 and early 2017, including those organised in coop-
eration with non-diaspora organisations.
5.3 Means and Repertoires of Action
Diasporas are known to engage in a great variety of transnational 
political activities, and the Kurdish diaspora is no exception 
to this (Baser 2014; Scheffer 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). 
The activities of Kurdish diaspora communities date back to the 
arrival of Kurdish migrants in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Therefore, some activities witnessed in the 2010s joined a long-
standing tradition of organising activities by diaspora associa-
tions, including the Newroz celebrations and the demonstration 
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calling for the liberation of the Kurdish political leader Abdullah 
Öcalan, for instance. Another, more long-standing demand was 
the call to remove the PKK from the list of terrorist organisations 
in Europe (Casier 2011).79 As far as the mobilisations in France 
are concerned, the ‘transformative events’ discussed earlier have 
shaped mobilisation processes and the related repertoires of 
diaspora activism across French cities (see Karagöz 2017). It is 
vis-à-vis these ‘transformative events’ that different diasporic 
claims have been articulated and framed by diaspora actors.
One approach to understand diasporas’ political action is to 
examine the degree of institutionalisation they embody. For 
instance, Chaudhary and Moss (2016) distinguish between three 
types of immigrant transnational political action, in order from 
most to least institutional: electoral, organisational and non-
institutional. Loosely following this distinction between different 
forms of transnational political action, I have chosen first to focus 
on electoral, organisational and semi-institutional activities, the 
latter also including cultural activities with a political aim. The reper-
toires of action in the collected material included all three forms, 
although in several cases different activities overlapped. The 
latter part discusses different factors that have shaped such trans-
national political activism.
5.3.1 Electoral transnational political action
Electoral transnational political action refers to voting, campaign-
ing, campaign fundraising and mobilising for or against parties 
or candidates in the home country (Chaudhary & Moss 2016: 6). 
The most common electoral activity by diaspora Kurds in Paris 
included long-distance voting in the general elections that took 
place in Turkey in June and November 2015. In fact, it first 
became possible for Turkish citizens to cast long-distance votes in 
the presidential elections in 2014, which were followed by general 
elections in June 2015 and its second round in November 2015. 
The quick election in November was called by President Erdoğan 
after the June elections resulted in a hung parliament. Whereas in 
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the early 2010s there seemed to be some hope of ending almost 
40-year-old conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish 
Workers’ Party, this hope evaporated in the summer 2015 as peace 
negotiations fell through and the country steered towards more 
authoritarian tendencies (see Baser & Özturk 2017) with military 
curfews put in place in south-eastern Turkey under the auspices 
of the state of emergency. The general elections in 2015 took place 
in this context.
So how did the voting play out in the diaspora that gained the 
right to vote in 2014? The voter turnout for France in the 2014 
presidential elections was merely 8.35%, quite similar to the turn-
out of Turkish citizens’ voting patterns in other host societies, 
whereas in Turkey it was 74.13%. However, for the general election 
in June 2015 it reached 36.97% in France, among the highest in 
host countries in Europe, and in November 2015 it rose to 44.78% 
among diaspora voters; the turnout in Turkey in these elections 
was 86.38% and 87.40%, respectively (Akgönül 2017: 133).
In both rounds of the general elections in 2015, Turkish citi-
zens voted for the party not the candidate. Akgönül (2017: 314) 
observes that: ‘the only two political parties that have consistently 
drawn large vote shares abroad are the two erstwhile “counter-
hegemonic” ones – the AKP and the HDP’. He also notes that it is 
the leaders of these two parties,80 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Sela-
hattin Demirtaş, who were the only ones to hold public meetings 
with diaspora electors, although the contents of their speeches 
related to internal politics in Turkey instead of building a policy 
towards the diaspora electors. For instance, Demirtaş was invited 
to give a talk at a seminar titled ‘The Crisis in the Middle East, 
Kurds and the Resistance against ISIS’ (La Crise au Moyen Orient, 
les Kurdes et la Résistance contre Daesh), organised in Paris in 
November 2015. He also visited Marseille during the same trip 
(Karagöz 2017). In both cities, he addressed a public consisting 
mostly of diaspora members.
In 2015, the diaspora organisations aimed to mobilise their 
members to vote in the election, which was considered quite his-
torical. For instance, the KDC-E (Kurdish Democratic Society 
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Congress in Europe) called for mobilisation with the statement: 
‘The support you gain in Europe for the HDP will deal the greatest 
blow to the AKP. Every single vote counts if the threshold is to be 
exceeded.’81 In fact, it was the first time that the pro-Kurdish People’s 
Democratic Party (HDP – Halkların Demokratik Partisi) passed 
the 10% threshold needed to enter the parliament. The voting pat-
terns for Turkish citizens (including ethnic Turks, Armenians, 
Kurds etc.) located across different European countries shows that 
the HDP enjoyed wider support in northern Europe (Sweden, 
UK), whereas the AKP received the large majority of votes in 
Germany and France during the general elections in June 2015 
(in brackets) and November 2015.82
As we can see, the proportion of votes cast in the diaspora, par-
ticularly for the HDP, differed from the totality of votes, largely of 
course cast in Turkey. The HDP had a higher voter turnout in the 
diaspora than it did in Turkey, as did the AKP in France and in 
Germany. The Republican People’s Party, CHP, was clearly a less 
popular choice among Turkish citizens in the diaspora.83 What 
was interesting to notice was the mobilisation to vote in the gen-
eral elections. Indeed, quite a few respondents had voted in the 
general elections, many also for the first time in their lives. One 
interviewee explained that he had never previously voted in his 
life, including in French elections.
MT: Okay, so now persons with Turkish nationality can vote at 
distance; it hasn’t been like that for a long time …
Interviewee: It’s the second vote, yes.
Table 2: Vote share in diaspora and all counted votes.
Political 
party
Percentage of votes, November (June)
France Germany Sweden UK  
(London)
All votes
AKP 58.4 (50.7) 59.7 (53.7) 40.7 (34.0) 20.2 (14.6) 49.50 (40.87)
HDP 25.8 (29.6) 15.9 (17.5) 39.1 (43.2) 54.6 (59.2) 10.76 (13.12)
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MT: So how does it usually work? Are there many people  
who vote?
Interviewee: Yes, you go to the Turkish consulate and vote there. 
After the votes are sent back there, they are counted here. We 
went to vote for the HDP. It was a must. I have never voted before, 
even in France. My first vote was for the HDP, the first vote in  
my life.
Diaspora organisations also organised transportation possibili-
ties for eligible diaspora members who held Turkish citizenship to 
come and vote at the Turkish consulate in Paris. Other activities 
that could be characterised as electoral included fundraising for 
electoral campaigns. One activity not listed by Chaudhary and 
Moss (2016), yet which can be characterised as electoral, was the 
electoral monitoring visits to Turkey that were organised via HDP 
offices in Brussels.
MT: So, you mentioned the electoral monitoring missions …
Interviewee: Yes, they are organised via the invitation by HDP in 
Brussels, and we take care of the delegations and also send trans-
lators if needed, and then they are sent to Turkey. We have been 
doing this for 15 years at least, every time we sent in delegations. 
Each year for the elections and the Kurdish new year. When you 
go there for Newroz, you have the chance to meet up with the 
elected and to talk with them. After you participate in the party 
and meet associations, institutions etc.
The electoral activities were at the same time locally based in Paris, 
yet included a significant transnational dimension as they aimed 
for a change in the political landscape of the sending country. 
Electoral activities such as monitoring missions and campaign-
ing can be considered a part of organisational activities, with the 
exception of individual voting activities. In that sense, there was 
no significant distinction between the two concerning the differ-
ent degree of institutionalisation. However, for the purposes of 
clarity, I have discussed the electoral activities separately from 
other organisational activities.
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5.3.2 Transnational organisational activities
Organisational activities consist of advocacy groups, ethnic 
associations, charities, hometown associations and ruling party/
opposition organisations (Chaudhary & Moss 2016). Besides 
Kobane, the worsening human rights situation in Turkey and the 
spiralling violence (namely state violence) in the Kurdish region 
were also often referenced in the organisations’ events. The social 
uprisings that followed the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul, 
and which spread across the country amid protests originally con-
testing urban development plans, resonated in the diaspora (Baser 
2015b: 256–257) and were also visible at the level of organisational 
activities. For instance, police brutality and the tightening state 
censorship and human rights’ violations later evoked large-scale 
political protests both in Turkey and in European cities with size-
able Turkish and Kurdish diaspora communities.
These events, among others, were reflected in diaspora organisa-
tions’ activities of a transnational and political nature, also bring-
ing Turkish and different Kurdish diaspora groups together to 
collaborate (Baser 2015b: 256–257). The organisational activities 
also made visible the collaboration that was established between 
different diaspora and non-diaspora actors via organisational 
means. This meant, for instance, that a number of different associ-
ations organised an event to discuss the ongoing conflicts and the 
situation of Kurds in the region. Several seminars aimed to raise 
awareness, as shown below, were organised via the collaboration 
between Kurdish diaspora organisations, Turkish diaspora organ-
isations, French leftish parties, student associations and French 
civil society organisations. This also recalled a longer history of 
political alliances and sensibilities among the French left towards 
the Kurdish question, as discussed earlier.
The most visible organisational activities were advocating and 
raising visibility of the situation of the Kurdish people in Turkey 
and Syria to local policymakers via seminars and discussion events. 
Organisational activities also included the establishment of pro-
Rojava solidarity groups, which created new solidarity nodes in 
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the diaspora in addition to the existing ones. Collaboration with 
Turkish leftist-leaning organisations became visible, for instance, 
in the electoral activities coordinated by Kurdish and some Turkish 
diaspora organisations in 2015. This observation is similar to 
Karagöz (2017: 96–97), who notes concerning the Kurdish dias-
pora mobilisation in Marseille that: ‘this specific conflict has mul-
tiplied the interactions between the Kurdish activist sphere and 
the host society’s space of mobilization’. She concludes that these 
extra-community links had given rise to a ‘hybrid sphere of con-
tention’ and that Rojava and Kobane had a ‘multiplier effect’ on 
the emergence of such a hybrid sphere of contention between the 
diaspora and non-diaspora actors.
This also became evident in the observed events that took place 
in high-profile locations, including at the National Assembly 
in Paris or at the townhall of the 10th arrondissement in Paris, 
indicative of the networks that diaspora organisations had with 
non-diaspora actors. The observed events’ programmes could 
feature political actors from the local administration of Rojava, 
Image 1: Non-Kurdish associations mobilising in Paris for Kobane. 
Source: Cuervo/AL Paris-Sud. Published under CC BY-ND 2.0.
Mobilising in Paris 137
activists from diaspora organisations and leaders of the HDP, as 
well as French policymakers from leftist parties. For instance, in 
the event referenced above, ‘The Crisis in the Middle East, Kurds 
and the Resistance against ISIS’, other invited speakers besides 
Selahattin Demirtaş included the former minister of foreign 
affairs Bernard Kouchner, the co-president of Rojava cantons 
Sinem Mohamed, and the political coordinator of the leftist party 
in France, Eric Coquerel. Also, the Kurdish Newroz celebration 
in 2016 was organised at the City Hall in Paris, on the initiative of 
Paris mayor Anne Hidalgo. In her opening speech, Hidalgo con-
firmed her support for the Kurds and the Kurdish troops fight-
ing against ISIS. The event also included speeches from Kendal 
Nezan, the director of the Kurdish Institute, from the Iraqi Kurd-
ish diplomat Sirwan Barzani and from Bernard Henri-Lévy, the 
French public intellectual, who made reference to an earlier dis-
cussion between Barzani and President Hollande, the latter con-
firming France’s support for Kurds and Kurdish troops.84
Image 2: Demonstration in Paris for the killed activists on 26 January 
2013. Source: Chris Sang-hwan Jung via Wikimedia Commons. Pub-
lished under CC BY-SA 2.0. Photo edited slightly at HUP to obscure 
faces.
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What made these mobilisations quite different from previous 
ones was the extent to which non-diaspora actors came together 
with diaspora organisations (see Eccarius-Kelly 2017). The assas-
sinations of three Kurdish activists and the situation in Kobane 
(and in Rojava more generally) received considerable visibility 
in France, evidenced by the photo of the three Kurdish activists in 
front of the City Hall, at the heart of Paris. In fact, President 
Hollande knew one of the killed activists (Marchand 2017: 30), 
highlighting the networks Kurdish actors have succeeded in estab-
lishing with high-ranking politicians in France.85 Another exam-
ple of this was the visit to Rojava by the French former foreign 
minister Bernard Kouchner and a leader of the German party The 
Left, Gregor Gysi, in 2014. During the same time, a delegation of 
the European Parliament also visited the region.86
Also, in summer 2016, the Bureau of Representation for Rojava 
was opened in Paris, after the first attempt failed. Other bureaus of 
representation for Rojava were opened in Moscow, Prague, Berlin 
and Stockholm in 2016. The representative of the Rojava Bureau 
in Paris, Khalid Issa, stated in an interview that the Kurdish dias-
pora has two significant roles in France: one as a diplomatic actor 
between France and Rojava and the other to raise awareness. Issa 
also suggested that it was thanks to the diaspora’s lobbying efforts 
in France that the country was the first in Europe to express a 
supporting position vis-à-vis Kobane. Indeed, it can be said that 
Kobane was a turning point in the representations of Kurdish 
combatants and their role in the armed conflict in Syria.
Such imaginaries and representations were constructed through 
an active media work and lobbying by diaspora organisations 
to increase the visibility of the Kurdish combat (see Andén-Papa-
dopoulos & Pantti 2013). This strategic dimension was also referred 
to by one politically active interviewee, who talked about how the 
pro-PKK movement had employed the visibility of the conflict.
In the media, it’s us. We have contacts in the news agencies, not 
only the French ones, but also the Arabic ones and so forth. The 
war in Syria and in Rojava was very mediatised. It is also our 
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way of showing how we engage in war through transparency. We 
didn’t restrict the entry of journalists to the front.
Therefore, it is also important to account for the impact of pictogra-
phy and media discourses in shaping sensitisation to the Kurdish– 
ISIS conflict beyond the boundaries of Syrian Kurdistan. This is 
similar to Andén-Papadopoulos & Pantti’s (2013) observations on 
Syrian diaspora activists’ media work. The authors analysed ‘cul-
tural brokerage’ and showed how Syrian diaspora actors linked 
the voices of homeland protesters to the outside world, how they 
managed messages that bridged the gap between social media and 
mainstream media and how they also collaborated with profes-
sional journalists to make the stories fit for foreign publics.
A considerable amount of awareness-raising initiatives were 
organised in collaboration between diaspora and non-diaspora 
associations and NGOs. Indeed, the associative structures and net-
works gradually constructed since the arrival of Kurdish migrants 
in France played an important role in the mobilisations. The rep-
ertoires of action inscribed into a long history of Kurdish diaspora 
activism, as discussed earlier. Many of the observed events were 
organised by pre-existing associations, such as by those belonging 
to CDK-F (the Kurdish Democratic Council in France, grouping 24 
associations across France), which had close connections to associ-
ations in the Kurdish region. However, it was noteworthy that both 
of these critical events gave birth to new associations, especially in 
the aftermath of Kobane. An interviewee tells how he and some 
others founded an association in one small city in France:
They became active; there are several active youths. I can say 
that at the moment I was in [city]87 and we founded an associa-
tion during the war in Kobane. Nothing more, an association, in 
[city]. It means that even in [city] there was a Kurdish association, 
so imagine how it was elsewhere in France!
Several pro-Rojava solidarity associations were established fol-
lowing the siege of Kobane, also indicating collaboration between 
diaspora and non-diaspora actors, yet with the clear aim of raising 
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awareness of the situation in the Kurdish region. Also, the assas-
sinations in Paris gave birth to the creation of at least one asso-
ciation, that of the France-Kurdistan Association, in 2013. The 
Facebook page of the association describes the following objectives:
The France-Kurdistan Association was declared on 9 January 2013 
… created as a response to the assassinations of three Kurdish  
militants, Rojbin, Sakine and Leyla, in Paris. Truth needs to be 
known and justice served on this acknowledged political crime.88
Overall, we can say that the pre-existing Kurdish associations in 
Paris, several of which had close ties to the PKK, focused their 
organisational activities to raise awareness of the situation in 
Kobane and in the Kurdish regions in Turkey, while new associa-
tions also saw daylight in response to the two mobilising events 
discussed earlier.
5.3.3 Transnational semi-institutional activities
The electoral and organisational activities share a high degree of 
institutionalisation. Chaudhary and Moss (2016) argue that, in 
addition to these two, there is a need to attend to non-institutional 
collective action as a third category of transnational political action 
engaged by immigrants. By this, they refer to transnational politi-
cal action that aims to affect social and political change in the 
homeland context (ibid.: 7), including protests, demonstrations, 
boycotts, petitions, covert actions, armed conflicts and revolu-
tion. I have chosen to refer to such activities as semi-institutional 
as they included an organisational dimension. The observed semi- 
institutional activities included participation in protests, demon-
strations, circulating and signing petitions, and in some rare cases 
there were references to participation in the armed conflict.
The semi-institutional activities are located somewhere 
in-between the organisational and non-institutional activities. In 
several cases the semi-institutional activities included an organi-
sational component, but these differed from the organisational 
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activities discussed above. Seminars and discussion events organ-
ised by different associations could be characterised as organisa-
tional activities as they took place within an organisational frame: 
for instance, one or several associations organised a seminar and 
had the power to determine its focus, contents and speakers. In 
other words, the level of institutionalisation in transnational polit-
ical activities of organisational nature was higher. Demonstrations 
differed from these in the sense that, even though in many cases 
they were initiated by associations, they were attended by and 
most importantly took shape through the participation of differ-
ent individual actors. However, this distinction was not always 
clear. One example where the organisational agency became 
enmeshed with non-institutional individual actions was the crea-
tion of humanitarian networks to channel material and logistic 
aid to northern Syria. During the siege of Kobane and immedi-
ately after it, diaspora members participated in sending aid to the 
Image 3: Demonstrators marching in Paris on the World Day for 
Kobane, 1 November 2014. Source: Jiel Beaumadier via Wikimedia 
Commons. Published under CC BY-SA 4.0. Photo edited slightly at 
HUP to obscure faces.
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region. These initiatives were channelled through associations, 
such as Heyva Sor (Kurdish Red Crescent), but included a consid-
erable amount of both individual initiatives and non-institutional 
collective action.
Although listed as non-institutional activities by Chaudhary 
and Moss (2016), demonstrations were the most common 
semi-institutional activities in which diaspora members took 
part. These included participation in massive protests, demon-
strations, and petitions that circulated online; one interviewee 
explained:
MT: So how about activities … So you took part in the meeting 
organised by [association’s name]; are there other things in which 
you take part?
Interviewee: I really try if I have time, to participate in every demon-
stration and huge movements. For instance, when the three women 
were assassinated, I really had to participate; it was essential.
In addition to participating in large-scale demonstrations, engag-
ing in humanitarian aid and circulating petitions, some referred 
to diaspora members who had joined the YPG troops to combat 
ISIS in Syria.89 Those returning to Europe from Syria after having 
fought in YPG troops were met by the local authorities with a sus-
picion similar to former ISIS combatants. This led to court cases 
in Europe, as discussed in the following part. One interviewee 
tells of his motivation to leave and engage in combat before find-
ing another way to engage. In his case, an association provided an 
alternative avenue to get engaged instead of leaving the region.
Interviewee: Historically we are great combatants. We know that 
Kurds are not afraid to die. They are ready to give their lives to the 
cause and even beyond that. If it’ll come, it’ll come.
MT: Do you know many youth who left to fight with the YPG?
Interviewee: I don’t know anybody personally. I know somebody 
from the university who left to fight. I would have wanted to leave 
myself too … But when I saw [association], I engaged in that.
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Although Chaudhary and Moss (2016) mostly focus on trans-
national political action, I suggest that cultural activities can also 
contain a political dimension when they aim at raising aware-
ness of and gaining visibility for the situation in the homeland. 
Discussing organisations’ aims and objectives, Chaudhary and 
Moss (2016: 6) suggest that they may not be explicitly politi-
cal but that ‘their actions and impact on communities in places 
of origin nonetheless have political implications’. Following a 
similar logic, the observed cultural activities were comparable 
to demonstrations that aimed to raise awareness on and draw 
attention to the situation of Kurds in Syria. Such politically moti-
vated, yet often framed as cultural, action included the organisa-
tion of Kurdish film festivals, photograph exhibitions, concerts, 
fundraising events for humanitarian projects, discussion events 
and seminars that clearly contained the objective of raising 
awareness of the situation in Kurdistan, and in some cases col-
lecting funding for reconstruction projects, for instance. One 
interviewee set out the significance of cultural production in the 
following manner:
The cultural side contributes enormously to better understand the  
situation. For example, documentaries that are made from  
the region, sometimes they are better than books because in  
50 minutes of a documentary, the viewer has understood the 
political project that we wish to put in place, our values, what we 
feel, what we wish to transmit. The work on arts and culture is as 
important as the political side … You should never underestimate 
that … To win over a heart is to win over a thousand hearts.
A photo exhibition that displayed Kurdish female combatants 
in Rojava was organised by the Kurdish Institute in Paris in late 
2015. The photos were taken by award-winning photojournal-
ist Emilienne Malfatto.90 In some cases, this political aspect was 
more articulated than in others. One such event was the organi-
sation of the photo exhibition that aimed to raise awareness for 
the Kurds’ combat in Syria. The opening words of the brochure 
stated that:
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The Kurdish people is at its direst moment. In Syria, Iraq and  
Turkey, different regimes aim at its submission. But we are con-
vinced that never will the Kurds kneel, never will they abandon 
their wish for peace and for the respect of their rights. Their com-
bat for the universal values takes place on the ground, in the first 
line against ISIS. Their success will equally be ours.
Such cultural activities were organised either via associations, 
thus evoking a (semi)organisational political action, or as private 
initiatives. Examples of the latter included engaging in cultural 
production, for instance through translating and distributing 
Kurdish literary texts. The content for such Kurdish cultural 
production frequently evoked the combat against ISIS, with a 
particular focus on women combatants, as shown above. Fur-
thermore, the assassinations in Paris were often referenced and 
featured in cultural artefacts produced by diaspora actors, namely 
in the form of art exhibitions, Kurdish film festivals and books. 
For instance, the Kurdish film festival that took place in October 
2015 dedicated the fourth edition of the festival ‘to three Kurdish 
assassinated militants, to those who have made and are making 
the revolution in Rojava happen and to Kurdish women’.91 In addi-
tion to the assassinations, the preface also mentioned the siege of 
Kobane, and the fate of Yezidi women in Iraq.92 These activities all 
contained a rather clear political dimension as they were explicitly 
aimed at raising awareness of the Kurds’ situation in Syria.
The cultural artefacts further contributed to solidifying the collec-
tive narrative of the Kurdish combat in Kobane against ISIS. Images 
drawing from the critical events were employed to construct an 
emotionally powerful narrative of the Kurdish struggle, which was 
then communicated to larger audiences. This was indeed a very effi-
cient means to sensitise and mobilise both the diaspora and non-
diaspora audiences. In that sense, we can say that they constituted 
an effective way to advocate and draw attention to the Kurdish 
struggle and operate as a more indirect form of lobbying differ-
ent actors in the host society. Indeed, they constituted a part of the 
diasporic initiatives and claims-making that took shape through a 
wide range of activities in which both diaspora and non-diaspora 
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actors engaged and which included different degrees of institu-
tionalisation. On the basis of the collected material, the observed 
mobilisation in Paris consisted of electoral, organisational and 
semi-institutional activities that had a clear transnational dimen-
sion in how such activities were organised in the transnational 
space and how the ‘homeland’ was evoked in them.
5.4 What Affects Mobilisations?
This part specifically discusses different factors that have shaped 
the formulation of Kurdish diasporic claims and activities in the 
2010s. In this part, I draw from the social movement literature 
and how that has been applied to the diaspora context by vari-
ous authors. The emphasis concerning what factors facilitate or 
hinder mobilisation processes by diaspora communities has been 
on three aspects: 1) political opportunity structures, 2) how differ-
ent resources (including pre-existing organisational and network 
structures) are mobilised and 3) how mobilising events are framed 
in terms of collective identity (Quinsaat 2013, 2019; Sökefeld 
2006). The following parts discuss these aspects in more detail.
5.4.1 Political opportunity structures
One major stream of research concerning collective mobili-
sations, in general, seems to have been the political context, in 
other words the role played by the political opportunity struc-
tures (POSs). In short, this has usually meant paying attention to 
the openness of the political system to accommodate collective 
action, the presence of elite allies and the state’s capacity for repres-
sion (della Porta & Diani 2006; Giugni 2011; Meyer & Minnkoff 
2004). More recently, scholars have argued that to understand 
transnational activism by diaspora communities, in addition to 
addressing the political structures in the country of settlement, 
there is a need to account for those in the country of origin – and 
the interaction between these two (Adamson 2012; Grojean & 
Massicard 2015; Sökefeld 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Adopted 
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to the diaspora context, Sökefeld (2006: 270) understands political 
opportunities as ‘means of communication, media and transport, 
as well as the legal and institutional (for example multicultural-
ist) frameworks within which claims for community and identity 
can be identified’, both in the host society and homeland setting. 
Building on this, Chaudhary and Moss (2016) suggest a triadic 
political opportunity approach to conceptualise how immigrants’ 
transnational political action is shaped by 1) host country contexts 
(integration policies; access to local politics; co-development poli-
cies), 2) origin country contexts (authority type of governance; 
internal stability; diaspora policies) and 3) transnational politi-
cal opportunity contexts (supranational institutions; international 
legal regimes; bilateral relations; foreign policy).
The first aspect is the host society context, which has tradition-
ally been considered to provide more space in terms of politi-
cal organisation and greater liberties for political mobilisation 
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Integration policies and access to 
receiving country politics have been considered to be rather open 
in France (MIPEX 201593), although migrants’ political activism 
has met with suspicion from the French authorities (Escafré-
Dublet 2014: 5). Based on the overall material, however, it can 
be said that the country’s political system is open to protests and 
lobbying, and the institutional and policy environment in gen-
eral is not opposed to Kurdish diaspora actors’ political claims-
making. Also, Giugni and Passy (2004: 51) note that the ‘civic- 
assimilationist conception of citizenship in France gives migrants 
greater legitimacy to intervene in the national public space’. How-
ever, there were also instances in the overall material when the 
political activism had negatively affected the granting of citizen-
ship and residence permits. For instance, one interviewee told of 
the situation in which her mother had been for years:
For instance, my mother has been in this country since the 1980s, 
she’s been working here for 30–40 years, she has always paid her 
taxes … She has made five requests to have the citizenship and 
they have all been refused due to her political opinions.
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Indeed, there have been some limitations concerning particularly 
pro-PKK political activism in France that have affected the grant-
ing of citizenship or a residence permit. This will be discussed 
further in the following section.
Another aspect that has been tackled in the POS literature con-
cerning diasporas is the origin country context (Chaudhary & 
Moss 2016). We can say that the origin country context – that is, 
Turkey – steered towards more internal instability when the peace 
negotiations came to an end in 2015. In that sense, the transna-
tional political action observed during that time was fuelled by the 
ongoing situation in Turkey, particularly in the Kurdish regions. 
Also, diaspora engagement policies in the form of electoral rights 
also concerned Kurds who held Turkish citizenship, but they 
were likely directed to Turkish constituents in the diaspora. In 
that sense, the origin country POSs have not facilitated Kurdish 
political mobilisations in the diaspora, particularly those sympa-
thetic to the PKK. On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence 
of the intrusion of Turkish sovereignty into the European space 
with the aim of limiting pro-PKK Kurdish activities, as discussed 
in Chapter 4.
Thirdly, there are the transnational political opportunity contexts, 
such as supranational institutions, international legal regimes, bila-
teral relations and foreign policy, which shape the diaspora’s trans-
national political activism (Chaudhary & Moss 2016; Ögelman 
2003). The observation on the significance of transnational POS 
is made by Østergaard-Nielsen (2001, 2003) in her earlier studies 
on Kurdish political action in Germany and the Netherlands. She 
argues that, in addition to the political institutions in the sending 
and the receiving state, global institutions and networks of other 
non-state actors (including the NGOs) are also significant in shap-
ing how migrants can engage in transnational political practices. 
For instance, Baser (2011) discusses how numerous civil society 
organisations are used to raise awareness of the Kurds’ situation 
in Turkey. Based on the overall material, we can say that, together 
with the host society context, the transnational POSs, including 
particularly NGOs and the tradition of appealing to European 
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political institutions (Casier 2011), have been quite enabling in 
terms of the observed political mobilisation.
5.4.2 Mobilising structures and practices
Besides POSs shaping collective action in the diaspora, Sökefeld 
(2006) also refers to mobilising structures and practices as a second 
strand in the literature on social mobilisations. By this, he refers 
to networks via associations that can be of a transnational char-
acter and that affect diaspora mobilisations. They are, according 
to him, ‘networks of people that are bound to the same issue or 
formal organisations that are established for the purpose of mak-
ing particular claims’ (Sökefeld 2006: 269). As previous studies 
have shown, the transnational diaspora space, including the mul-
tiple networks between associations, is significant for the political 
mobilisation of Kurdish communities (Khayati 2008; Østergaard-
Nielsen 2001, 2003). These networks have a significant online 
dimension, as also referenced by the interviewee below.
They were mobilised for Kobane. Since I have worked with  
Kurds, they are more and more mobilised. Even if it is hard for 
them, because not all speak the language, you have contacts, 
political networks and the Internet also plays a role.
These are the words of an activist who had founded a solidarity 
association supporting the Kurdish issue but who nevertheless 
was not of a Kurdish background. The activist also refers to the 
importance of networks, both local and transnational, that were 
essential in the mobilisation processes. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, the transnational contacts between the diaspora actors 
and between political actors in the societies of departure constitute 
extensive networks that transcend the nation-states’ boundaries. 
For instance, the demonstrations for Abdullah Öcalan’s release 
are organised and even take place in the transnational space, in 
the sense that the demonstrations organised in Paris, for 
instance, are attended by diaspora Kurds from Germany, the 
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United Kingdom and elsewhere. This has also been the case for 
World Kobane Day since it was first organised in 2014 in different 
European capitals. Both events have attracted thousands of Kurds 
to the streets. They also have another common denominator, as 
explained by this interviewee (italics added):
MT: When you talk about politicization, was there a difference 
after Kobane, for instance?
Interviewee: For the mobilisation, as you know, it can be at times 
a bit artificial. It touches people’s hearts when you see Kobane 
being sieged by ISIS, and then there was Turkey … Kurds who 
wanted to cross the border to help their brothers and sisters that 
were sieged and were not allowed to do so. So, it touched every-
body, in my opinion … But in the end, the Kurds in Europe, they 
are mobilised via the PKK that can for sure unite hundreds of thou-
sands of people in a day.
The interviewee refers to the mobilising power of the PKK. The 
PKK, which is the best-known Kurdish organisation, has trans-
formed from a military organisation in the 1990s to become a 
political and social movement that enjoys a significant mobilising 
power and transnational networks in the diaspora (Jongerden & 
Akkaya 2016). One interviewee, active in a pro-PKK organisation, 
refers to the organisational and political culture that has mobilis-
ing power vis-à-vis the diaspora community and which has been 
actively developed since the 1980s:
In the early 1980s, and till the end of 1990s, what was created 
and what is today the network we have, the diaspora’s network 
that is well structured, everywhere and numerous, it needed a 
lot of sacrifice since the beginning. If it hadn’t been done in the 
beginning, during the tough times, it wouldn’t have been possible 
to get organised. Today, when the tensions calm down, a certain 
passivity will settle. That’s why we have the organisational cul-
ture, a political culture that makes the diaspora move and act all  
the time. So even when there are times when it seems passive, we 
manage to make the diaspora dynamic and move.
150 The Kobane Generation
In fact, Grojean (2015) goes as far as to suggest that the situation 
of Kurds in France (and in Europe), the ‘integration’ of Kurdish 
migrants, asylum or immigration policies, or even the POSs in 
France, Germany or Great Britain have little to do with how the 
Kurdish diaspora communities mobilise. Instead, he argues that 
the mobilisations in the diaspora are the result of the transnation-
alisation of similar mobilisations taking place in Turkey. In this 
regard, he notes that the PKK has a central role in the processes of 
mobilisation that take place in Europe, namely via the organisa-
tional and political cultures, as also referenced by the interviewee 
above. He further notes the importance of paying attention to the 
role played by pro-Kurdish political organisations, to significant 
events of the conflict concerning Kurds in Turkey and to the for-
eign policies of different European countries towards that conflict.
How such networks are employed for the purposes of mobilisa-
tion is, for instance, via transnational political actors. Adamson 
(2013), who has studied the mechanisms of diaspora mobilisa-
tion in the case of the Turkish–Kurdish conflict between 1980 and 
2000, refers to them as transnational brokers. She shows that they 
can be political entrepreneurs (associations, individuals, political 
wings), who successfully connect diaspora populations (and their 
resources) in Europe to the Kurdish actors in Turkey, and make the 
Kurdish case visible to European policymakers. This observation 
still holds true, as diaspora members and organisations operate 
as mediators between the host society political actors and those 
in the sending society. For example, the YPJ commander Nessrin 
Abdullah visited Paris in January 2016, where she gave a presenta-
tion to an audience consisting of both Kurdish diaspora members 
as well as of non-Kurdish listeners. The event was organised by 
diaspora organisations.
Even though mobilisations are fuelled and shaped by ‘trans-
formative’ events that can take place in both the homeland and 
host country contexts, their success is also based on the mobilis-
ing structures and practices. One example of those is the struc-
tures of existing associations that are able to use their networks to 
invite and organise events for political entrepreneurs to address 
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the diaspora audiences. The visits by political actors from Rojava, 
including female combatants, was a particularly efficient means 
to reach the host society political actors, as exemplified by the 
visit of Kurdish political leaders at the Elysée. In this sense, 
the pre-existing networks and associative structures of both 
pro-PKK organisations and other Kurdish actors played a crucial 
role in the mobilisations in Paris.
5.4.3 Frames
The third aspect of social mobilisation, frames, according to 
Sökefeld (2006: 270), are ‘ideas that transform certain conditions 
into an issue, that help to define the grievances and claims, and 
that legitimize and mobilise action.’ In the diaspora context, this 
includes references to belonging to the diaspora community that 
shares a common identity, to ‘homeland’ and to specific events 
that are framed to affect the entire community (see Quinsaat 
2013). This is similar to Adamson’s (2013) understanding of stra-
tegic framing that is employed to mobilise a diaspora. In her study 
on Kurdish diaspora mobilisation between 1980 and 2000, she 
shows how, via a strategic framing of the conflict, transnational 
brokers were able to deploy a certain sense of nationalism and to 
awaken a ‘Kurdish identity’, which then gained a politicised mean-
ing. The construction of ‘Kurdishness’ took place via cultural, and 
hitherto political, activities, and appealed particularly to second- 
and third-generation members in Germany, who felt a sense of 
belonging to neither the Turkish nor the German state.
The strategic framing of certain critical events that resonate 
with diaspora members, particularly in ways that make reference 
to a sense of collective belonging or the ones that are emotion-
ally laden, can be particularly efficient means for mobilisation 
(Adamson 2013). This seemed to be the case with mobilisations 
that followed the assassinations in Paris and the siege of Kobane. 
There was a framing of the Kurdish combat against ISIS through 
the victimhood discourse (Khayati 2008) as the Kurdish nation 
was constructed as being a victim of barbarous acts by ISIS. This 
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was a familiar diaspora discourse to build on, as also noted by 
Karagöz (2017: 85), who observed that the stigmatisation of 
immigrant communities, especially when associated with the 
PKK, ‘facilitates the perpetuation of a victimhood discourse used 
as a mobilising strategy to strengthen the diasporic community 
links’. This means that the transnational space of Kurdish dias-
pora communities shows particular dynamics in terms of exile, 
the historical background of Kurdish nationalism, and the sense 
of ‘otherness’ that continued to inform the framing of the Kurdish 
combat against ISIS. Indeed, references to both past and ongoing 
events were used to construct a collective narrative of the ongoing 
struggle and political aims, which were then used to frame mobi-
lisations (see Macdonald 2012; Orjuela 2018).
Furthermore, the framing of the Kurdish combat was made 
in a way that it extended beyond diaspora politics and the 
‘Kurdish issue’. One interviewee tells of the Rojava experiment 
and its applicability beyond the borders of Syria, particularly to 
the leftist movement.
Because what happened in Rojava, it’s not only for Kurds. It’s 
also the combat of the left, we can say, especially of the left. So I 
remember when even Marine Le Pen gave a speech for Kurds … 
But it’s definitely a combat of the left, because the left sees how the 
system is back there and that it works.
Rojava’s societal experiment, deemed to be in danger by the 
threat posed by ISIS, was framed as having political significance 
beyond its borders, both in Syria and internationally. For instance, 
concerning the Kurdish leaders’ meeting with then President 
Hollande, Zuhat Kobani, the PYD foreign relations official, 
told in an interview with Al-Monitor94 that they had explained 
their vision for Syria. He further continued on the topic of their 
political aims:
Our goal is to democratize all of Syria. We want decentralized 
Syria. We have proven ourselves militarily and politically. We 
put together a democratic governance model incorporating all  
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political, ethnic and religious groups. We want this system to  
prevail in all of Syria.
In the overall material, it was frequently emphasised that the com-
bat led by Kurdish troops in Syria did not only concern them; the 
Kurds were fighting for a societal model that had universal value. 
Also, the fact that ISIS had organised attacks on French soil was 
an efficient means of framing the issue to also concern the French 
state and its citizens. Other similarities with France were drawn 
when framing the combat, with references to the familiar politi-
cal vocabulary of leftist movements (resistance, solidarity). As one 
interviewee observed,
The resistance means a lot to the French people. They remem-
bered this feeling of resistance with Kobane, when resistance 
came to mean protecting the values of your homeland. It means 
a lot to the French. In the Second World War, when the Germans 
came, there was a sentiment of resistance.
These frames were employed by transnational brokers who 
addressed the diaspora audience in France. For instance, women’s 
role in the ongoing conflict95 as combatants was also underlined 
by the YPJ commander Nessrin Abdullah during her visit to Paris 
in January 2016, when she not only highlighted the international 
dimension of YPJ’s struggle but emphasised that Kurdish women 
were engaging in two simultaneous battles. The first was the 
national struggle for the liberation of the Kurdish people, and 
the second a struggle for women’s rights via raising awareness 
of the significance of emancipation and self-determination.96
Another aspect of this framing was the media representations. 
What made the media representations of the shared combat 
against ISIS even more powerful and persuasive was the emphasis 
put on Kurdish female combatants fighting the patriarchal ISIS. 
This framing stood in direct opposition to the discursive and 
legal framing of the PKK as a ‘terrorist organisation’. The Western 
political powers, as well as the media, initially avoided associating 
the PKK with the YPG. Indeed, once referred to as ‘terrorists’ in 
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the mainstream media, the representation of the PKK and YPG 
significantly changed in the course of the conflict. The Kurdish 
YPG and YPJ troops were soon depicted as the only forces capa-
ble of deterring the attacks by ISIS in the region, particularly after 
the massive breakdown of the Iraqi army and the flight of its sol-
diers, which left a sizeable arsenal of weaponry in the hands of the 
advancing ISIS forces. Both the media and diaspora actors’ fram-
ing of the Kurdish combat against ISIS, which simultaneously 
drew from the victimhood discourse and portrayed the Kurdish 
combatants as defenders of universal, democratic values, stood in 
stark contrast to the ‘terrorist’ discourse associated with the PKK.
5.5 Political Ambivalence: Terrorist or Not?
We can say that the diasporic claims and projects were formu-
lated in the context of political ambivalence. The background of 
this ‘ambivalence’, as it was communicated in the material, origi-
nated from the fact that the PKK was added to the list of terrorist 
organisations in the European Union in 2002.97 One of the main 
groups fighting ISIS in Kobane was the PKK, closely affiliated with 
the YPG/YPJ, an ally to international forces in the combat against 
ISIS. With the increased media visibility that Kurdish combatants 
received following Kobane, the question of the criminalisation of 
the pro-PKK movement in Europe and the listing of the PKK as 
a ‘terrorist organisation’ led to what the interviewees identified 
as political ambivalence concerning the ‘Kurdish question’ and 
what actually constituted ‘terrorism’.
5.5.1 Criminalisation
How did this question of ‘terrorism’ play out in France, then? 
After the attacks on the French newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris 
in January 2015, the prime minister, Manuel Valls, declared that 
France was ‘in war against terrorism’.98 However, the security 
measures that were reinforced after his declaration had already 
been in place for decades, in particular the infamous Fiche S 
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(security file), applied to individuals considered to represent a 
potential threat to the ‘security of the state’.99 After the attack in 
November 2015, Valls confirmed that in total 20,000 individuals 
had Fiche S,100 of whom 10,500 people were suspected of having 
contact with Islamic movements and the others for their suspected 
belonging to movements considered terrorist, such as the PKK.101 
As one second-generation interviewee, who had previously been 
politically active in the ranks of a pro-PKK organisation, said:
Fiche S – it’s for everyone who is more or less politically active, 
who could be an inconvenience to France. Unfortunately, the 
Kurdish movement in Europe is considered a terrorist organisa-
tion, so everyone who’s more or less active in it has Fiche S … I  
have never been arrested in France, I have a clean record, but  
I have Fiche S; it’s by the French secret service.
As far as pro-PKK activism in France was concerned, after 2006 
the application of security measures was intensified (Marchand 
2017: 154–156). A defence lawyer working on the cases of Kurdish 
political activists prosecuted in Paris noted that after 2008 such 
measures comprised at least 22 police operations initiated against 
Kurdish individuals and associations, as well as 256 arrests, includ-
ing dozens of indictments and legal procedures.102 Another inter-
viewee observed the following change in the authorities’ attitudes 
towards pro-PKK activities after 2007.
Interviewee: There has been a certain criminalisation since 2007. 
The French politics towards the Kurdish movement changed 
drastically then.
MT: Why is that?
Interviewee: Well, there was some international agreement 
between Turkey and France. Till then, France knew about the  
activities and followed them, but then, I’m not sure which  
trade agreement they passed, but the approach changed radically. 
There was a wave of arrests in 2007, 2008, another one in 2010 and 
one recently, and the court cases take years. They end in nothing, 
but it stays in the record even though the court case is cancelled.
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In 2006, 18 Turkish citizens were arrested for their suspected 
membership of the PKK. At the same time, the Kurdish Cultural 
Center, Ahmet Kaya, in the 10th arrondissement in Paris was 
accused similarly of association with and financing of a terrorist 
organisation (Le Monde103,104). In 2017, 13 people were arrested in 
the Parisian region for same allegations.105 One interviewee told of 
this wave of arrest in the following way: ‘In 2007, there was a wave 
of arrests in France, of persons who worked for the Kurdish move-
ment. So, we gathered some 50,000 Kurds to Paris to demonstrate.’ 
These waves of arrests were referenced upon by some interviewees 
and sparked some mobilisation to contest the court decisions and 
rulings through demonstrations and petitions.
In 2011, France and Turkey signed a major agreement concern-
ing internal security. It stated that the two countries engaged in 
‘operational collaboration in the combat against terrorism’. The 
minister of the interior, Claude Guéant, expressed the total deter-
mination by France to fight with Turkey against the terrorism 
of the PKK. He also mentioned that, in 2010 and 2011, 38 and 
32 members of the PKK had been arrested in France.106 In 2012, 
Adem Uzun, a board member of the Kurdish National Congress 
(Congrès national du Kurdistan) was arrested and charged with 
‘financing terrorism’ (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015). Some time later, an 
investigation was opened concerning his involvement in arms 
trafficking, before those charges were dropped in 2014 following 
the decision by the Court of Appeal. His lawyer, Antoine Comte, 
declared in the French media that ‘It was a disturbing decision in 
the sense that the French police abided to the political oppres-
sion practiced by the Turkish authorities. It all started with 
Turkish intelligence’ (20 Minutes 2016107). In early 2015, 10 Kurds 
were accused of having financed the PKK and were condemned 
following the antiterrorism legislation. The Court of Appeal con-
demned Maison du peuple kurde in Marseille for collecting funds 
for a terrorist organisation (Le Monde 2015108).
In fact, most cases seem to concern the ‘participation and 
financing of a terrorist organisation’, which is also visible in the 
rejection of citizenship applications and in the reluctance of 
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authorities to renew visas for politically active Kurds on the prem-
ise that their ‘loyalty towards our institutions and our country is 
not guaranteed’. One such case took place in 2015, when a Kurdish 
individual’s citizenship application was denied on the basis of her 
husband participating in the ‘financing of a terrorist organisation’, 
in this case the PKK.109 The request to overturn the decision reads 
as follows:
Madame A B spouse X requests the overturning of the decision 
of 3 February 2015 by which the Interior Ministry rejected her 
request for citizenship on the grounds that the loyalty of her hus-
band towards France and its institutions was not guaranteed.110
This echoes the French state’s attitude towards migrants’ politi-
cal activities that are directed towards their homeland, which are 
‘often met with official suspicion’ (Escafré-Dublet 2014: 5), as dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. The phrasing ‘on the grounds that 
the loyalty towards France and its institutions is not guaranteed’ 
also speaks volumes of the relationship between the citizen and 
the state in the French context.111 Indeed, it means the exclusion 
of the national community by means of losing one’s citizenship, 
a debate that has been invoked in relation to terrorism in France 
since the 1990s but which has resurfaced with the question of ISIS 
fighters with acquired French nationality. Between 2002 and 2016, 
13 French citizens lost their citizenship because of terrorism-
related sentences.112
The overall material also included references to the tense rela-
tions between the French authorities and the demonstrators in 
the past, which to some extent echo Baser’s (2017) observations 
on the relationship between the German authorities and pro-PKK 
activists in the country in the 1990s. One interviewee told of her 
earliest memories in a demonstration where the police teargassed 
the demonstrators and beat them with batons: ‘We were once in 
a demonstration and I don’t know why, but the police attacked us 
with batons so we got scattered and everybody fled. I was maybe 
seven or eight.’ However, one interviewee affiliated with a pro-PKK 
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organisation described that there was a certain balance between 
the PKK and the French authorities, and with their political allies 
in the French leftist movement:
The PKK is very well settled in France. They have contacts  
with the socialist parties and the French secret service knows that 
they are here and that they organise always demonstrations … 
And then there were the court cases for financing terrorism and 
several persons were investigated upon. The socialist party sup-
ports the Kurdish movement, but they are cautious about it at the 
same time. You don’t want to create too much pression. There is 
a kind of a balance.
Indeed, it seems that the waves of arrests of individuals assumed 
of financing the PKK were fluctuating throughout the 2010s in 
France. One interviewee noted that such security measures were 
applied at the national level, including police operations target-
ing Kurdish associations in a way that coincided with diplomatic 
visits by Turkish politicians in France. These court cases were 
contested by associations and private individuals via petitions, 
political actions and appeals to authorities, including the case of 
Eutelsat concerning the suspension of two Kurdish channels in 
France following a request by the Turkish authority, RTÜK. As 
discussed in the earlier chapter, similar cases have taken place 
across Europe since the 1990s (Hassanpour 1998; Sinclair & Smets 
2014), including in Denmark113 (Schøtt 2021 forthcoming), the 
United Kingdom (Sentas 2015, 2018), Belgium114 and Germany.115 
Indeed, the material collected for this study goes to testify of the 
continuing insistence of the Turkish state to pursue pro-PKK 
political action in a way that extends its sovereignty beyond its 
state boundaries into the European space, including in France.
5.5.2 Contestations
The political ambivalence in which the mobilisations took 
place were referenced by the participants, who considered the 
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criminalisation of the PKK and the more general political approaches 
to the Kurdish struggle to be hypocritical and incoherent. The most 
common criticism concerned the criminalisation of the PKK while 
the YPG troops,116 close to the PKK, were fighting ISIS in Syria and 
Iraq, and being widely applauded for their actions. The interview-
ees referred to several contradicting cases. For instance, Kurdish 
female combatants’ meeting with President Hollande at the Elysée 
received quite a lot of media attention.117 Simultaneously, members 
of the PKK were pursued in court in different European countries. 
One example given of this political ambivalence concerned com-
batants who left different European countries to join the Syrian 
Kurdish military troops (YPG) in Syria. As a number of individuals 
simultaneously left for combat in the ranks of ISIS, both groups 
tended to be treated as potential terrorist threats on their return.118 
This created some issues for the combatants, who returned to their 
countries after having fought in Syria with the YPG. For instance, 
the first court case of such kind that was opened in the United 
Kingdom was against the father of a British man who volunteered 
with YPG troops in Syria.119 Also, Schøtt (2021 forthcoming: 
145–189) dis cusses Kurdish activism in the judicial arena and court 
cases against fighters who left for Syria in her study on Kurdish 
mobilisations in Denmark. The issue also attracted some media 
attention in France, with ‘native’ combatants returning after having 
engaged in combat in the ranks of the YPG.120
The ambivalence concerning Kurdish political claims was criti-
cised and directed both to Europe and to particular countries, as 
shown by these two interviewees:
They are massacring Kurds in Eastern Turkey and you close your 
eyes, youth mouths, otherwise you’ll receive a million refugees 
and it’ll destabilise Europe. So the question is, are we Kurds just 
carpet merchants? We are 40 million, and we are carpet merchants  
for you and the Europeans are silent when Kurds are massacred 
… We are fighting ISIS without any help, so there’s hypocrisy.  
It’s the UK, France, Germany … For me it’s total hypocrisy, it has 
to be said.
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***
It’s also politics, really dirty politics. How can they look into the 
eyes of people who actually fought against ISIS? Everybody agrees 
that ISIS is the enemy of humanity, and the only people fighting 
them are the Kurds. Are they being helped by the Europeans? No. 
They are all just hypocrites.
Whereas the first criticism concerned more generally the broader 
political situation and the international listing of the PKK as a 
terrorist organisation, another raised point related more specifi-
cally to the French context. France has been used as the perfect 
example of a nation-state that considers itself universalist and 
egalitarian (Kastoryano 2002). The respondents considered there 
to be an incoherence between the republican values of freedom of 
speech and political liberties, and the criminalisation of pro-PKK 
Kurdish activism in France:
It has been written down, liberty, equality and fraternity, but you 
cannot see it at all. There are mottos that do not work at all in 
France, that’s a reality.
For Kurds, I don’t know how many people have Fiche S, but I 
know that, for a country where we speak a lot about the freedom 
of expression, of thought and such things, it’s problematic.
Another point of criticism that was particularly directed towards 
France was how the families of three assassinated activists had 
not been received by the president at the Elysée Palace, unlike 
in other similar cases. One interviewee was particularly out-
raged by this treatment, referring to the long-standing tradition 
in France to acknowledge injustice in similar cases by the presi-
dential invitation of family members. He contrasted the treatment 
of three Kurdish women’s families to how the Jewish community 
was acknowledged when 17 French Jews were killed in attacks in 
January 2015. Following the attacks, President Hollande, with 
Prime Minister Valls and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu, visited a synagogue in Paris.121
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So with Jews, the families were invited to Elysee and Hollande 
went to a synagogue. It’s not against Jews, the criticism I’m mak-
ing. They have a strong lobby, they can make political pressure. 
But does the president of the Republic determine his approach 
towards peoples according to political pressure? We don’t have 
a strong lobby but that does not mean you cannot come and 
express your condolences. It’s really the greatest shame for France. 
We don’t ask them to liberate Kurds. We just ask to be treated as 
human beings, like they do with others.
The interviewee referred specifically to the power of a lobby 
that the Kurds lacked, according to him. His narration also echoes 
more collective calls for recognition, not specifically as a nation 
but as human beings. The lack of such recognition on behalf of the 
French state was considered to be the result of political ambiva-
lence surrounding the Kurdish political claims.
In this chapter, I have approached ‘diaspora’ as a category of prac-
tice, following Brubaker’s approach that was discussed in Chapter 2 
(2005: 12). In other words, I have examined how diasporic 
claims were made, and projects articulated and loyalties evoked 
and mobilised, instead of focusing on the Kurdish diaspora as a 
homogeneous community acting in a uniform manner. Instead, 
this chapter has aimed to show how group formation takes place 
through multiple actions, and how it makes more sense analyti-
cally to examine particular circumstances where such diasporic 
claims and projects are made, instead of approaching them as a 
group property. This also follows Sökefeld’s (2006) observation 
that diasporas need to be thought of as imagined transnational 
communities that come about through specific processes of 
mobilisation, instead of considering diasporas as clear-cut com-
munities sharing ethnicity, language, ancestry and so forth (see 
Quinsaat 2019). These diasporic claims and projects were formu-
lated in the context of political ambivalence towards the pro-PKK 
movement in France, and more generally at the European level. 
Through such claims and articulations, the Kurdish (diaspora) 
nation became constructed as an actor that appealed to its rela-
tional others, in this case the French government and European 
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institutions, and one that opposed ISIS and Turkey. This observa-
tion is similar to that of Eccarius-Kelly (2017: 43), who notes that 
the ‘European Kurdish diaspora presents itself as an interlocutor 
for broadly conceived Kurdish interests and strongly supports 
the efforts that enhance the level of legitimacy for Kurds at the 
international political level’. There was indeed an increased level 
of legitimacy that the Kurdish diaspora actors managed to achieve 
at the international political level, the solidity of which in future, 




Kobane was a peak that united the diaspora youth. It was heroic, 
mythic and a strong symbol. We had won in any case. Either we 
became the martyrs or we won against ISIS, which then happened. 
It brought hope, especially after the bitter feeling after Sinjar.122 It 
was a moment of pride, of unity. Since the enemy was ISIS, the 
French also felt concerned by it. (Second-generation Kurd, 32)
This interviewee referred to the emotions the Kobane siege stirred 
among second-generation members, how Kurdish troops’ victory 
over ISIS generated a sense of pride among his generation, the 
unifying effect it had and how even ‘the French also felt concerned 
by it’. As discussed in the previous chapter, a series of events in 
the Kurdish regions in Turkey, Syria and Iraq sparked mobilisa-
tion in the Kurdish diaspora communities across Europe. They 
also gained considerable visibility in the international press, nota-
bly the military engagement by Kurdish female guerrillas against 
ISIS (Toivanen & Baser 2016). At the same time, the simultaneous 
criminalisation of the PKK and the international alliances made 
with the YPG, closely associated with the PKK, to combat ISIS 
evoked sentiments of ambivalence and incoherence among dias-
pora members. It was also in this context that the second genera-
tion mobilised for Kobane.
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This chapter builds on a discussion on the diaspora mobilisa-
tion that took place in Paris in the 2010s, following a series of 
different events, including the siege of Kobane and the assassina-
tions of three Kurdish activists in Paris. In this chapter, I will spe-
cifically focus on the second generation of Kurdish parentage, and 
how they discussed these two events. This chapter is divided into 
three sections. The first two focus on the mobilisation and trans-
national activities by second-generation members, and how those 
differed from their parents’ generation, tackling the following 
questions: how did the mobilisation play out in the case of second- 
generation members? What came from this mobilisation in terms 
of their transnational activities and engagements, and how did it 
differ from that of their parents’ generation? The last section tack-
les the visibility the Kobane siege and the Kurds’ combat against 
ISIS received in the international media, and what significance 
Kobane had for the second generation in terms of their under-
standing of ‘Kurdishness’, also discussing the online dimension 
of constructing the ‘homeland’. This chapter, more broadly, deals 
with the following question: why did the Kobane siege, in particu-
lar, spark an interest in the second generation, compared to other 
events that had taken place in their ancestral homeland during 
their adulthood years?
6.2 Kobane Calling123
I think that there is a certain interest towards the Kurdish move-
ment among the youth, notably with the civil war in Syria. More 
and more are interested and, in the movement of young Kurds 
of PKK, some are very committed. I think that there is a grow-
ing consciousness and, starting from 2013, we really felt it with as 
young as 12-, 13-year-olds becoming interested too. I don’t know 
if that interest will really become concrete in the long run, though.
The second-generation interviewee, active in a pro-PKK organisa-
tion, described his observations concerning the awoken interest 
towards the ‘Kurdish movement’ among the younger generation 
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since the early 2010s. Whereas some members of the second 
generation had already engaged in political and civic activities 
towards Kurdistan before 2014, it is clear that a series of events in 
Turkey, Iraq and Syria, including particularly the Kobane siege, 
also generated mobilisation among those members who had pre-
viously been less active. This was also reflected in other European 
countries, including Germany and the United Kingdom (Eccarius- 
Kelly 2017: 45–46), as well as Denmark (Schøtt 2021 forthcom-
ing). The interviewee above also expressed his doubt over whether 
the mobilisation would lead to any sustainable and long-term 
engagement among the younger generation. Whereas future 
research can delve more into this, we can say that the mobilisation 
of the Kurdish diaspora communities in the 2010s led to second-
generation members taking part in a variety of different transna-
tional activities that will prove to be either sporadic or sustained 
over time.
6.2.1 Translocal activities
So, what activities did second-generation Kurds in Paris take part 
in? In concrete terms, such activities included participation in 
numerous demonstrations, in electoral activities (long-distance 
voting and election monitoring campaigns in Turkey) and in 
humanitarian convoys and collection of funds towards Syria. 
They also consisted of translating and blogging on the Kurdish 
issue, organising and participating in campaigns and seminars to 
raise awareness of the situation of Kurds in Syria and Turkey, and 
even in some cases short-term visits to the Kurdish regions. In 
terms of formal, more institutionalised means, second-generation 
members engaged transnationally via pre-existing associations 
as well as via new ones that saw daylight in the early 2010s and 
that particularly targeted the second generation. For instance, the 
UEKF (Union des Étudiants Kurdes de France, Union of Kurdish 
Students in France), which has existed since 2010, included 
mostly members from the second generation. It organised a 
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wide range of different activities for its members, as described by 
one member:
MT: So is it mostly second-generation members who take part in 
the activities …?
Interviewee: Exactly, we are active at Paris 8 University … We 
meet up weekly. So every committee meets up in their university 
and us, as co-responsible for each university, we coordinate and 
then all meet together every second week to manage activities.
MT: Okay, and what sort of activities do you then organise?
Interviewee: Conferences, seminars, film showing and debates, 
cultural days, festivals, a bit of everything …
MT: So is it for the purpose to gain visibility, to raise awareness?
Interviewee: It’s specifically to give voice to the situation back 
there, to make the Kurdish question more known, to meet up 
with students that are interested in the region and also to create 
connections, and in the long term to maintain those connections 
and work together on the Kurdish question.
The interviewee referred to the variety of different activities, rang-
ing from more political conferences and seminars to more cultural 
events, such as film showings and festivals. He also mentioned 
the organisation’s motivations to foster long-term commitment 
and to provide a space for such among participants. He referred 
to the importance of maintaining connections among second- 
generation Kurds and towards Kurdistan. This also motivated 
the establishment in 2016 of a second-generation Kurdish asso-
ciation, Ambition kurde, which identifies itself as a non-political 
association. The association’s founder opened the motivations to 
establish the association by emphasising the need both to foster 
networks among second-generation Kurds and to engage towards 
the Kurdish question. Associations that attracted second- 
generation Kurds were also founded in other countries at the 
time, including Youth for Kobane in the UK and other pro-Rojava 
solidarity groups. Also, Schøtt (2021 forthcoming) observes how 
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young Kurds established several associations in Denmark, follow-
ing the Kobane siege.
One major theme among mobilised second-generation Kurds 
was the sense of urgency to react to these critical events, the 
Kobane siege and the assassination of three Kurdish activists in 
Paris. For instance, when talking about the siege of Kobane, one 
interviewee noted the change in her commitment:
For me, Kobane didn’t change my commitment, but it changed 
the urgency of the matter. I couldn’t wait anymore, so I think  
that the commitment did not change, but it speeded things up. It 
was now or never.
This was particularly visible in the rapid organisation of humanita-
rian convoys to Rojava. Kobane, which had been almost comple-
tely destroyed by the siege, became the target of reconstruction 
projects in the aftermath. One interviewee described his partici-
pation in sending a humanitarian convoy to Rojava, although the 
uncertainty of the convoys reaching the intended final destination 
seemed to be one major concern. The second spoke of the sig-
nificance of reconstruction. In the words of the interviewee below, 
the quick recovery and reconstruction were highly symbolic and 
a sign of resistance against the destruction that followed the siege.
We collected different things, cardboard boxes of clothes, with 
my mother and my brothers. We have too many things … Our 
friends participated too. I gave up new shoes that I had never 
worn.
MT: They were sent to Kobane?
Interviewee: They were sent to Rojava. Now it starts to slow 
down, and it would be our job to reorganise a collect with the 
Rojava Bureau of Representation here, and you need logistics, a 
truck, storage space, volunteers. And it would really need to go 
to the refugee camp with Kurds, Yezidis, Syrian … Not to those 
with ISIS.
***
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If the villages in Kurdistan remain destroyed, for me it’s serious, 
since it means that ISIS or the Turkish government have won. 
They came to start a war and they destroyed everything and then 
left. So, for me it’s crucial to reconstruct quickly, to make an inter-
national effort now, and to focus directing all donations there. 
And to show that we are not afraid, that you came to destroy and 
we reconstructed right after. It’s symbolic.
In addition to activities that were channelled through more insti-
tutional means, via associations for instance, second-generation 
members took part in private initiatives of a semi-institutional 
nature, such as humanitarian convoys, reflecting activities under-
taken by second-generation members across Europe. For instance, 
Schøtt (2021 forthcoming: 107, 229–230) identifies a group of 
young Kurds who mobilised at the individual level instead 
of through associations or collective initiatives. She observes that, 
while other groups engaged in collective action through support-
ing the pro-PKK movement or what she calls the ‘Kurdistan move-
ment’ (for independence in Iraqi Kurdistan), this particular group 
‘engaged themselves in individual projects pertaining to research, 
journalism, teaching, human rights, fundraising, media and art, 
utilising their professional and educational skills’. She also notes 
that such humanitarian action forged new transgenerational con-
nections between the first and second generations, through dis-
cussions on how to navigate emergency aid to the conflict areas. 
This distinction was to some extent visible also among the partici-
pants in this study.
Overall, the activities second-generation Kurds took part in 
were transnationally orientated but also quite locally bound, with 
the exception of mobilities. They were locally bound in a way 
that potentially differs from more traditional diaspora politics in 
which the first-generation members take part. This was visible 
in how second-generation members mobilised via student asso-
ciations at different universities, leftist networks and NGOs and 
not always via ‘diaspora’ organisations. In this sense, we can say 
that second-generation members mostly engaged in a translocal 
activism: one that was locally bound in terms of organisation and 
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targeted audiences (in awareness-raising campaigns, for instance) 
and simultaneously one that was linked to the political situation 
in the Kurdish territories (see Brickell & Datta 2011).
The local dynamics also became visible when talking about the 
assassinations of three Kurdish activists that took place in Paris 
one year earlier. In fact, the assassinations, in a way, laid the ground 
for the mobilisations that the Kobane siege generated. As the first 
interviewee described, the sudden proximity of violence made 
these events more tangible, with ‘homeland’ dynamics becoming 
conflated with ‘hostland’ dynamics. The second interviewee also 
made a parallel with the attacks that had taken place in Paris the 
week preceding the interview. She referred to the November 2015 
attacks, which had been organised by ISIS members in the Bata-
clan concert hall and a few other places, including restaurants, in 
Paris. The mobilising effect and the sudden proximity of violence 
were referenced by several interviewees, who considered that the 
diaspora members were not used to the threat of violence in 
the host society, compared to the conditions in Turkey.
In fact, the mobilisation was already taking place. Many students 
joined us after the assassination of our comrades. It really created 
a shock. They understood the importance of getting involved. 
Often their parents had to leave the country for political reasons, 
economic too, so they are conscious of the question. They are not 
all politicised, but they want to get involved, in whatever way, for 
the people.
***
It’s like with the attack that took place last week. Nobody was 
expecting to get exploded or killed in the middle of Paris by  
jihadists. It’s a bit the same thing. It caused psychological trouble 
to the Kurdish population during quite a while, but also to the 
people working within the Kurdish movement, because of not  
knowing the perpetrators and the fact that one of them had mana-
ged to infiltrate the movement and to gain a position within it.
The first interviewee’s account portrays a level of diasporic con-
sciousness among the second generation: ‘they are conscious 
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of the question’ and fully aware of their parents’ motivations to 
migrate. As I will discuss this in more detail in the following chap-
ter, I suggest that the observed translocal activities included also a 
‘diasporic’ component in the sense that they evoked and aimed at 
changing the situation in the ancestral ‘homeland’.
6.2.2 Mobilising resources
The sudden urgency to react to these transformative events 
was made possible by the existence of transnational networks 
and organising structures that had previously enabled Kurdish 
diaspora members to take part in cultural production and 
political activism and to be informed of the events back in the 
‘homeland’ (see Chapter 4). The transnational networks and 
organisational structures, which are the result of decades of 
active diaspora politics, have also enabled second-generation 
members to engage in activities towards Kurdistan. One exam-
ple of such transnational activities was, for instance, the send-
ing of a team of diaspora members to monitor the general 
elections that took place in Turkey in 2015, organised via the 
HDP offices in Brussels. The teams consisted also of second-
generation members.
As I have argued elsewhere (Toivanen 2019), the transnational 
ties, practices and mobilities can represent a significant mobilis-
able resource for second-generation members to advance their 
educational or professional advantages and to potentially contrib-
ute to the development of Kurdistan. Kinship ties, for instance, 
can come to constitute a form of ‘migrant capital’ that has become 
available to second-generation members as a result of their hav-
ing been raised in a transnational space. One example of when 
the transnational networks became useful was in the case of visits 
to the Kurdish region, although this concerned only a few of the 
respondents. One interviewee tells how she left for the Kurdish 
region in Turkey to complete an internship, which then led her to 
establish networks in her professional domain towards the region. 
She observed the following:
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For my friends, I think that lot of things take place on Facebook, 
associations, events, collaboration … There are people who left 
for the region, in Germany too, and who did a bit the same thing 
than I did. So my friend left for Kobane, for instance; she already 
came back. So I think that Kobane speeded things up, and per-
sons that were not previously engaged, I think they became  
more engaged.
In the case of the interviewee above, her kinship ties enabled the 
mobility, which then led to the establishment of professional con-
tacts in the region through her internship period that were not 
based on kinship ties. Although only a few interviewees took part 
in such mobilities towards Kurdistan, with the particular aim of 
contributing towards its development, it nevertheless remains an 
important aspect to consider concerning the role of the second 
generation in diaspora contributions.
At the same time, the interviews also echoed Eccarius-Kelly’s 
(2017) observation on how the mobilisation that followed Kobane 
was more directed towards European publics, in addition to 
diaspora actors pleading to national stakeholders. Indeed, she 
observes that, during the siege of Kobane, Kurdish activism in 
Europe engaged more with European publics, with Kurdish activ-
ists also reaching out to international academic and media circles: 
‘The rise of a Euro-Kurdish intelligentsia succeeded in elevating 
Kurdish claims for recognition and historical justice, and their 
discussions received public attention’ (Eccarius-Kelly 2017: 44). 
One example of the rise of the Euro-Kurdish intelligentsia and the 
role that second-generation members played in it is the Kurdish-
European Society (KES), based in Brussels. KES aims to promote 
cooperation between different European institutions and institu-
tions in the Kurdish region. It identifies its members as ‘scientists, 
officials, university graduates with different backgrounds and 
students from all over Europe’,124 and speaks directly to second- 
generation Kurds. I participated in a meeting with Ambition 
kurde and KES where common interests and forms of collabo-
ration were discussed. On the other hand, there was also a clear 
consciousness of the utility of fostering links to local stakeholders 
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in France, yet with a transnational focus towards Kurdistan. 
For instance, one interviewee pointed out that the networks and 
links they fostered in France were crucial to the reconstruction 
projects in Kobane:
Because the links we foster here are beneficial to better under-
stand the society back there. The relations that we create here, they 
are as important, to facilitate activities, projects … For instance, 
it’s quite simple, but the construction of Kobane, it’s about the 
money, and one needs to find it, so we can create relations with 
the municipalities, projects that aim to it.
This speaks of the networks in which second-generation members 
are embedded and how they utilise such networks. For instance, 
Eccarius-Kelly (2017: 48) also notes that the Kurdish associa-
tions benefited from a rising number of highly educated second- 
generation Kurds: ‘Activists who had gained advanced levels of 
education and improved skills relied on innovative discursive 
spaces to reach audiences through cultural events, art and photo 
exhibits, satellite programming and later through social media 
campaigning as well’. The increasing number of highly educated 
second-generation Kurds in political mobilisations and the related 
actions is also observed by Schøtt (2021 forthcoming: 229–230), 
who notes that second-generation Kurds in Denmark perceive 
being Kurdish to be an asset, since they speak several languages 
and understand the political dynamics both in the diaspora and 
in Kurdistan. She also notes that they align with a global cosmo-
politan class of young, educated people who in times of crisis 
mobilise in support of fellow Kurds and ‘become occasional mem-
bers of the diaspora, however, they continue to act in their own 
way’ (Schøtt 2021 forthcoming: 230).
The complex spatial dynamics, namely second-generation 
members organising more locally or at the European level, may 
well reflect the changing nature of the diaspora and the role sub-
sequent generations play in mobilisations. It is therefore impor-
tant to acknowledge that second-generation mobilisations can 
be quite heterogeneous: they can include both those members 
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who are more engaged via institutional means and associations’ 
networks and those acting individually and through personal net-
works. The latter can also more easily fall outside the scope of 
research, as their transnational engagements are less visible than 
those taking place through associations, for instance. Yet, both 
need to be accounted for if the role of the second generation in 
diaspora contributions is to be better understood. Similarly, to 
fully grasp the role the second generation can play in diaspora 
contributions, their translocal activities and engagements ought 
to be approached more broadly than merely evidencing some sort 
of kinship connection to their ancestral ‘homeland’.
6.3 Generational Particularities
Studies on young people’s political (dis)engagement have sug-
gested that the contemporary youth is less and less interested 
in politics (Kitanova 2019). Three explanations have been given 
for this, as listed by Mahéo and colleagues (2012: 409). The first 
posits that younger generations have lost interest in politics and 
become more cynical towards it (Henn, Weinstein, & Forrest 
2005). Another line of research suggests that resources, such as 
their socio-economic position and knowledge of politics (Favre 
& Offerlé 2002), affect the youth’s participation in politics (Muxel 
2002). The third line of research accounts for the changes that 
have taken place in contemporary societies, changes in entry to 
the labour market or the combination of work and studies that 
leaves little time for political engagements.
These studies approach generations as those belonging to par-
ticular age cohorts, in contrast to migration studies that deal 
with ‘generation’ often in terms of the first and second genera-
tions, referring to those who have migrated and to their descend-
ants. This distinction is made with the argument that the lived 
experiences between migrant parents and their grown children 
are to some extent different in terms of having been socialised 
in different social settings (Levitt 2009). If we come back to the 
strategies suggested by Dahinden (2016: 2208–2209) in her plea 
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to ‘de-migranticize’ migration studies, she suggested reorientating 
the focus away from ‘migrant populations’ towards ‘overall popu-
lations’. This raises this question: what else are we to see in second-
generation young adults’ approach to political (dis)engagement 
if we are to consider it in light of research conducted on youth’s 
political (dis)engagement more broadly? In this section, I will 
discuss the generational dimension, by analysing both the socio-
logical and ‘migrant’ generational aspects of how the research par-
ticipants talked about politics and its generational particularities.
6.3.1 Disinterest in (diaspora) politics
The second-generation mobilisation and the activities that 
followed it were, in a sense, both quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from those of their parents’ generation. The second- 
generation members considered that they participated less in 
political activities than their parents’ generation did. One reason 
for this was the dislike towards more traditional forms of politics 
and disbelief that change could take place through such traditional 
politics. For instance, this interviewee communicated this dislike 
by equating the French political scene with that in Kurdistan:
In France, you have many people that are fed up with politics, 
there are many intellectuals who don’t give a shit, because the 
politicians say one thing and then do another. And it’s the same 
thing back there [in Kurdistan], between the promises and what 
is actually done. Let’s take the example of my young brother. He 
says that it’s not politics that will solve things; they won’t solve the 
conflicts. In fact, if there were no politics, perhaps things would 
be simpler.
This echoes the findings concerning the perception of politics 
among the younger generation, regardless of their background. 
In this sense, we can say that the second-generation Kurds’ expe-
riences reflect the general tendencies of their age group as far as 
beliefs in the political system are concerned. For instance, the Euro-
pean Survey in 2005 showed that only 37% of 15- to 25-year-olds 
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expressed an interest in politics (EUYOUPART 2005a), and that 
the younger generation is generally less interested in traditional 
party politics than older generations are (Bennett 2008; Furlong 
& Cartmel 2007). The EUYOUPART (2005b) survey concern-
ing the French data showed that the interviewed youth were less 
interested in politicians and political affairs concerning partisan 
quarrels, but in general felt concerned about national issues and 
international problems. This means that contemporary youth can 
well be turning towards alternative modes of political participa-
tion, including digitally networked action and everyday politics 
in the form of petitions, boycotts, demonstrations and so forth 
(Dalton 2017; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Sloam & Henn 2019). In 
fact, maybe one reason that the young second-generation Kurds 
found the Rojava experiment particularly fascinating was this dis-
enchantment and disinterest towards more traditional politics, 
including diaspora and non-diaspora politics.
Furthermore, there were also more diaspora context-specific 
reasons that were named for the dislike towards politics. These 
were the high level of hierarchy in diaspora associations and in 
‘homeland’ politics, and the lack of critique and nuance in political 
debates. One interviewee opened this problematic in the following 
way, also evoking the role that the second generation has to play:
The freedom of thought, the freedom of expression, the free-
dom to say whatever you wish, for me it’s very important. But 
back there, it’s not seen that way. It’s between the leaders, and if  
Mr Leader says something, everybody follows. It’s not the French 
way, you can agree on something and disagree on something 
else. Back there, you agree on everything or on nothing; it’s really 
binary. They don’t have the culture or education for nuance, which 
is very important. I think that, today, the second generation tries 
to put in place and to transmit that towards the Kurdish issue.
He also observed the lack of critique in ‘homeland’ politics, 
compared to the French political culture, also mentioning that 
it takes time to build such politics based on debate. This echoes 
the socialisation into the French political culture (see Crul, 
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Schneider & Leslie 2010; Crul & Vermeulen 2003); he also referred 
to the role that the second generation could play in this regard. 
Another diaspora-specific reason for the dislike towards politics 
was interethnic relations, which were often seen as conflict-based, 
especially among the first generation. One interviewee affiliated 
with a pro-PKK organisation felt that the younger generation was 
transcending the political (and ethnic) divisions within the move-
ment, which were of more importance to their parents. Another 
pointed toward the role of the second generation to ‘take matters 
into [their own] hands’ so that the rivalries between the Turks and 
Kurds could be overcome.
I think that our generation has enough distance, and my hope is 
that people involved in the PKK … the generation before, they 
are way too in it. But that our generation, I hope that there is no 
more that animosity between the parties and that youth born in 
France will be different and don’t make the same mistakes as our 
parents that are a bit fascist.
***
It is really our task to take matters into hands; it’s my genera-
tion’s task to make it so that there is no rivalry between Turks and 
Kurds in some years’ time. Unfortunately, if we don’t succeed, it 
will be for the following generation. The first generation tried and 
failed, so it’s now our turn to do things right.
These accounts echo Baser’s (2015a) observations on the signifi-
cance of interethnic relations and how those are communicated 
between the first and second generation. As she notes, the context 
of socialisation and politicisation in the hostland remains highly 
significant in terms of whether the interethnic conflicts pass and 
are ‘inherited’ from the first generation to their descendants. Her 
study dealt with first- and second-generation Kurds in Germany 
and Sweden, and showed significant differences between the 
two Kurdish communities concerning this. This study’s findings 
seem to indicate a tendency similar to her observations (2015a: 
268) that, unlike the first generation, the second generation 
‘(re)constructs the conflict through the prism of their experiences 
The Second Generation 177
in the host country’. Building on this observation, we can also 
conclude that the second generation reconstructs peace through 
their experiences.
6.3.2 Redefining ‘political’
Indeed, one major difference that was communicated between 
the first- and second-generation activities concerned the political 
nature of activities. The second-generation members seemed to 
express a preference towards apolitical activities compared to politi-
cally and ideologically motivated activities. This was related not 
only to conflicting interethnic relations but also to political divi-
sions within the Kurdish communities. One second-generation 
interviewee, active within the PKK, reflected the generational dif-
ferences when he had discussed alternative ways of organising 
activities with the older generation members. In fact, he referred 
to the preference that the second-generation youth had to engage 
more locally and in a less hierarchical way. Another interviewee 
underlined that the movement had not been able to change to 
accommodate the needs and the visions of young Kurds in Europe. 
He specifically pointed out the division between Kurds in Turkey 
and other parts of Kurdistan, with the younger generation identi-
fying themselves simply as Kurds.
The alternatives didn’t please the elder. They are not like us. There 
are many young people, like myself, who have this mentality and 
who engage in a similar manner, in a better manner, in a way that 
the activism is more local, much less elitist.
***
Today most youth do not feel concerned by the PKK. Or not that 
they are not concerned by the PKK, all Kurds are for the PKK, 
no matter where they come from. But, today, people do not feel 
so much concerned by the PKK. The party has moved away from 
the vision of young Kurds in Europe. Because they are about the  
Kurds in Turkey, Kurds in Iraq and Kurds in Iran, and what  
the young people today want, in fact, is just to get along as Kurds.
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This preference for politically neutral associations and activi-
ties was communicated in relation to the need for unity and to 
an understanding of pan-Kurdish identity that transcended 
national boundaries, which I will discuss in more detail later. At 
the organisational level, this also gave birth to new associations 
that were explicitly apolitical in character, and which emphasised 
educational or cultural activities. One example of a politically 
independent association was the foundation of Ambition kurde, 
which focused on educational and cultural activities, particularly 
concerning the second generation of Kurdish parentage in Paris. 
At the same time, the association’s activities included support-
ing the reconstruction of a school in Rojava. This was one exam-
ple of the translocal activism that second-generation members 
took part in and that included political, cultural and educational 
aspects. Also, Schøtt (2021 forthcoming: 105) observes how young 
Kurds in Denmark established KAD, Kurdish Alternative in 
Denmark, to bridge the gap between young supporters of PKK 
and the Iraqi Kurdish movement, by dissociating themselves 
from political parties.
However, it would be rather simplistic to conclude that the sec-
ond generation was politically less engaged than their parents 
owing to their dislike or disinterest in politics. Several scholars 
(Mahéo, Dejaeghere & Stolle 2012; O’Toole 2003; O’Toole, Marsh 
& Jones 2003) have argued that, to study contemporary youth 
and political engagement, it is necessary to acknowledge that the 
definition of politics has changed. Instead of focusing on formal 
politics or electoral activities, they suggest that non-electoral 
activities, including boycotting or signing a petition, also need 
to be accounted for (Mahéo, Dejaeghere & Stolle 2012: 407). 
This means that such participation can also be spontaneous 
and sporadic in time, instead of a long-term commitment in 
formal politics.
In fact, when inquiring about the nature of activities, the inter-
views with second-generation members and other stakehold-
ers confirmed that the members of the second generation also 
tended to participate in activities different from their parents. 
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For instance, whereas the commemorative events and political 
meetings were mostly attended by first-generation members, the 
second-generation members instead took part in cultural events, 
concerts, associations for educative purposes and so forth, which 
they did not necessarily consider political activities. They also 
engaged in sporadic activities via different online spaces.
Indeed, another significant difference that was communicated 
by the interviewees concerning the transnational engagements 
between the first- and second-generation members was the 
use of social media tools. The online activities that the second- 
generation youth participated in included blogging, distributing 
information on Turkey, Kurdistan and the Middle East, circulat-
ing petitions, communicating their own views, engaging in online 
debates, and also in some cases using social media platforms to 
organise activities, events and seminars to raise awareness of the 
situation of Kurds. This they did in French, Turkish and Kurdish. 
At the same time, it meant that they were frequently and visu-
ally informed by the events taking place in Kurdistan. Indeed, the 
sensitisation to the conflict in Kurdish territories took place via 
the embeddedness in online spaces where images and videos 
of the Kurds’ combat against ISIS were circulated. One interviewee 
described the influence of social media on the younger generation 
compared to their parents:
MT: How do you consider the significance of social media? Now-
adays you see everything that takes place in direct …
Interviewee: Yes, it is huge. As my parents are less on social media, 
they are less influenced by such media. They follow the newspa-
pers or news transmissions on televisions, or they discuss the sit-
uation with others but they don’t see what happens on Facebook, 
Instagram. That’s true, there’s a generational difference.
Studies on youth and political activism show that youths’ reper-
toires of action reflect more global changes in political subjec-
tivities, including technological changes that modern societies 
are going through (Mahéo, Dejaeghere & Stolle 2012; O’Toole & 
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Gale 2010; O’Toole & Gale 2013; Sloam & Henn 2019). In other 
words, the ways younger generations engage in civic and politi-
cal activism are rapidly changing, and this change naturally also 
touches upon young people of migrant parentage. For instance, 
several of the online activities were not considered ‘political’ by 
interviewees. In fact, the understanding of ‘political’ seemed 
to be associated with direct political action and in the frame 
of more traditional (diaspora) party politics that characterised 
their parents’ generation. Instead, they rarely identified their 
‘offline’ or online transnational engagements as purely politi-
cal, although they did contain a political dimension in the sense 
that they addressed and aimed at a change in the situation in 
the Kurdish regions. Similarly to Costa and Alinejad’s (2020: 4) 
observations, some second-generation Kurds engaged in ‘home-
land’ politics by the management of online information, without 
actually taking part in political organisations and groups. This 
speaks volumes to both the changing nature of politics but also 
more generally to the changing understandings of it among the 
younger generation.
Overall, the second generation’s political (dis)engagement dif-
fered in some respects from the activities in which the members 
of their parents’ generation engaged. For instance, the informal 
activities were often spontaneous, such as participation in dem-
onstrations, and potentially sporadic in nature. There was also 
more emphasis on cultural and educational, that is, non-political 
activities, which was communicated through the dislike towards 
the existing political divisions among Kurdish political actors and 
diaspora associations. Also, the respondents’ accounts indicated a 
greater use of the online space and platforms, to distribute infor-
mation and to get organised, than their parents’ generation. At 
the same time, second-generation activities can be considered to 
include a diasporic component in the sense that they evoke the 
‘kinship’ connection to an ancestral homeland, as will be dis-
cussed later. In other words, their modes of mobilisation and ways 
of engaging in diasporic circulation are reflective of having been 
raised in a transnational diaspora space but not limited to it.
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6.4 Constructing ‘Kurdistan’ Online
MT: Since 2011, the combat has been widely mediatised … 
Do you think that it contributed towards a mobilisation in the  
Kurdish diaspora and the youth?
Interviewee: In fact, it woke them up. It really showed that this 
can happen to us as well, people dying just like that. And since 
it’s all over the Internet, on social media, it’s where you see it 
the most. There were videos, images, and I think that it woke 
many youths, since there was a lot of discussion about Kurds and 
since we are Kurds. I know that, back then when my parents were 
young, it was way worse so that’s why they were not that influ-
enced by that.
This citation by a second-generation interviewee summarises quite 
poignantly the mobilisation for the second generation that followed 
the siege of Kobane. She referred to social media and its impor-
tance in making the combat more visible to second-generation 
Kurds, and how the Kurds were suddenly in the international 
spotlight. Indeed, the cruelties committed by ISIS in the Middle 
East were extensively mediatised by international news outlets in 
Europe and North America.125 As ISIS drew closer to Syrian Kurdish 
territories in the summer of 2014, the Kurds and the siege of 
Kobane were also thrown into the international spotlight. It can 
be said that Kobane was a turning point in the representations of 
Kurdish combatants and their role in the armed conflict in Syria. 
In fact, the international media framed the combat and the siege 
of Kobane by focusing largely on the role of Kurdish women fight-
ers in the combat against ISIS (Buffon & Allison 2016; Shahvisi 
2018; Şimşek & Jongerden 2018; Toivanen & Baser 2016). The 
Kurdish ‘guerrilla women’ became such a phenomenon that even 
the clothing chain H&M featured guerrilla overalls in their collec-
tion in 2014.
One example of media framing was the news story of the ‘the 
angel of Kobane’, Rehana, referred to as the ‘poster girl’ of YPJ. 
The news story was widely spread across social media sites, and 
was even picked up by mainstream media outlets,126 before the 
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BBC published a news story setting the record straight.127 Rehana 
was constructed as the heroic incarnation of a female combat-
ant. She allegedly took part in the battle against ISIS by killing a 
hundred of its combatants. Then she was supposedly beheaded 
by the organisation, before finally making an appearance in 
Kobane. Such representations of female fighters in ‘Western’ 
media, although quite one-sided, played a crucial role in giving 
visibility to the Kurdish combat. These news stories were also cir-
culated by diaspora actors on different social media platforms, for 
instance via diasporic associations’ Facebook pages, which strate-
gically employed the visibility gained for political purposes (see 
Andén-Papadopoulos & Pantti 2013).
As discussed in Chapter 4, the online space has been signifi-
cant for the constructions of ‘Kurdishness’ and imaginaries evok-
ing Kurdistan due to states’ oppressive measures against Kurdish 
politics and culture (Hassanpour 1998). However, the media rep-
resentations of the Kurdish combat against ISIS, particularly after 
the Kobane siege in late 2014, changed the way Kurdish political 
geography was reimagined and shaped (Kardaş & Yesiltaş 2017: 
265). Indeed, Kardaş and Yesiltaş (2017: 259–260) observe in their 
study on media representations on the Kurdish combat against 
ISIS the following:
The so-called Rojava revolution of Syrian Kurds and their strug-
gle to break the siege of Kobane from the IS forces in particular 
have remarkably been at the centre of a meaning-making strategy 
around which verbal and visual representations of identity, war, 
gender and global politics coalesced.
The authors conclude that there are two outcomes of the inter-
nationalisation of the Kobane War: the regional consolidation of 
Kurdish identity and the international support for Syrian Kurds 
following the mobilisation of global support. Such pictography 
did not only generate global support but was also a mediated 
experience. In their study on second-generation Kurds in Italy, 
Costa and Alinejad (2020: 2) refer to such mediated experiences 
as ‘a state of being, a set of perceptions, feelings, and emotions that 
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are bound to media practices and doings’. For instance, one inter-
viewee told how she experienced the war as a mediatised experi-
ence, bringing the conflict closer:
I feel that there is a lot of exaggeration online and suddenly we 
feel very concerned, perhaps more than what is necessary. There 
is a lot of manipulation in social media, so our parents are affected 
differently because they have a distance to them and they know 
about the situation already. They are more objective because we 
young people are influenced by the images of killed children, 
destroyed wells, videos of people being burnt, I’m really scared of 
ISIS because of that, so social media has a great impact.
In this section, I will discuss such narrations of mediatised expe-
riences in the context of the positive visibility that the Kurdish 
combat received, which was far beyond the more traditional dias-
pora news outlets. The second-generation members were embed-
ded in both mediascapes, diasporic and non-diasporic, and in 
many cases also had access to such spaces through mastering 
several languages (Kurdish, French, English, Arabic, Turkish). I 
will discuss firstly how second-generation members referred to 
the media’s framing of the Kobane siege and more generally of 
the Kurdish combat against ISIS, and secondly how these media 
representations of ‘Kurds’ and of the Kurdish combat against 
ISIS were discussed in relation to their understandings of 
‘Kurdishness’. What meanings did the mediatisation of the com-
bat, communicated largely via online spaces, evoke for second-
generation members in terms their relationship to Kurdistan?
6.4.1 Visibility
In October 2014, Marie Claire published a news story titled 
‘These Remarkable Women Are Fighting ISIS. It’s Time You Know 
Who They Are’.128 One month later, The Economist published 
a news story titled ‘The War against Islamic State. The Kurdish 
Stalingrad’,129 thus making reference to the battle in Stalingrad 
between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in 1942–1943.130 
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Some interviewees also depicted the fight for Kobane as the 
‘Kurdish Stalingrad’. The Kobane siege and the Kurdish troops’ 
combat against ISIS also received lot of media attention in the 
French press. For instance, Arte published a short video in July 
2015 titled ‘Kobane, Martyr City’ (‘Kobane, ville martyre’131), while 
several other news outlets reported on the siege in a detailed man-
ner. Also, books dealing with the topic were published, includ-
ing one by Patrice Franceschi, To Die for Kobane (Mourir pour 
Kobané). In it, he tells of his experiences of accompanying Syrian 
Kurdish forces over two years, shedding light on the political ide-
ology of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, contrasting it 
to that of ISIS. During one interview, a young second-generation 
member took Franceschi’s book out of his bag and told me that it 
had really made an impact on him.
These media productions on the Kurdish combat against ISIS 
were followed online and via social media platforms by second-
generation members. The visibility the Kobane siege received res-
onated among them. Also, not only was news of the siege widely 
distributed in news stories; it also featured in photo exhibitions, 
movies and other cultural artefacts, as discussed earlier. In fact, 
the images of the Kobane siege and of the combat against ISIS 
were circulated in both ‘offline’ events and online spaces in which 
second-generation members were embedded. Also, the media vis-
ibility was not just any kind of visibility. What was emphasised by 
the interviewees was that it was positive media imaginaries that 
were circulated in social media. As one interviewee described the 
impact of this positive visibility,
Yes, because when we came to France, and we said we were Kurds, 
nobody knew what that meant. Today with the media visibility, 
it’s true that people know who we are. And suddenly they associ-
ate it with the combat against ISIS, so for once we are on the right 
side, and not considered ‘terrorists’.
As this interviewee described, the Kurdish military action was 
associated with the combat against ISIS, thus casting them in a 
positive light. The interviewees also noted the stark difference 
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to the previous media visibility that the Kurdish military action, 
notably by the PKK, had received. Listed by the EU and the US as 
a terrorist organisation, the Kurdish question in Turkey has been 
framed through a ‘terrorism discourse’ for decades, although there 
has been an increasing visibility of the Kurdish issue in Turkish-
language media (Yüksel-Pecen 2018).
Therefore, the media representations of the Kobane War did 
evoke the question of terrorism, but associating it this time with 
ISIS. Instead, the Kurdish military action was framed through the 
narratives of ‘resistance’ in the international mediasphere (Kardaş 
& Yesiltaş 2017). This resistance was communicated through the 
juxtaposition between the Kurdish forces and ISIS, starkly con-
trasting their ideological foundations and the role of women in 
both movements. The interviewees also associated this positive 
visibility with the juxtaposition of the Kurdish forces with ISIS, 
with the former considered to defend democratic values in a 
region riddled with authoritarianism and dictatorships. As one 
interviewee observed,
In France, there is a positive opinion on Kurds because they 
defend the democratic values in a region where it’s not evident 
to do so. I have the impression that Western states, and France 
especially, recognise themselves in the values defended by Kurds 
so the contrast is easy to make when it’s about a region such as 
the Middle East where there are many dictatorships and author-
itarianism.
Within this frame, the Kurds became soon depicted as the heroic 
defenders of human rights and liberal values, fighting off the bar-
barous ISIS terrorists (Kardaş & Yesiltaş 2017: 263). For instance, 
the New York Times published an op-ed in March 2015 titled ‘The 
Kurds’ Heroic Stand Against ISIS’. The article ended with a plea 
for the United States to ‘help the Kurds translate their bravery 
into a true ability to defeat the Islamic State’. In fact, Kardaş and 
Yesiltaş (2017: 259) note that the media outcry that centred on the 
atrocities that ISIS committed towards Kurds and the Yezidis con-
tributed to the mobilisation of global support for Kurds, and, in 
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military terms, to the formation of the international coalition of 60 
states to combat ISIS. One reason for this was that these visual and 
textual meaning-making strategies employed by the international 
media made the threat of ISIS and the ‘distant’ war in the Middle 
East suddenly closer, thus awakening international solidarity.
There was also a strategic dimension to this media visibility. 
Evidently, the Kurdish political actors also took advantage of the 
online forums and channels to increase visibility for their cause 
and the combat they were waging in Syria. The secular and lib-
eral democratic values were often put forth, including respect for 
gender equality (evidenced by the inclusion of women in military 
forces), respect for religious and ethnic diversity and emphasis 
on ecological values (Toivanen & Baser 2016). The media repre-
sentations emphasised the role of Kurdish women in the military 
troops, which also enabled the juxtaposition with the cruelty and 
patriarchy displayed by ISIS. The Kurdish actors aimed to take 
full advantage of this mediatised visibility to enhance their politi-
cal aspirations, including during the visit of three Syrian Kurdish 
political leaders to the Elysée Palace in early 2015. Also, one polit-
ically affiliated interviewee discussed how the visibility that the 
Kurdish combat against ISIS received was employed strategically 
by the pro-PKK movement:
Like [name redacted] said the last time, the young people are very 
politized, so I don’t think in itself it is something new. Everybody 
follows what takes place there, but it has taken more magnitude 
compared to before. Now the combat is more internationalised. 
Before nobody talked about it. Today, when you talk about Kurds 
in France, people know who they are. Ten years ago, when I 
was smaller, it wasn’t clear at all. So that changed. I think that 
the major Kurdish conflict touched us all, it became mediatised. 
People want to know what takes place in Syria and we will take 
advantage of that for our cause.
On the other hand, whereas the visibility was overall perceived 
in a positive light, the media frames used to depict Kurds also 
drew criticism from some interviewees. The emphasis on Kurds 
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being warriors and representing them through the frame of 
war and conflict was criticised since it was felt to overlook the 
aspects of Kurdish culture, literature and ‘Kurdish civilisation’, as 
one interviewee put it. Another criticised the superficiality of the 
media visibility, suggesting that they did not actually lead to any 
real political solutions in the region. Thirdly, most interviewees 
criticised the ambivalence surrounding the criminalisation of 
the PKK and the simultaneous positive visibility that the Syrian 
Kurds received. This, it was suggested, showed the hypocrisy 
of Western states towards the Kurdish issue and their compli-
ance with the Turkish state. The silence of the EU towards the 
military measures by the Turkish state in the Kurdish regions 
was strongly denounced, as was also their mutual agreement on 
Syrian refugees.
Overall, we can say that the mediatised visibility of the Kurdish 
combat against ISIS evoked many emotions among second-
generation members, both appreciative of the positive visibility 
the Kurdish military combat received and sceptical of its actual 
ramifications. This mediatised visibility was also discussed in 
relation to ‘Kurdishness’, with narrations evoking a construction 
of a Kurdish nation.
6.4.2 Kurdish (online) nation
Yes, it’s something we have never had before. We have experi-
enced conflicts, massacres, but it was never so mediatised. This 
is really the first time, the whole planet was talking about us.  
I was joking with my brother saying that before we did not exist, 
and now all of a sudden we can say that being a Kurd is a pride, 
whereas before people didn’t even know who we were.
In her study on Kurdish diaspora communities, Mahmod (2016: 3) 
writes about the role of digital media for the constructions of imag-
ined communities. She argues that ‘new information and commu-
nication technology is increasingly challenging the imaginings of 
belongingness based on ethnicity, identity, and the nation-state 
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that have been constructed largely through traditional media such 
as television, radio, and newspapers’. In other words, she suggests 
paying attention to how the Internet is challenging the notion of 
national consciousness. This is a particularly interesting question 
vis-à-vis the Kurdish combat against ISIS.
Online spaces were of great importance for the second gen-
eration and the Kurds’ mediatised combat against ISIS was 
discussed in relation to understandings of ‘Kurdishness’, thus 
evoking constructions of the Kurdish nation. The positive 
media visibility evoked emotions, such as a sense of pride to be 
‘Kurdish’, as articulated by the interviewee above. More impor-
tantly, the sudden media visibility was contrasted with the long- 
lasting historical silence and ignorance concerning the Kurds 
and Kurdistan. In fact, the reference to Kurds’ inexistence 
(‘before we did not exist’) echoed the historical denial of Kurdish 
identities and culture, which was now contrasted with the posi-
tive associations of being a ‘Kurd’. Several interviewees referred 
to the contrast between now and before, associating it with the 
assimilationist and oppressive measures that the Kurdish popu-
lations in the Middle East and Turkey had been subjected to for 
a number of decades (see Chapter 3). In this sense, the positive 
media visibility for ‘Kurds’ was interpreted as an acknowledge-
ment of their existence and based on some form of exilic mem-
ory, as discussed later.
The invisibility and ignorance concerning the Kurds was not 
merely a historical fact; it was in many cases a lived experience. 
One interviewee recounted how her teacher had reacted after 
having heard of her identifying herself as ‘Kurdish’. Several others 
shared similar experiences when they had been taken for a ‘Turk’. 
This, however, was gradually changing with the media visibility 
that the Kurdish combat against ISIS had received in 2014.
I was in the bus with my friends from the French high school and 
we spoke in French. One lady asked me, what are you? And I told 
her, well, I’m Kurdish. Then she told me that I wasn’t Kurdish, 
that I was Turkish. I replied that no, I’m Kurdish, and she told  
me that there are no Kurds. I was really shocked because she was 
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a professor, somebody educated. How could she say something 
like that? I was hurt and sad.
***
Before it was like, where do you come from? I’m a Kurd. Oh, you 
are Turkish. Nope. Isn’t it the same thing? No, it is not. The differ-
ence started to emerge with the arrival of ISIS in the Middle East 
and when Kurds started to rise to the international scene.
These instances show how second-generation youth were posi-
tioned by their surroundings, therefore touching upon the question 
what it means to be ‘Kurdish’. The discussions on media visibility 
and how that related to ‘Kurdishness’ brought up also how they 
wished ‘Kurdishness’ to be understood, transcending regional 
and political divisions. The need for unity and to identify oneself 
merely as a Kurd, and not as a Kurd from Turkey, Syria, Iraq or 
Iran, was also discussed at length. One interviewee explained how 
she became engaged for the first time in her life, since she felt that 
it was important to do something that would unite the Kurds.
Usually I don’t like organisations like that since the Kurdish 
organi sations in France are anchored in politics, whether it’s the 
PKK or I don’t know what. The thing I don’t like at all is that, 
before thinking about politics, we need to think about our unity. 
Before being on the left or the right side, we are first and fore-
most Kurds. So I think that it’s important to find something that 
unites us, even if today we don’t have a country. I think that the 
problems come from that, from the fact that the Kurds don’t get 
along between each other … It’s the idea of being attached to an 
idea, to a flag, our origins, our culture, our language before being 
attached to a political idea. That’s the most important thing for me 
and that’s why I haven’t been in any association before this one.
This also echoes Kardaş and Yesiltaş’s (2017) observation on how 
the Kobane War increasingly regionalised and international-
ised the Kurdish geopolitical imagination beyond the territorial 
and political complexities in the region. In such pictography 
as described by the respondents, the Kurdish nation became 
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constructed in particular manner. Indeed, the narrative recon-
structions and pictorial representations of Kurdistan employed by 
the international media suggested that the ‘Kurdish homeland’ was 
being in peril in the face of ISIS. The defence of Kobane was also 
represented as the defence of the ‘greater Kurdistan’ and the feared 
loss as the defeat for the entire Kurdish nation (Kardaş & Yesiltaş 
2017: 265). As Kardaş and Yesiltaş (2017: 266) note, ‘the process 
of re-writing of the Kurdish geopolitical space during the Kobane 
defence further strengthened and consolidated the feeling of Kurd-
ishness despite the territorial and demographic complexities of 
Turkey’s, Syrian and Iraqi Kurds’. This rewriting of the Kurdish geo-
political space, as referred to by the authors above, was visible also 
in second-generation members’ narrations concerning Rojava.
Indeed, what was noteworthy was how these ideas of ‘Kurdistan’ 
were projected towards Rojava, although the large majority of 
interviewees did not have any kinship connection to Syrian Kurd-
istan. Rojava was imagined as a kind of a societal laboratory, 
towards which political aspirations could be more easily projected. 
Furthermore, such aspirations were articulated on an ideological 
basis, not so much as Rojava representing a societal experiment 
for Kurds and only Kurds. For instance, one interviewee described 
this in the following way:
It’s like a laboratory, Rojava. It’s a laboratory of Öcalan, where 
his ideas are being applied. Rojava fascinates us and why we 
could die for Rojava is because of the values that they put forth. 
The assembly of peoples, equality between sexes, for instance, in 
councils, the respect of other peoples. In Kurdistan, there are also 
Arabs, Syrians, Turkmens and for us it’s important to create a real 
atmosphere of peace between people. The main idea is not to have 
millions of Kurds, but Kurds who are conscious of their identity 
and of the society we could create that would place the human 
in the centre. The ideas of Rojava could be entirely applicable in 
other parts of the world too, because it is a system that accounts 
for the human in the first place, how to live together.
Rojava represented a concrete, physical place towards which the 
political aspirations and ideals could be more easily directed. It 
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was represented in a way that it allowed ethnic divisions to be tran-
scended and an idea of a pan-Kurdish identity to be constructed. 
On the other hand, it operated as way to express more general polit-
ical discontent towards the existing political systems, as discussed 
later. This is similar to Costa and Alinejad’s observations (2020: 5) 
concerning second-generation Kurds in Italy. The authors suggest 
that second-generation members use online communication to 
construct their own attachment ‘toward the Kurdish cause and a 
Kurdish-imagined homeland’. They also note that the experiencing 
of this ‘homeland’ then takes place through regular, everyday prac-
tices of online political engagement (albeit not defined as political) 
that shapes their experiences of the homeland.
Costa and Alinejad (2020: 2) note that, for the first-generation 
migrants, social media reminds them of their exile, thus shaping 
their experience of homeland as a loss, whereas for the second gen-
eration social media contributes to ‘shaping expressions of their 
political and ethnic consciousness and their becoming engaged in 
homeland politics’. Also, Müller-Funk (2020) observes concern-
ing Egyptian diaspora youth in Vienna that the revolution of 2011 
in Egypt led to a renegotiation of their relationship with Egypt, 
and that their activism was a way to claim their right to multiple 
identity constructions.
I argue that the second-generation members also (re)con-
structed their relationship to Kurdistan through the mobilisation 
and the diasporic activities they engaged in, including through 
their daily online practices. In this sense, the relationship to ‘Kurd-
istan’ was made by the second-generation Kurds through their 
translocal participation and in online spaces. This is similar to 
Alinejad’s (2017) observations in her study on Iranian Americans 
that social media is used transnationally by second-generation 
members to mobilise homeland solidarities through symbols and 
discourses. In that sense, participating online, for instance via cir-
culating posts and petitions to raise awareness, allowed second-
generation Kurds to construct a relationship towards Kurdistan 





In Chapter 5 I discussed the Kurdish diaspora community’s 
mobilisation and transnational participation that followed the 
Kobane siege, whereas in Chapter 6 I focused particularly on 
the second generation. This generation has evidently grown up 
in the transnational social reality, which is also reflected in their 
lived experiences. Also, the fact of having a family background in 
major diasporic movements from the region of Kurdistan towards 
Europe is visible in their narrations concerning mobilisation for 
Kobane and their transnational participation towards the Kurdish 
regions. However, it would be rather simplistic to conclude 
that the second-generation members mobilised for Kobane 
because of their ‘ethnic’ background or to treat it as a sign of lin-
gering loyalties towards their ancestral ‘homeland’. It would also 
be intellectually lazy (not to mention incorrect) to explain it away 
as a ‘lack of integration’ into French society. On the other hand, if 
we were to conclude that the mobilisation was only the result of 
second-generation members being embedded in a transnational 
space, we would miss other dynamics at play.
Indeed, I suggest that, if we are to fully understand the mobili-
sation and transnational participation of diaspora communities 
towards the ‘homeland’ (and their role in diaspora contributions) 
including particularly that of subsequent generations, a conceptual 
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approach that moves beyond transnationalism and the methodo-
logical nationalism-coloured approach is needed. In this chapter, 
I argue that, if we were to focus only on the ‘ethnic’ or ‘diaspora/
transnational’ context in second-generation members’ lived 
experiences, we would miss a great deal about other dynamics 
that also need to be included in the analysis. These include, for 
instance, the global transformations in political subjectivities and 
the broader tendencies in this generation’s – that is, age cohort’s – 
ways and modes of political (dis)engagement. At the same time, 
if we were to understand how mobilisations take place through 
diasporic claims, stances, projects and practices, we need to move 
beyond treating diaspora-related mobilisations uniquely as some-
thing taking place between the host society and the ‘homeland’ 
and open our eyes to how diasporic claims, stances, projects and 
practices are also shaped by local and global forces.
This chapter deals first with the significance of the transnational 
diaspora space, before moving to discuss other lines of analysis, 
including ‘generation’ and the local/global context, that are not 
reducible to ‘groupist’ explanations (Brubaker 2002). This chapter 
specifically tackles the following questions: to what extent can 
we understand these mobilisations for Kobane through the focus 
on the transnational diaspora space and to be inscribed in the 
diasporic background of the second generation? What indeed 
is diasporic in their mobilisation and what is not? How can we 
understand the mobilised action and transnational participation 
among second-generation members without essentialising them 
simply as a manifestation of their nationalist feelings towards the 
ancestral ‘homeland’ – or as a lack of integration into the so-called 
host society?
7.2 Growing Up Transnational
Peggy Levitt (2009: 1266) argues that the second-generation is 
raised in a transnational field, meaning that the lines between the 
‘host country’ and the ‘homeland’ become blurred, ‘making them 
one interconnected social experience’. This significance of the 
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transnational field (or space132) cannot be denied, nor should it 
be. Indeed, one common factor for the interviewees was definitely 
the fact of being raised in a transnational social reality, follow-
ing similar findings in case studies on second-generation Kurds in 
Finland (Toivanen 2014), Sweden (Eliassi 2010), Germany (Baser 
2015a), the United Kingdom (Ata 2017), Italy (Costa & Alinejad 
2020) and so forth. For instance, the interviewees had often grown 
up visiting family members left behind, in multilingual environ-
ments speaking Turkish, Kurdish and French, and with daily 
references to the situation in Kurdistan and to the ‘homeland’ 
through (diaspora) media consumption. Several had also partici-
pated in the activities organised by diaspora organisations from a 
young age, albeit differently from their parents, as discussed in the 
last chapter.
One major debate concerning transnationalism has been 
whether the second generation is as ‘transnational’, and continue 
to engage transnationally with the same intensity and frequency 
as their parents’ generation (Kasinitz et al. 2002; Lee 2008; Levitt 
2009). Second-generation Kurds who participated in this study 
reflected upon their lived experiences, which were perceived to 
differ from those of their parents’ generation.133 They were con-
sidered to participate less in transnational diaspora politics, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, although their definition of 
‘political’ most often referred to traditional forms of (diaspora) 
political activism. However, there was ample evidence and ref-
erences pointing towards having grown up in a transnational 
social reality. This is how one interviewee described her and her 
generation’s experiences of having grown up in two differing 
social settings:
In fact, we are permanently between the two [settings], but for 
me it is totally normal. Because you have grown up in both,  
you went to school in France, in a multicultural environment, you 
come back home and it’s 100% Kurdish. And at the same time, the 
two tend to get mixed too. When I got home, I taught my father 
French and my mother knows, for instance, all the French singers 
now because she saw us following them. Both learn from each 
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other. So, thanks to us, we brought some international culture 
back home and our parents made a home where the Kurdishness 
is preserved.
Although her account shows that the distinction between the two 
social spaces at home and outside home environment is far from 
being clear cut, they entail different expectations and norms. For 
instance, she continued to describe the tensions that arise when 
these two social milieus’ normative systems concerning gendered 
expectations compete:
So I have grown up in this double culture, but today I struggle. 
I’m torn between the two, between the communitarian rules 
and personal reasons. For my parents, it’s a must that I marry a  
Kurdish person. But I don’t want to be a housewife; I want to 
study and to work. Sometimes I wonder why we came to France, 
and life could have been simpler back home, in the village. The 
fact of leaving Turkey forced us to change and it’s not always easy.
This is quite telling of the differing expectations and normative 
systems that the second generation can encounter. Anthias (2012: 
104) describes this asymmetry in gender relations concerning the 
second generation and their embeddedness in the transnational 
social field:
for those who are embedded within two social milieus with dif-
ferent and at times competing normative systems, there are two 
sets of social relations, such as arrangements and expectations 
(say around gender, sexuality and behavioural norms …) that 
impact upon their lives.
This has also been shown in other studies concerning second-
generation members (Berrington 2020; Levitt 2009). What was 
particularly interesting in the case of two female interviewees 
was how they narrated their political participation in the PKK in 
relation to such gendered expectations. One interviewee explained 
how she escaped arranged marriage by joining a pro-PKK 
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organisation during her teenage years, and of the significance 
the political engagement had in her case:
The PKK helped me to make it, it gave me an identity in that soci-
ety. Because when you are a militant of the PKK, people respect 
you and even today, when I have left the movement, it follows me 
for the rest of my life. For me the Kurdish cause allowed to stand 
up to a patriarchal society and culture in which it is very hard to 
live. It helped me to get respect for who I am.
Also, Marchand (2017: 29) mentions in her book on the assas-
sinations in Paris that one of the killed activists had opted for a 
political career in the PKK instead of agreeing to an arranged 
marriage suggested by her parents. Such accounts suggest that 
there is a need to understand the processes of politicisation 
for individuals in relation to normative gender relations (see 
Grojean 2019). Whereas the interviewees’ experiences differed 
in terms of the gendered norms and expectations, the class posi-
tion was also reflected upon. Having just completed a master’s 
degree, one interviewee told of the significance of having an 
education that he considered to have ‘inherited’ from his par-
ents. His father had been a teacher in Turkey prior to his migra-
tion, which is why he valued education highly. There had been 
a minimum requirement when he was growing up that the chil-
dren in the family would acquire at least a high school degree, 
since everybody else in the family had completed studies. He 
discussed at length the significance of parents passing on to 
their children the motivation to study, observing that, in fami-
lies where the parents had little education, this rarely took place. 
However, he considered that it was not sufficient to have such 
support from home to be able to make it in the labour market. 
For instance, he recognised the significance of networks to find 
an internship in his field.
The internships in the enterprises, it’s very important in my field. 
And we who have very few networks, we know few people, it’s 
really complicated. It’s hopeless, in fact. In France, if you don’t 
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have networks, your mother or father knowing somebody, a 
friend, it’s really hard.
The second-generation members did not necessarily possess such 
local forms of capital compared to their fellow students and col-
leagues of French parentage, although they did possess social 
resources that were available to them as a result of having been 
raised in the transnational field. As I have argued elsewhere 
(Toivanen 2019), these transnational networks and ties consti-
tuted a form of ‘migrant capital’ for them, as they held the power 
the be mobilised and converted to accumulate professional and 
educational advantages via the transnational field. Also, the trans-
national realities were evidenced by eventual plans or aspirations 
of ‘return’ to the ancestral ‘homeland’. A few had returned tempo-
rarily for professional reasons (internships) or student exchange 
programmes (Toivanen 2019), and permanent ‘return’ was mostly 
not perceived as a viable option considering the worsening secu-
rity situation in the Kurdish regions in Turkey.
I have discussed in this section, albeit very briefly, the trans-
national social reality in which the second-generation Kurds had 
grown up. At the same time, I have wished to point out that the 
second-generation’s experiences and processes of politicisation 
are not homogeneous but instead they are shaped, for instance, 
by social differences of gender and class (Anthias 2012: 104). On 
the other hand, they were also shaped by the locality they had 
grown up in. For instance, some interviewees’ families had lived 
in neighbourhoods and in cities that did not have major Kurdish 
communities and had therefore barely socialised with other 
Kurdish families when growing up. Therefore, instead of employ-
ing (migrant) ‘generation’ as a unitary category, we need to 
acknowledge that there exists a great heterogeneity within the 
second generation in terms of their lived experiences. Simultane-
ously, there were also significant commonalities that the diaspora 
and transnational lenses can help to unravel. As discussed next, in 
addition to the transnational social field, the second-generation 
members had also grown up in the Kurdish diaspora space.
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7.2.1 Socialisation into the Kurdish question
Besides the organisational dimension shaping broader waves 
of diaspora mobilisation, the transnational field is significant 
in terms of socialisation into the Kurdish question, particularly 
concerning the second generation. Levitt (2009: 1266) notes on 
the second generation that ‘they are not only socialised into the 
rules and institutions of the countries where they live, but also 
into those of the countries from whence their families come’. Sim-
ilarly, we can say that the second generation is also socialised into 
the political questions touching upon the ancestral ‘homeland’ 
through being embedded in the transnational diaspora space. The 
prior socialisation into the Kurdish question played a role in 
the second generation being familiar with the geopolitics con-
cerning the situation of Kurds and Kurdistan in the Middle East. 
For some, this socialisation into Kurdish geopolitics and the 
related political activism meant that they had become engaged 
in diaspora associations at a quite young age. For instance, one 
second-generation interviewee had engaged in the Kurdish move-
ment since his early teen years after having been socialised into 
the Kurdish question as a child.
In addition to the second generation’s transnational political 
participation differing from that of their parents, there was also 
heterogeneity among the second-generation members in terms of 
their activism. For instance, some had already been active in the 
Kurdish movements before Kobane. They had taken part in differ-
ent associations and organisations, had regularly attended dem-
onstrations and political meetings, and had engaged in a variety 
of different transnational activities. The socialisation into political 
activism among some participants was therefore quite striking, 
although not surprising. One interviewee described it this way:
MT: So are there many people from the diaspora who come here 
from elsewhere for the meetings?
Interviewee: Yes, there are, but not that many. I have met seve-
ral who come from Germany, England or elsewhere. They come 
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because there’s the atmosphere, everybody is together and  
motivated. It’s impressive. Every party for us is a place of sociali-
sation, for example every demonstration too. There are families 
that meet in every demonstration. And when there are demon-
strations like in Strasbourg, they say that it’s the opportunity to 
meet, to exchange, talk etc. So, they are places of socialisation 
where we plan to meet.
As Karagöz (2017: 96) discusses in her study, diaspora politics 
operate as a socialisation factor. She mentions that the sec-
ond-generation Kurds have lived their first activist socialisa-
tion within the Kurdish associations, also pointing out that the 
second socialisation happens in the local activist spheres (with 
French NGOs and such). For instance, the interviewee above 
referred to the major demonstration that is organised yearly in 
Strasbourg to call for the liberation of Abdullah Öcalan. Demon-
strations also taking place more locally in Paris operated as places 
of socialisation. As the interviewee described, this tradition to 
demonstrate has been passed on, in this case, from the mother 
to the daughter:
Interviewee: Before we were invisible, even with the demonstra-
tions every Sunday. In fact, my mother told me that she partici-
pated in a demonstration when I was one year old, still in the 
stroller, and 20 years later we went to a demonstration together, 
one Sunday, and towards the end of the demonstration, she was 
tearing up and told me that she had attended the same demon-
stration some 20 years earlier and still they were making the same 
claims, that nothing had changed. So that was a bit sad, but now 
it has changed a bit …
MT: So you and your family have the habit of going to demon-
strations?
Interviewee: Yes, it’s a tradition among the Kurds, to go and par-
ticipate in a demonstration on Sundays.
MT: And it seems that it continues to be so … I heard that the 
Kurds are one of the most politically active diasporas in Europe, 
with at least one demonstration a week.
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Interviewee: Yes, it is almost a need to go and shout, it cannot stay 
somatic …
The interviewee above mentioned her mother’s comment about 
how the Kurdish demonstrators had been making the same claims 
for the previous 20 years. The transnational space was significant 
in terms of socialisation into claims-making and the collective 
narratives such claims evoked. Regardless of whether or not the 
interviewees had already been politically active before the siege of 
Kobane, it can be said that all respondents had been more or 
less socialised to know the politics and the related discourses for 
claims-making that surrounded the Kurdish question. This was 
visible in references to the Kurdish question being politicised and 
to the politicisation of diaspora Kurds in general. As one inter-
viewee noted, ‘you cannot grasp your reality’ without acknow-
ledging the Kurdish history:
The politicisation … We would have wanted to be artists or 
something else, but today the existence of the Kurdish people, 
dispersed across the world, the fifth part being the diaspora, you 
must be politicised first. If you do not know your history that is 
purely political, the fact of being divided into four parts since the 
16th century, the reason and the consequences of that division, 
you cannot grasp your reality.
This resonates with the historical background of Kurdish nation 
as stateless and divided (see Chapter 3) and shows that, in addi-
tion to taking into consideration the transnational social field in 
which second-generation members had grown up, the diaspora 
space also plays a significant role in shaping their social realities. 
In this case, the exilic past, the state of statelessness and the eth-
nonational dimension of the Kurdish diaspora are also significant 
factors to consider when examining the second-generation Kurds’ 
socialisation in the transnational space. That is to say that not only 
had they grown up in a transnational space with frequent refer-
ences to the ‘homeland’; they had also grown up in a transnational 
diaspora space that included frequent references to the division 
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and the ongoing state of statelessness of Kurdistan, and to collec-
tive narratives of Kurdishness and the ‘homeland’. In other words, 
their narrations pointed towards a transgenerational transmission 
of exilic memory and identity, as discussed in the next section.
7.2.2 We are all Kurds, right?
The Kobane siege mobilised a larger segment of the second gener-
ation than previous events taking place in the Kurdish regions had 
succeeded in doing (Eccarius-Kelly 2017; Schøtt 2021 forthcom-
ing). Second-generation members took largely part in demonstra-
tions and a variety of different transnational activities following 
the Kobane siege, as described in the previous chapter. Several 
interviewees had to some extent already been politically active or 
at least following the situation in Kurdistan even before the Kobane 
War, before becoming mobilised. However, the participation for 
most interviewees changed with the Kobane War. Why exactly 
did the Kobane siege mobilise second-generation members? How 
were the transnational mobilisations and engagements discussed 
in relation to constructions of ‘Kurdishness’ and the ‘homeland’?
One reason for this mobilisation following the Kobane War was 
the media visibility that the Kobane siege received, not only in 
diaspora-led news outlets and Kurdish-language media but also 
in this case in the French media. The combat was particularly vis-
ible in the online spaces, as discussed in the previous chapter. This 
interviewee linked the increased visibility to the greater sense of 
revolt second-generation members expressed concerning Kobane:
I feel that Kobane affected me a lot, it was so much information 
every day, but I couldn’t help to follow what was taking place. 
Sometimes I even felt like leaving everything here and going 
there, because I was so fed up with seeing all that news. I know 
that it’s dangerous. It does nourish our revolt.
The significance of being embedded in online spaces and 
the impact of information flows that the second-generation 
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Kurds suddenly experienced concerning the Kurdish territo-
ries is undeniable. The war between Kurdish troops and ISIS in 
Kobane represented a critical event triggering such mobilisa-
tion. This resonates with Hess and Korf ’s study (2014: 431) con-
cerning the second-generation Tamils in Switzerland and their 
political mobilisation following the final battle in the civil war 
in Sri Lanka, in 2009. The authors argue that ‘critical events’ can 
trigger a politics of affect among second-generation members. 
They observe that:
For second-generation Tamils, the affect of witnessing the suffer-
ing of Tamils in the last days of the war in Sri Lanka generated a 
sort of ‘home-coming’ into the diasporic and transnational com-
munity of ‘Tamilness’ – in fact it intensified their ‘Tamilness’.
In that sense, the authors relate the mobilisation processes to sec-
ond-generation members’ construction of their identity as ‘Tamil’. 
There exists scholarship discussing the relationship between the 
second generation’s mobilisation and their (often ethnic) identity 
construction. For instance, Weinzimmer (2008) has studied how 
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict affects the identity formation of 
first- and second-generation Jewish Israeli American and Pales-
tinian Americans, showing that it is not only the experience of 
conflict but also its perception that bears an impact on the con-
struction and maintenance of identity. Also, Müller-Funk (2020: 
1112) shows in her study on Egyptian diaspora youth in Vienna 
that the revolution in 2011 led to a renegotiation of her inter-
viewees’ relationship to Egypt and that their activism was a way 
to ‘claim their right to multiple identity constructions’, including 
with both Egypt and Austria.
In many ways, the Kobane siege and the combat of Kurds 
against ISIS was narrated in relation to constructions of ‘Kurdish-
ness’. In fact, what was often emphasised when talking about 
the Kobane siege and its significance for Kurds was the need for 
unity among Kurds. This is similar to Eccarius-Kelly’s (2017: 41) 
observations that Kurds showed unprecedented levels of unity 
204 The Kobane Generation
in continental Europe and the UK: ‘In the struggle for Kurdish 
cultural identity, human rights and self-determination, few 
comparable moments exist that produced such levels of pan-
Kurdish unity as the desire to liberate Kobane from the control 
of ISIS.’ In fact, one respondent even stated that they were the 
‘babies of Kobane’, implying an experience that touched his gen-
eration beyond any political divisions that their parents might 
have fostered.
Diasporic consciousness
Often our parents had to leave the homeland for political prob-
lems. Economic too, but often linked to politics, so they [the  
second generation] are aware of the issue. They are not all politi-
cised, but they want to become involved, in whatever manner, for 
the people.
As evidenced by this interviewee, what is reflective of the trans-
national social reality and diaspora space in which the second-
generation members are embedded is the way they made sense of 
major events that had taken place both in the host society and in 
the homeland, yet which were to some extent linked to the larger 
geopolitical struggles concerning the Kurdish people. Evidently, 
not all members of the second generation of Kurdish parentage 
were similarly concerned or related to the events that took place 
in Kobane or in Paris, but at the same time Kobane was invoked 
and spoken of with emotion by all interviewees. Regardless of 
the heterogeneity among the respondents, it is possible to distin-
guish significant commonalities in how Kobane was experienced 
and what emotions and actions it evoked. They also talked about 
‘Kurdishness’ in relation to it in a rather similar manner. Com-
bined with the importance of the online spaces and the tradition 
of diaspora mobilisation, the Kobane siege also seemed to evoke 
a kinship connection (although it should not only be analysed in 
those terms). To conceptualise these similarities, I have used the 
term diasporic consciousness, which was manifested in the inter-
viewees’ accounts.
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One reason that the political disturbances in Turkey touched 
second-generation members directly was that they had fam-
ily members living in the region. One interviewee explained the 
interest the second generation had towards Kobane and the situa-
tion in Turkey as follows:
MT: So, do the youth feel more implicated by what is taking place 
in Turkey and in Kobane, for instance, in Rojava …?
Interviewee: Of course, our generation, if we are more inter-
ested in what is taking place there, it is because our families 
are in the front lines. Even if we live here, we follow the politics 
back there. If there’s a dictatorship in Mali, it won’t interest us, 
because we know nobody back there. But if there is a dictator-
ship in Turkey, the first people to be touched by it are our fami-
lies, our uncles, aunts, cousins and it is for us to do something 
about it.
This is quite telling of the transnational space in which the second- 
generation members were embedded and had grown up 
(Levitt 2009). I suggest that the Kobane siege and the visibility it 
received kindled some sort of a kinship connection to Kurdistan, 
in the sense that ‘if there were a dictatorship in Mali, they would 
not have been as interested’, to paraphrase the interviewee’s 
words above. At the same time, only a very few interviewees had 
a Syrian Kurdish background, and most had therefore no direct 
kinship connections to Syrian Kurdistan. They still felt con-
cerned by the Syrian Kurds’ combat against ISIS and referred 
to the combat as ‘we’ as Kurds against ISIS. This echoes Schøtt’s 
(2021 forthcoming: 226–228) observations on deterritorial soli-
darity evoked by the Kobane siege, which she refers to as ‘alter-
territorial identification’. Indeed, the interviewees referred to a 
common ‘Kurdishness’, a pan-Kurdish identity in a sense, all the 
while acknowledging the heterogeneous demographics and poli-
tics concerning the Kurdish populations.
I argue that second-generation Kurds drew from a sense of 
diasporic consciousness134 that characterised their motivations to 
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take part transnationally and to mobilise for Kobane. Firstly, this 
sense of diasporic consciousness was visible in how they narrated 
their parents’ reasons to migrate and how their lives had been 
shaped by those decisions. For instance, Baser (2011) observes 
how the Kurdish second-generation members often manifest a 
consciousness of the traumas and violence experienced by their 
parents. This was also visible in this study, as several interview-
ees referred to the sacrifices and traumatic experiences their par-
ents had gone through to be able to raise their families in safety. 
Secondly, it was also visible in ways of talking about Kurdistan, 
of the continuous lack of self-determination for Kurdish people 
and of Kurds facing ISIS, which made the conflict appear more 
tangible. In other words, the sense of diasporic consciousness 
was rooted in exilic memory. For instance, Weinzimmer (2008) 
has studied the relationship between ethnic identity and conflict 
among first- and second-generation Jewish Israeli Americans and 
Palestinian Americans. Concerning the generational differences, 
she concludes that the first-generation Jewish Israeli Americans 
and Palestinian Americans had a stronger connection to the con-
flict owing to their lived experiences of the conflict setting. For 
the second generation, born and raised in the United States, she 
discovered that they also strongly felt concerned by the ongoing 
conflict, but what shaped their concern were the shared memories 
and first-hand stories by their parents. This was also the case in 
this study.
Thirdly, the diasporic consciousness was visible in the wish to 
contribute to Kurdistan, expressed by a large majority of the inter-
viewees. For instance, one interviewee thought about moving to 
the region to ‘give back to people’. She considered herself lucky 
to have had the chance to complete her education.
Even in Rojava, a concrete thing for me would be to go and set-
tle there and not just settle, but to work for the benefit of people. 
I have had the chance to complete my studies with good teach-
ers who have supported and helped me … I want to give back to 
people. It’s not even a wish; it’s a need to transmit my knowledge 
because I was lucky …
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Several accounts also showed how there was a will to contribute 
either at distance or by temporarily moving to Kurdistan. For 
instance, one interviewee told of his educational and professional 
choices in relation to his wish to contribute to Kurdistan. He had 
chosen to work in the field of chemistry, through which he con-
sidered himself able to contribute to health, environment and so 
forth. And, most importantly, he had chosen this field of study as 
it enabled him to take part in knowledge transfer at a distance. 
As he noted, ‘I don’t need to be there myself, but I can do things 
that have an impact there’. I have discussed this aspect at more 
length elsewhere (Toivanen 2019).
In fact, having chosen one’s field of study or profession with the 
motivation to contribute to Kurdistan was not exceptional in 
the overall material, thus evidencing a sense of diasporic con-
sciousness. These three aspects – perceiving one’s life story as 
part of the family’s exilic past, narratives about the situation of 
Kurds in Kurdistan, and the wish to contribute became part of a 
larger narrative – were shown by the interviewee below:
I started medical studies after high school because I was interested 
in it and also because I asked myself how I could help my coun-
try of origin, Kurdistan, in my own way. I wanted to become a 
humanitarian doctor and return there to help people. That’s why I 
chose medicine. And, before entering university, my choices were 
guided by that wish, because my father also arrived here after 
having political problems in Turkey.
What was striking among the interviewees’ accounts was that the 
large majority voiced a sense of duty to act and to contribute to 
the Kurdish cause, either through associations or even through 
everyday ‘resistance’ by speaking Kurdish. In this sense, the 
diasporic consciousness was rooted in ‘diasporic memory’. I draw 
from Marianne Hirsch’s (2008) conceptualisation of the second 
generation’s memory as postmemory that characterises second-
generation members’ experiences in growing up with narratives 
that are shaped by traumatic events of their parents. In her study 
on Holocaust survivors in the United States, Hirsch also combines 
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postmemory with the diasporic experience, in saying that ‘The 
children of exiled survivors, although they have not themselves 
lived through the trauma of banishment and forcible separation 
from home and the destruction of that home, remain marked 
by their parents’ experiences’ (1997: 243). This consciousness of 
their parents’ experiences was visible in narrations such as the 
one below:
I’m telling myself that there are too many people, who are perse-
cuted and who have died back there. For me it’s a duty, to speak 
up, to share all the information. It’s a duty towards them, who 
are still there. And why we have come to Europe, is to be able to 
express ourselves, not to remain silent like our parents were back 
there. For me, that’s the objective of the second generation. So 
that we can speak up through cultural stuff, through associations, 
in our studies, even in everyday life by speaking Kurdish …
This interviewee made reference to the role of the second gen-
eration. This diasporic consciousness was present in the under-
standings of the second generation’s role in Europe vis-à-vis the 
development of Kurdistan. The second generation was consid-
ered to have a crucial role in terms of contributing towards the 
region and in building bridges between France and Kurdistan. 
One interviewee highlighted the role of the second generation as 
building bridges between the diaspora and Kurdistan. The role of 
the diaspora was seen as being vigilant about what takes place 
in Kurdistan, and communicating concerns over human rights 
violations, for instance, to non-diaspora audiences and actors.
Back there, nobody can talk, but now if there’s the slightest thing, 
everybody talks about it. Because we are everywhere, so they are no 
longer so free to do whatever they please. So that’s the role of the 
diaspora. The diaspora passes information to the entire world, and 
it bothers them that we are everywhere. They have no power over us.
At the same time, their claims-making evoked their belonging to 
France. Hess and Korf (2014), in their study on second-generation 
Diaspora and Beyond 209
Tamils’ political mobilisation in Switzerland, observe that the 
mobilisation was a sort of ‘homecoming’ that spanned several 
identity politics, including being a Tamil, being Swiss and being 
Tamil in Switzerland. They further note that: ‘this politics of affect 
generated a double reaffirmation of identification – with their 
Tamil origins and with the Swiss host society, but also a double 
identification crisis’ that was about the host society’s indifference 
towards the conflict. This was echoed among second-generation 
Kurds as well. Evoking both identities, they considered the Western 
countries’ approach towards the Kurdish question ambivalent 
and the relationship fostered by the European Union countries, 
including specifically by France, towards Turkey hypocritical.
The engagement in political activities or in cultural events that 
raised awareness for the Kurds’ situation in the Middle East was 
associated with a sense of responsibility to contribute to Kurdistan. 
As shown also by interviewees’ accounts, this sense of duty to 
contribute stemmed from the consciousness of their own privi-
leged position compared to the local population in Kurdistan, and 
it was narrated in relation to diasporic postmemory. It has been 
suggested that the experiences of second-generation members 
originating from families with refugee backgrounds can differ con-
siderably from those whose families’ settlement to a new society 
was not a result of forced migration (Chimienti et al. 2019). 
This consciousness of the forced migration background of their 
parents was visible in the narrated motivations to contribute to 
Kurdistan, thus indicating the impact of having grown up in a 
diaspora space that included collective and personal narratives 
of exile, displacement, ‘homeland’ and the Kurdish struggle for 
self-determination.
7.3 Other Dynamics
In the previous section, I discussed how second-generation mem-
bers’ transnational engagements and mobilisations were narrated 
in relation to constructions of ‘Kurdishness’ and the ‘homeland’. 
I argued that the Kobane siege kindled some sort of kinship 
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connection towards Kurdistan, witnessed in the diasporic con-
sciousness visible in their narrations. However, there is simul-
taneously a risk of reducing and essentialising the transnational 
participation and mobilisations by second-generation members 
if such participation is merely treated as an indicator of belong-
ing or non-belonging to a national community, and taken as a 
reflection of their assumed identity formation, integration or the 
lack thereof.
Brubaker (2002: 164) has argued that there is a need to move 
beyond such ‘groupism’. By this he refers to the tendency to 
approach ethnic/racial groups as ‘substantial entities to which 
interests and agency can be attributed’. As he rightly notes, attempts 
to understand the social world through the division of individuals 
into different groups is what should be under scrutiny, not the way 
to scrutinise it. As he (2002: 165) puts it, this tendency ‘belongs to 
our empirical data, not to our analytical toolkit’. Also, Dahinden 
(2016) pleads for the ‘de-migratization’ of migration studies. By 
this she refers to the growing number of researchers who have 
called for a reassessment of the nation-state- and ethnicity- 
centred approaches to migration-related phenomena (Bommes & 
Thränhardt 2010; Pries 2005; Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002). She 
demonstrates how ‘migration-related difference is naturally given, 
even while trying to be critical of this paradigm’ and offers three 
potential strategies to rectify this. She suggests clearly distinguish-
ing between common-sense and analytical categories (similarly to 
Brubaker), bringing migration theory into closer communication 
with other social science theories and reorientating the focus away 
from ‘migrant populations’ towards ‘overall populations’ (Dahinden 
2016: 2208–2209). In other words, we would miss a great deal of 
the complexity of second-generation members’ mobilisation were 
we to conclude that the Kobane siege sparked an interest among 
second-generation members simply because they identified them-
selves in ethnic/national terms as ‘Kurdish’. The question, then, 
is what else to consider to better understand the motivations of 
second-generation Kurds to engage towards Kurdistan, besides 
understanding them as a manifestation of diasporic consciousness.
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Concerning the research on second generation of migrant par-
entage, Anthias (2012: 103) has observed that the generational 
perspective ‘often retains a national paradigm for understanding 
migrant adaptation and incorporation’. She suggests that, instead 
of studying variations between different generations as originat-
ing from where they were born, several differences between the 
first and the second generation can be linked to stages in the life 
cycle and age. In this study, this is exactly what I have attempted 
to do. Instead of treating the categories ‘second-generation’ and 
‘Kurds’ as homogeneous entities with clearly demarcated bound-
aries, I have aimed to move beyond the tendency to treat these 
categorisations as taken for granted, and instead paid attention to 
the heterogeneity and analytical tools that allow the capturing of 
dynamics other that those deducible to the ‘ethnic’ or ‘diaspora’ 
context. Therefore, here I will follow two lines of analysis that were 
visible in the second-generation members’ narrations, ‘generation’ 
(understood also as an age group) and the local/global context.
7.3.1 Generation
What is common in migration studies is to approach ‘generation’ 
from the perspective of migration experience. Indeed, the migra-
tion literature is replete with references to the ‘first’, ‘second’ and 
‘third’ generations (of migrants), with the first term referring to 
individuals who migrated as adults, the second to individuals 
born to migrant parents in the society of settlement, and the 
third to their descendants. The term ‘second generation’ is, there-
fore, usually used to refer to migrants’ offspring and to individu-
als who have migrated in their childhood or early teenage years 
(see Rumbaut 2004).
However, different studies have suggested the need to consider 
the heterogeneity among the ‘second generation’. For instance, 
Chimienti et al. (2020) have questioned to what extent the cate-
gory ‘second generation’ is exclusionary, pointing out that chil-
dren of refugees in particular have been lumped together within 
the broader analysis of the second generation. Also, Anthias 
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(2012) has approached ‘generation’ as being fragmented by vari-
ous social differences, including gender, class and racialisation, 
instead of taking it as a unitary category. In other words, such an 
understanding acknowledges that, regardless of belonging to a 
particular generation, second-generation members’ lived experi-
ences and transnational engagements are not unitary and reflect 
diverse outcomes. This also defies the construction of binary gen-
erational distinction between the first and second generations, 
which, according to Anthias (2012: 103),
often retains a national paradigm for understanding migrant 
adaptation and incorporation, seeing the processes purely in 
terms of those encountered in the country of settlement and other 
influences linked to what have been accumulated in the ‘past’ in 
their countries of origin.
So what analytical value does the term ‘second generation’ in 
the sense of migration then have? In a way, it allows narrow-
ing down the focus to individuals who have been raised in a 
transnational space and who have arrived in the country of 
settlement at a fairly young age or who were born there. This 
was evidenced in the previous section with a discussion that 
highlighted the commonalities in narrations that can be traced 
back to having been raised in a transnational diaspora space. 
On the other hand, there are commonalities shared by members 
belonging to the second generation that can perhaps be better 
captured by diversifying the understanding of ‘generation’. Sec-
ondly, Anthias (2012) argues that, instead of making the dis-
tinction between first and second generations only on the basis 
of where their members were born, the differences between the 
two can also be linked to age and life cycle. In other words, 
the demographic sense of the term as in belonging to the same 
age cohort also needs to be accounted for.
Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly for this book’s focus, 
Anthias suggests that the political and economic changes taking 
place in a particular context and over time also affect people 
differently depending on at which stage they are in their lives. 
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This gets us closer to the sociological or ‘Mannheimian’ (1952) 
understanding of ‘generation’, i.e. how certain events and societal 
developments have shaped the experiences of a particular age 
cohort. The combination of these three aspects when narrow-
ing the focus on the ‘second generation’ can bring to the analysis 
insights that the generational lens in the sense of migration expe-
rience would not necessarily capture.
So how does the diaspora context intertwine with a more 
sociologically informed understanding of ‘generation’? It can be 
through the transnational diaspora space that certain ‘homeland’ 
events and societal developments become communicated and 
transmitted in the form of powerful narratives that reach second-
generation members and that can eventually constitute a genera-
tional experience. One such example was the ‘Kobane momentum’. 
One line of analysis would be to treat second-generation Kurds’ 
transnational attachments and activities, or mobilisations, solely 
as identity-driven phenomena towards the ancestral ‘homeland’, 
Kurdistan. Indeed, the Kobane siege did evoke a sense of kinship 
connection towards the conflict, but there seemed to be more to 
it. As one interviewee explained, witnessing the Kobane siege had 
been a generational experience:
For instance, between 2013 and 2015, it was the Kobane gen-
eration. I still remember in 2009, there was the Oramar genera-
tion, the great military offensive that Turkey launched against 
the PKK.135
Indeed, it seemed that Kobane was a generational experience 
in the sociological sense. Concerning the Kurdish diaspora, the 
role that second-generation members play in (diaspora) politics 
has been less studied than that of their parents (see Baser 2012; 
Mügge 2010), although several authors have expressed the need 
to pay attention to the importance of the generational dynamics 
in transnational participation and mobilisation (Alinia & Eliassi 
2014; Baser 2015a; Baser, Emanuelsson & Toivanen 2015). How-
ever, even fewer studies have dealt with the notion of genera-
tion in a sociological sense, i.e. how certain events and societal 
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developments have shaped the experiences of a particular age 
cohort. This is all the more significant in this case, as the respond-
ents were part of the same generation in the demographic sense 
of the word (belonging to the same age cohort), in the sense often 
dealt with in the migration research literature (belonging to the 
second generation of migrant parentage), and lastly in the soci-
ological (or in ‘Mannheimian’) sense of the word, meaning that 
they have shared both the ‘Kobane momentum’ and the impact 
of the assassinations in Paris on the local community.
One interviewee noted that there had been growing discontent 
among young people even before Kobane and that the Kobane 
siege operated as a trigger to channel the discontent that second-
generation members felt. He explained the significance of Kobane 
as a triggering event:
I think that it was already in their minds, they wanted to do 
something but they had not been any triggering event, so I think 
Kobane was that, but it does not mean that there was nothing 
before that.
This also speaks to the earlier observations about the political dis-
content among young people in general. What seemed to speak 
to many second-generation members was the societal experiment 
taking place in Rojava and how its main ideological premises 
echoed among young Kurds. For instance, one interviewee affili-
ated with a pro-PKK movement emphasised the relevance of the 
Rojava experiment beyond the boundaries of Syrian Kurdistan, 
stating that it was simultaneously a ‘conflict and a sort of a revolu-
tion together’. He specifically underlined the ideological basis of 
the experiment, and considered it a radical departure from the 
capitalist system, the ‘old models’ and the status quo (Colasanti 
et al. 2018):
The aim is to make it for everyone. Today, what’s taking place 
in Rojava is that the combat is becoming internationalised. 
The Middle East is perfect for that, since there’s chaos and that  
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allows to put in place that type of system. So what is the PKK 
doing today? They are giving another way to see the world, other 
model for a society. We combat people who want to preserve the 
status quo, the old models and their old interests, capitalism in all 
its splendour.
Another interviewee, who was not politically affiliated but 
found the societal experiment in Rojava fascinating, associated 
the second-generation Kurds’ interest towards Rojava with the 
fact that the French political scene did not evoke great emotions 
for them.
People discovered the Kurdish combat via Kurds in Syria. At the 
same time, the French political scene does not awake big motions 
for young Kurds, not like the combat in Kobane that has opened 
the minds for the cause of Rojava.
In this sense, the interest towards Rojava did not seem to be 
(only) inscribed into and explicable via the kinship connection 
towards Kurdistan, but also by more general political discontent 
and by criticism of the existing political/societal models and 
ways of thinking, as discussed earlier. It seemed to be an added 
pride that the societal experiment was led by Kurds in Syria, but 
simultaneously it was emphasised that it was not meant only for 
the Kurdish populations. Including a more sociological (and 
demographic) approach to generation also allows mobilisation 
processes to be considered from a de-ethnicised perspective and 
shed light on aspects of diaspora contributions that have pre-
viously been left in the shadows. This enables the recognition 
that mobilisation processes and political activism do not neces-
sarily only concern particular diaspora groups but that they can 
also concern ethnic minority youth across ethnic boundaries, 
or simply individuals whose parents and ancestors are not part 
of diasporic movements. This leads us to take into account the 
dynamics of the political and societal context in which this gen-
eration has grown up.
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7.3.2 Global cities, glocal constellations
As stated earlier, one must avoid the temptation of making 
assumptions that are too straightforward between second- 
generation participation in diaspora politics and their assumed 
diasporic identity. Whereas identity and a sense of belonging have 
been shown to play a part in second-generation mobilisations 
(Hess & Korf 2014), second-generation mobilisation can also 
reflect broader transformations in political repertoires and ways 
to engage simultaneously at the local level, yet via activities that 
entail a transnational (yet not necessarily a diasporic) dimension. 
Indeed, second-generation members’ transnational activities can 
be ‘glocal’ in the sense that they reflect larger political transforma-
tions currently taking place and become narrated through global 
political issues, even though they take localised forms (Wieviorka 
2005). For instance, one interviewee explained his preference of 
politics in the following manner:
MT: So, would you like to be politically engaged towards French 
politics, or …?
Interviewee: I hesitate … Because I’m based in France, it would 
be a European thing. So either it’s a European thing that I’ll do 
or a Turkish thing, but something completely French … When I 
see the political debate in France today, I’m not really interested. 
I cannot see what I could do. I think Turkey is much more inter-
esting than France. And if I do a European thing, it’s to help the 
Kurds, to help the Kurds in France to have good relations.
This is similar to O’Toole and Gale’s observations (2010) in their 
study on ethnic minority youth in Britain, where they found evi-
dence of changing political subjectivities that are to some extent 
based on the ‘glocal connections’ that ethnic minority youth foster. 
In a way that is different from diasporic and transnational connec-
tions, they suggest that ‘new grammars of political action’ are ‘glocal’ 
in the way that ‘local spaces are conceived in relation to aware-
ness of global political issues, and this has been enabled through 
access to international media outlets and active engagement 
Diaspora and Beyond 217
in internet-based publics’ (p. 128).136 In this study, the motivations 
for such translocal activism were narrated in relation to discourses 
and more global calls for political and social change, for social 
justice, equality, sustainable environmental policies and minority 
rights. These were visible in the motivations of second-generation 
members to engage politically in a way that moves beyond 
‘homeland’ motivation. The emphasis was on the commonality 
as ‘human’. One interviewee explained the applicable nature of 
Öcalan’s ideas beyond the Kurdish societies. He also emphasised 
that such ideas included the rejection of the nation-state with 
boundaries and a flag, contrasting it with the nation-state models 
in France and the United Kingdom:
If the ideas of Öcalan started to be applied in societies, totally 
human ideas, he speaks very little of Kurds, and instead he talks 
of peoples, democracies, of freer and just societies. If we could 
only work together as human beings and move beyond the idea of 
an independent nation-state with boundaries, a flag, a language. 
You know, the idea taken by the Jacobin French, by the British, 
which does not work at all … Boundaries only kill people.
Indeed, some respondents also voiced criticism towards the nation-
state system (and capitalism), echoing the political discourses 
of Syrian Kurdish political actors (Dinc 2020) but perhaps also 
echoing the critical sentiments towards the role of nation(-state) 
and national identities of that particular age group in general (see 
Ross 2019). In fact, Anthias (2012: 104) notes that, if individuals, 
regardless of their origin or migration trajectories, are considered 
to inhabit transnational spaces and continue have bonds with 
homelands and other localities, it becomes easier to discern what 
is a shared experience and what is not. She mentions multicultural 
cities as one example of such transnational spaces that are shared 
by those belonging to the dominant majority and those belong-
ing to minorities (albeit differently because of asymmetrical 
power structures).
For instance, the significance of urban political spaces and cul-
tures in global cities such as Paris that structure (diaspora) politics 
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and shape mechanisms for collective action is undeniable. Indeed, 
the significance of global and urban spaces to changing political 
landscapes and subjectivities is an important factor that needs to 
be accounted for in any analysis on political (dis)engagement in 
the new millennium. Concerning this, I find Sassen’s (2005: 39) 
observations on transnational politics particularly pertinent. 
When talking about the ‘global city’ she notes that:
insofar as the national as contained of social process and power is 
cracked, it opens up possibilities for a geography of politics that 
links sub-national spaces across borders. Cities are foremost in 
this new geography. This engenders questions of how and whether 
we are seeing the formation of a new type of transnational politics 
that localizes in these cities.
At the same time, the global context of cities and urban spaces is 
also important to diasporic mobilisations. Diasporas (and to some 
extent diaspora politics) fit quite nicely into this picture, as ‘global 
cities’ such as London, Berlin, Paris and many others have been the 
contexts to understand diaspora politics. Or, as Adamson (2016: 
297) notes, ‘the networked structure of diasporas means that they 
are ideally situated to inhabit new “non-national” political spaces 
such as global cities and cyberspace’. Among other global capitals, 
Adamson (2016: 296) lists Paris as an example of a global city that 
has become site for coordinated, transnational diaspora politics. 
This provides the means for diaspora actors to tap into new forms 
of global identity politics, by framing their political agendas in 
terms of more global struggles, such as struggles for social justice 
and equality. This was also visible in this study, as discussed in the 
previous section, in instances where the respondents emphasised 
the universal value of the Rojava model for other peoples too.
This study pointed also toward transnational elements in how the 
collective action was organised and to what Della Porta and Tarrow 
(2005) have called transnational social action. By this, they refer to 
‘coordinated international campaigns on part of networks of activ-
ists against international actors, other states, or international insti-
tutions’ (pp. 2–3). The year after the Kobane siege (2014–2015), 
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in 2016 the French social movement Nuit Debout (Up All Night) 
brought protesters to the Place de la République, in Paris. The 
movement rose out of protests against the labour reforms and 
soon became a protest for anti-austerity measures in general, simi-
larly to the Los Indignados movement in Spain or even the global 
Occupy movement that started off in the United States. I visited 
the square on several occasions and was able to witness diaspora 
organisations’ presence among French NGOs and other civil soci-
ety actors. One particular banner emphasised the transnational 
dimension of the protest, titled “De Calais à Barcelone, de Paris à 
Kobané. La solidarité avec les revoltes”. It made reference to soli-
darity with protests from the refugee camps in Calais, to the Indig-
nados movement in Spain and finally to Kobane. 
Indeed, this study points towards the need to take into account 
the new refashioning of the political (Norris 2002: 128), but 
also how ‘local spaces are conceived in relation to the aware-
ness of global political issues’ that have been enabled ‘through 
access to international media outlets and active engagement in 
internet-based publics’. This adds another spin on the discussion 
on methodological nationalism and transnationalism that started 
this chapter. In the words of Anthias (2009), it also highlights 
‘the need for a contextual, dynamic and processual analysis that 
recognises the saliency of different social ontologies at the local, 
national, transnational and global levels and their interconnected-
ness within social relations in terms of processes and outcomes’. 
A different picture emerges when examining transnational (dias-
pora) political action and mobilisation processes from perspec-
tives that depart from methodologically nationalist and ‘groupist’ 




This book examined how a series of events that took place in the 
Middle East, Turkey and France in the 2010s have resonated in 
Kurdish diaspora communities in France. Critical events, such 
as the Kobane siege (2014–2015), have mobilised diaspora com-
munities and their members in a multitude of ways and led to 
different forms of participation towards Kurdistan. I have argued 
that, in particular, the Kobane siege and the assassination of three 
Kurdish activists in 2013 were transformative events in the sense 
that they had a multiplying effect towards the diasporic mobilisa-
tions. I suggest that they were turning points in the sense that they 
mobilised more ‘dormant’ members, although it remains an open 
question whether this has led to transnational engagements and 
activities of a more sustainable nature.
These transformative events were also particular in the sense 
that, unlike the majority of previous case studies dealing with 
diasporic mobilisations,137 the assassination of Kurdish activists 
took place in Paris and not in the Kurdish territories. This meant 
that the homeland dynamics became conflated with host society 
dynamics through such transformative events that touched upon 
both settings. This dynamic consequently shaped the ways dias-
pora actors formulated claims and what narratives and discourses 
were employed to frame such claims. For instance, Kurdish dias-
pora actors were increasingly vocal towards the national actors in 
France, particularly after the assassination of the three Kurdish 
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activists that took place on French soil, as well as after the ISIS 
attacks that touched France in 2015, which presumably made the 
national interlocutors seem more receptive to diasporic claims 
concerning the Kurds’ combat against ISIS.
Simultaneously, there seemed to be a broader change in Kurdish 
diaspora activism across Europe in the sense that diasporic claims 
were increasingly made to the European policymakers, build-
ing on the already-existing alliances and networks that Kurdish 
political actors had in Brussels (Casier 2011; Eccarius-Kelly 2017). 
Indeed, diaspora actors simultaneously addressed EU-level inter-
locutors as well as local actors to raise awareness of the ongoing 
conflict. Through the examination of how diasporic claims were 
made, projects articulated or even loyalties evoked and mobilised, 
this book also shows how the Kurdish (diaspora) nation became 
constructed as an actor that appealed to its relational others, in 
this case the French government and European institutions, and 
one that opposed the treatment of Kurds by ISIS or by Turkey, 
thus increasing its legitimacy as a potential interlocutor on the 
international political scene.
Throughout the past decades, the Kurdish diaspora actors have 
fostered dense networks and linkages that expand to the trans-
national space. In this sense, the diasporic mobilisations in the 
2010s could lean on existing alliances, networks and organisa-
tional structures that facilitated diaspora members’ engagement 
in a variety of transnational political action, including transna-
tional electoral, organisational and semi-institutional (cultural) 
activities. Therefore, even though mobilisations are fuelled and 
shaped by ‘transformative’ events that can take place in both the 
homeland and host country contexts, their success is also based 
on different political opportunity structures, mobilising struc-
tures and practices (including networks) and the capacity to 
frame the transformative events in a way that they speak to dias-
pora members. In this case, the host society context together with 
the transnational political opportunity structures, including par-
ticularly the networks of local NGOs and the Kurdish diaspora 
actors’ tradition of appealing to European political institutions 
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(Casier 2011), were enabling factors in diasporic mobilisation. 
Another enabling factor was how the Kurds’ combat against ISIS 
was framed, both by key diaspora actors, or what Adamson (2013: 
69; see Baser 2015a: 33–34) calls transnational brokers, and by 
the international media.
The siege of Kobane received unprecedented media visibility 
that threw the Kurds into the international spotlight. The media 
frames depicted Kurds as the heroic defenders of human rights 
and liberal values and quickly became contrasted with the barba-
rous deeds committed by ISIS in the region. This positive media 
visibility led to the mobilisation of global support for Kurds 
(Kardaş & Yesiltaş 2017). The role of female Kurdish combat-
ants fighting off ISIS was particularly emphasised in the interna-
tional press (Toivanen & Baser 2016). This largely positive media 
visibility, and political support by Western countries, how-
ever, stood in stark contrast to the criminalisation of the PKK, 
an organisation that had close ties with the celebrated Syrian 
Kurdish forces but that nevertheless featured in the EU’s and 
United States’ lists of terrorist organisations. The diasporic claims 
and stances were, thus, also formulated in the context of political 
ambivalence towards the pro-PKK movement, also because the 
organisation had considerable mobilisation power through its 
transnational networks to mobilise Kurdish diaspora communities 
in Europe, and in particular in France (Grojean 2015; Jongerden 
& Akkaya 2016).
Whereas the first part of the analysis focused on the overall 
Kurdish diasporic mobilisations as they took place in the 2010s in 
Paris, the second part narrowed down the focus to the second gen-
eration and examined in particular the significance of the Kobane 
siege for young second-generation Kurds. The second-generation 
members took part in activities that included participation in 
demonstrations, electoral activities and humanitarian convoys. 
They also engaged via online spaces, translated and blogged on 
the Kurdish combat, and organised and took part in awareness-
raising campaigns and seminars. In a few cases, such transnational 
activities included also short-term visits to the region.
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Second-generation members’ mobilisations constituted of 
activities that were transnationally orientated and simultaneously 
locally bound: they mobilised through student associations, leftist 
networks in Paris and NGOs and often via means other than merely 
diaspora organisations. Their activities were translocal in the 
sense that they were locally bound in terms of organisation and 
targeted audiences but simultaneously linked to the political 
situation in the Kurdish territories. At the same time, they were 
considered to be less engaged than their parents and expressed 
a discontent towards politics. Such accounts echoed findings 
conducted more generally on the younger age groups in Europe 
(Bennett 2008; Dalton 2017; Furlong & Cartmel 2007; Inglehart & 
Welzel 2005; Sloam & Henn 2019). They also understood ‘politi-
cal’ to refer to more traditional forms of (diaspora) party politics 
and, for instance, did not consider their daily online activities to 
be political. The online activities did, on the other hand, contrib-
ute to constructing their relationship towards Kurdistan. In that 
sense, both ‘offline’ and online activities were inscribed into a 
sense of diasporic consciousness towards the ancestral ‘homeland’.
However, there was more to it. I have also argued in this book that 
there is a need to include other dynamics at play if we are to fully 
understand political (dis)engagements among youth with migrant 
parentage. Generation constituted the central theme throughout 
this book, as indicated by the title. In addition to acknowledging 
the significance of second-generation members being raised in 
transnational social realities and in a diaspora context, I focused 
particularly on two lines of analysis. The first was understanding 
‘generation’ in a sociological, demographic and ‘migrant’ sense 
of the term, and the second discussing the significance of the 
local, global and diaspora context. Leaning on these aspects, this 
book shows how the Kobane generation came into being and 
how it manifested itself in the midst of the Kurdish diasporic 
mobilisations in Paris in the 2010s. The Kobane siege was a 
generational experience.
Indeed, another picture emerges if we are to consider second-
generation members’ mobilisation and political (dis)engagement 
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in relation to studies that have been conducted on young adults’ 
political activism in general. They show that young adults’ rep-
ertoires of action reflect more global changes in political subjec-
tivities, including technological changes that modern societies are 
going through and the changing understandings of what ‘political’ 
means (Mahéo, Dejaeghere & Stolle 2012; O’Toole & Gale 2013; 
Sloam & Henn 2019). In other words, the ways younger genera-
tions engage in civic and political activism are rapidly changing, 
and this change naturally also touches upon young people of 
migrant parentage.
Why is this important? I suggest that, if we are to fully under-
stand the role subsequent generations can play towards ancestral 
‘homeland’ development, we need to move beyond considering 
potential contributions only through the ‘diaspora’ or ‘ethnic’ lens. 
This allows us to grasp the myriad ways subsequent generations 
take part in translocal activism and to understand the underlying 
motivations for it that can include other aspects than those merely 
deducible to the diaspora context. One such example of this was 
the way second-generation Kurds were inspired by Rojava’s societal 
experiment and its ideological basis, which they perceived to tran-
scend ethnic division lines. Another example was the heterogeneity 
in ways second-generation members engaged towards the ancestral 
‘homeland’ – both via institutional means and individually.
These aspects deserve more attention in future research in order 
to gain a better understanding of the role the second generation 
can play towards diaspora contributions. It also remains the task 
of future research to examine how intergenerational transmis-
sions and conflicts co-exist in migrant families, how those shape 
the reproduction of old repertoires of actions and the invention 
of new ones, and how second-generation members’ experiences 
and modalities of action are inscribed into different temporali-





The book is based on empirical data mainly collected between 
2015 and 2017 in France. The overall material consists of four 
different data sets, the main corpus of the material consisting of 
interviews, which were conducted in French. The data citations 
used are translated by the author.
1. The first set of data consists of qualitative interviews and informal 
discussions with first-generation Kurds, as well with members and 
activists in different diaspora organisations (n=20). The interviews 
were semi-structured and thematic, focusing in the case of first- 
generation Kurds on the mobilisation processes in Paris and on dias-
pora organisations’ scope of activities, transnational connections and 
engagements, and overall on the question of how the interviewees 
considered that different events back ‘home’ resonated in the dias-
pora and possibly generated mobilisation among its members. The 
informal discussions also included these themes. I interviewed first-
generation migrants who had arrived in the country in the 1980s 
and 1990s.
2. The second set of data consists of qualitative interviews with sec-
ond-generation members (n=30) of Kurdish background in Paris. I 
interviewed diaspora members who were active in the diaspora 
organisations, but also ones who did not engage in organisational 
activities. In addition to the mobilisation processes, in the case of 
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the second generation the interview themes also included ques-
tions on their life stories, transnational activities and engagements, 
educational choices and language skills, questions of identity and 
belonging, and future plans. The interviews were conducted with 
second-generation members who were born in France (or arrived 
very young) and who were aged at the time of interviews between 19 
and 35 years old. All respondents, both first- and second-generation 
members, lived in Paris or the Greater Paris region.
3. The third set of data includes virtual material and online data col-
lected from diaspora organisations’ official websites and social net-
working sites (such as Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, blogs and 
online campaigns and possibly Instagram accounts). This meth-
odological approach enabled the capturing of the virtual dimen-
sion of such activities and engagements. Furthermore, I completed 
a mapping of the relevant diaspora organisations through the 
sources available on the Internet, associations’ databases and offi-
cial reports.
4. The fourth and final set of data includes observation notes that I 
completed, alongside photographs, images and audio-visual material 
that I collected from a series of events (including but not limited to, 
demonstrations, cultural events, exhibitions, seminars and political 
meetings) in Paris between 2015 and 2017.
I have employed interviewing and participant observation as the 
main methods to collect the main body of the research material. 
The interview data collected was transcribed, processed with a 
computer-assisted qualitative analysis (Atlas.ti) and analysed with 
thematic analysis. The research participants were located by using 
snowballing sampling, and through various key persons, migrant 
organisations and cultural centres and with open interview invi-
tations published on relevant websites or social media. Most 
interviewees came or had a background in Turkish Kurdistan, 
although some also traced their background to Iranian, Iraqi or 
Syrian Kurdistan.
My researcher positionality in France was that of an ‘outsider’ 
both to the Kurdish community and to the majority popula-
tion, and it often evoked curiosity and even surprise of having 
undertaken such a research topic. Even though the political 
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circumstances surrounding the Kurdish question in France 
during the data collection were somewhat sensible, coming from 
a relatively neutral Nordic country in terms of the Kurdish ques-
tion my inquiries and participation in events were not met with 
suspicion or reservations. I have discussed this in more detail 
elsewhere (see Baser & Toivanen 2018b).
Ethical Considerations
For the first and second data sets, the ethical questions related 
mainly to drafting the research design and research questions, dif-
ferent phases of the data-collection procedure including collect-
ing the material, protecting and analysing it, and the preservation 
of the collected material and efforts to make the analysed mate-
rial available to research participants. The research questions were 
drafted in a way that they represent a careful ethical consideration 
of the research participants’ views and perceptions that are valor-
ised. Similar attention was paid to the drafting of interview themes 
and the formulation of interview questions. The semi-structured 
interview structure was considered to provide the research par-
ticipants with the most freedom and flexibility to provide answers 
to interview questions. The data was protected and preserved with 
utmost attention.
As for other ethical considerations, I have anonymised the 
interviews and opted to use pseudonyms. I informed the potential 
research participants of the research topic, design, purpose and 
distribution when they were first contacted. Their willingness to 
take part in the study was further confirmed at the beginning of 
the interviews. For the third data set, extreme care was put into the 
preservation of the collected material. In the analysis stage, I 
removed any recognisable characteristics from the data (age, back-
ground information on travels, family members etc.), particularly 
when using data excerpts. In cases when research material was 
collected from social networking sites that need to be accessed 
using a password, the purpose of the study and the presence of 
a researcher were made visible. In such cases, where (online) 
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material was collected through observation, I paid particular 
attention to anonymity, confidentiality and data protection.
On Naming
Defining the region of Kurdistan and delineating who the Kurds 
are is a politically controversial issue owing to the complex geopoli-
tics in the region. Naming is in no way innocent and it becomes 
an ethical issue for it attaches social meaning to geographical enti-
ties and peoples. When it comes to the Kurdish question, nam-
ing becomes particularly politicised. I have chosen to employ the 
term ‘Kurdistan’ to refer to the geographical region that covers 
the main areas inhabited by Kurdish speakers and refer to its 
specific parts within individual nation-states as ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’, 
‘Iranian Kurdistan’, ‘Syrian Kurdistan’ and ‘Turkish Kurdistan’. This 
seems to be common practice among scholars conducting research 
related to Kurds and Kurdistan (see Alinia 2004; Khayati 2008: 48; 
Natali 2005; Wahlbeck 1999: 7).
However, many Kurds also refer to Turkish Kurdistan as Northern 
Kurdistan (Bakûr), Iraqi Kurdistan as Southern Kurdistan 
(Başûr), Iranian Kurdistan as Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat) and 
Syrian Kurdistan as Western Kurdistan (Rojava), questioning the 
states’ sovereignty explicitly when doing so. Currently, the part 
of northern Iraq where the de facto state of Iraqi Kurdistan has 
emerged seems to be referred to mainly as Iraqi Kurdistan, while, in 
contrast, the most commonly used term for Turkey’s Kurdish-
inhabited regions tends to be ‘south-east Turkey’. Rojava is also a 
term that has become more and more employed, for instance by 
the international media in reference to the Syrian Kurdish region. 
Common appellations for Kurds as a people refer to Kurds from 
Turkey, Iran and Iraq, because, as Wahlbeck (1999: 7) mentions, 
‘Turkish Kurd’ and ‘Iraqi Kurd’ can be considered offensive.
Another controversial issue concerns the naming of Kurdish 
troops in Syria and Turkey. The PKK features on the European 
Union’s list of terrorist organisations, although contestably so, 
and the Turkish media and politicians refer regularly to the 
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organisation as a ‘terrorist organisation’. I will employ the rela-
tively neutral term ‘combatant’ in relation to the Kurdish fighters 
in northern Syria and eastern Turkey, instead of using terms such 
as ‘terrorist’, ‘guerrilla’ or ‘freedom fighters’ that have different con-
notations and political implications. I have also chosen to refer 
to the so-called Islamic State in the first instance as the so-called 
Islamic State, and from thereafter with the acronym ISIS instead 
of the Arabic acronym Daesh, which is in more common usage in 
France and was also used by most respondents. Similarly, I have 
also chosen to use the term Kobane, as it is the most common 
spelling in English, instead of using the Kurdish term, Kobanî, or 
the Arabic term, Ayn al-Arab.

Notes
 1 The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry deter-
mined in 2016 that the ISIS attacks on Yezidis constituted a genocide.
 2 See ‘ISIS’ Yazidi Genocide’ (Foreign Affairs, June 8 2017, https://www 
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-06-08/isis-yazidi-genocide).
 3 See Sheema Khan, ‘The Arab diaspora finds its voice’ (The Globe and 
Mail, October 31 2002, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion 
/the-arab-diaspora-finds-its-voice/article4243545).
 4 For instance, the EU-funded cooperation project Diasporas for 
Peace (DIASPEACE), which operated from 2008 till 2011, examined 
the activities of Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali diaspora organisa-
tions in the political processes of the sending countries.
 5 See ‘Turkish-Kurdish conflict spills over into Europe’ (The Conversa-
tion, October 16 2015 https://theconversation.com/turkish-kurdish 
-conflict-spills-over-into-europe-47610).
 6 It is important to note that several Turkish cities, for instance, host 
large Kurdish communities and it has been said that the city with the 
largest number of Kurds is, in fact, Istanbul.
 7 See William Safran, ‘Concepts, Theories, and Challenges of Diaspora: 
A panoptic Approach’ (SISSCO, September 18 2007, http://www.sissco 
.it/articoli/cantieri-di-storia-iv-391/programma-392/dispersione 




 8 The debate (and scholarship) on transnationalism and generation 
has been closely related to the question of integration (or assimila-
tion in the North American context) (see Waldinger 2015).
 9 This contextualisation section is to some extent based on the one 
in my PhD thesis, Negotiating Home and Belonging – Young Kurds in 
Finland (Toivanen 2014).
 10 See: http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama
 11 Description of the linguistic breakdown of Kurdistan can be found 
at http://www.institutkurde.org/images/cartes_and_maps/linguistic 
_composition.jpg.
 12 Hassanpour (2012) discusses the dialectical fragmentation of the 
Kurdish language, along with the conflict over the adoption of 
Sorani and Kurmanji as the official standard languages of Iraq.
 13 See ‘Rojava administration launches new curriculum in Kurdish, 
Arabic and Assyrian’ (ARA News, October 7 2016, http://aranews 
.net/2016/10/rojava-administration-launches-new-education-system 
-kurdish-arabic-assyrian-2).
 14 See also Martin van Bruinessen’s piece ‘The ethnic identity of the 
Kurds in Turkey’, at http://www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/m.vanbru 
inessen/publications/Bruinessen_Ethnic_identity_Kurds.pdf.
 15 The relationship of the Kemalist philosophy to religion is somewhat 
more complex. It did incorporate religion (Sunni Islam) into the 
notions of national identity and employed it at times to forge a sense 
of national unity. A good example of identities’ basis in religion can 
be found in the population exchanges of Greek Orthodox citizens of 
Turkey and the Muslim citizens of Greece in the 1920s, which were 
based on religion and not so much on language or the people’s ethnic 
identities (see Insel 2007).
 16 For Turkey, see Uppsala Conflict Database at https://ucdp.uu.se 
/country/640.
 17 Anfal refers to the ‘spoils of war’ and has its origin in one of the 
surahs in the Quran.
 18 Elaine Sciolino, ‘Kurdish Chief Gains Support in U.S. Visit’ (New 
York Times, 22 June 1988).
 19 If one wishes to gain a comprehensive understanding on the events 
taking place in the Kurdish regions and on those touching upon 
the Kurdish populations, the bulletin of the Kurdish Institute offers 
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onward. See https://www.institutkurde.org/en/publications/bulletins 
/list.php.
 20 See ‘The Kurdish National Council in Syria’ (Carnegie Middle East 
Center, February 15 2012, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48502).
 21 See ‘Kurdish People’s Protection Unit YPG’ (Global Security, http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ypg.htm).
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 26 For a detailed account on the dispersion of the Kurds in premodern 
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(2005: 215–217).
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240 The Kobane Generation
L’Etat français a sa part de responsabilité. Si les auteurs de ces délits 
ne sont pas retrouvés, la France sera considérée indiscutablement 
comme complice.’ Translation by the author. See ‘Kurdes et Turcs 
font pression sur Paris après les meurtres de trois militantes kurdes’ 
(Le Monde, 12 January 2013, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article 
/2013/01/12/manifestation-a-paris-apres-les-meurtres-des-trois 
-militantes-kurdes_1816225_3224.html).
 75 See Information and Liason Bulletin, no 334, January 2013 (Kurdish 
Institute of Paris), https://www.institutkurde.org/en/publications 
/bulletins/list.php.
 76 The Kobane siege is also referenced as a ‘transformative event’ by 
Ciordia (2018) in the recent development of the Kurdish conflict 
in Turkey and in how collective action frames are employed by the 
Kurdish movement.
 77 The role played by the subsequent generations is potentially one rea-
son for this and will be discussed further in the following chapter.
 78 See ‘Kurds across Europe hold protests calling for more help for 
Kobani’ (Euronews, 8 October 2014, https://www.dailymotion.com 
/video/x27hn8i).
 79 As discussed later, calls for the removal of the PKK from the list of 
terrorist organisations were also fuelled by the political ambivalence 
stemming from the partial recognition of the Syrian Kurdish forces 
(PYD) as a liable partner in the combat against ISIS and simulta-
neously of the listing of the PKK, very close to the PYD in terms of 
ideology and contacts, as a terrorist organisation.
 80 The AKP is the Justice and Development Party, a conservative party 
led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The HDP is the People’s Democratic 
Party, a pro-minority and left-wing party that was led by the cur-
rently jailed Selahattin Demirtaş.
 81 See ‘KCD-E: We must use the remaining voting time well’ (ANF News, 
25 May 2015, https://anfenglish.com/news/kcd-e-we-must-use-the 
-remaining-voting-time-well-11383).
 82 Table is compiled by the author and based on statistics provided at 
https://secim.haberler.com/2015/finlandiya-secim-sonuclari.
 83 The Kemalist Republican People’s Party, CHP, received 21.4% (20.9%) 
of votes in London, while its voter turnout remained less in other 
countries. Overall, although its share among diaspora votes was less, 
it received a quarter of all votes: 25.32% (24.95%).
 84 See ‘La Mairie de Paris organise Newroz pour les Kurdes’ (Gou-




 85 President Hollande also had close contacts with Iraqi Kurdish lead-
ers. He visited Iraq, first Baghdad and then Erbil, on 12 September 
2014, and described the visit to Iraqi Kurdistan as ‘very moving’ 
because of ‘the friendship between the French and Kurdish peoples’. 
Massoud Barzani also visited Paris in February 2015, where he met 
Hollande two days after he had met with the representatives of Syr-
ian Kurdistan. See Bulletin of Liaison and Information, September 
2014, no354, p. 4: https://www.institutkurde.org/en/publications 
/bulletins/list.php. See also ‘Massoud Barzani à Paris pour plaider la 
cause des Kurdes’ (La Croix, 10 February 2015, https://www.la-croix 
.com/Actualite/Monde/Massoud-Barzani-a-Paris-pour-plaider-la 
-cause-des-Kurdes-2015-02-10-1278955).
 86 See ‘Hollande-PYD meeting challenges Erdogan’ (Al-Monitor, 12 
February 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015 
/02/turkey-france-kurdish-guerillas-elysee.html).
 87 The name of the city removed for purposes of anonymity.
 88 ‘Le crime politique reconnu doit obtenir vérité sur les commanditaires 
et Justice.’ Translation by the author.
 89 See Janroj Yilmaz Keles ‘The European Kurds Rallying to Fight IS’ 
(Open Democracy, 10 December 2014, https://www.opendemocracy 
.net/opensecurity/janroj-yilmaz-keles/european-kurds-rallying 
-to-fight-is). See also ‘Diaspora Kurds Return to Homeland to 
Battle ISIL Jihadists’ (Hurrieyt Daily News, 8 October 2014, http://
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/diaspora-kurds-return-to-homeland 
-to-battle-isil-jihadists.aspx?pageID=238&nid=72724).
 90 See the exhibition website (in French) at https://www.institutkurde 
.org/activites_culturelles/evenement_425.html.
 91 ‘Dès lors, nous dédions la quatrième édition du festival aux trois 
militantes Kurdes assassinées, à ceux qui ont fait et font encore la 
révolution de Rojava, ainsi qu’aux femmes Kurdes.’ Translation by 
the author.
 92 See the festival programme (in French) at https://www.yumpu.com 
/en/document/read/54463103/festival-cinema-kurde-2015-web.
 93 See the Migrant Integration Policy Index report for France at http://
www.mipex.eu/france.
 94 See ‘Hollande-PYD meeting challenges Erdogan’ (Al-Monitor, 12 
February 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015 
/02/turkey-france-kurdish-guerillas-elysee.html).
242 The Kobane Generation
 95 Currently, the YPG troops include an estimated number of 30,000–
35,000 combatants, of whom approximately 20–40% belong to the 
female battalion, the YPJ (see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military 
/world/para/ypg.htm).
 96 These remarks are based on Nessrin Abdullah’s speech given in 
January 2016 in Paris.
 97 In practice, the legal measures taken against active members in the 
PKK vary considerably between different European countries, as dis-
cussed earlier.
 98 See ‘Manuel Valls : « Oui, la France est en guerre contre le terrorisme »’ 
(Le Monde, 13 January, 2015, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article 
/2015/01/13/manuel-valls-oui-la-france-est-en-guerre-contre-le 
-terrorisme_4555301_823448.html).
 99 This system of filing (FPR, Le fichier des personnes recherchées) was 
created in 1969 to facilitate the investigation of various individuals, 
such as lost minors, the escaped or individuals forbidden to exit 
French territory. See ‘Fiches S, FPR, et FSPRT, plongée dans les fich-
iers de l’antiterrorisme (France Culture, 26 March 2018, https://www 
.franceculture.fr/droit-justice/fiches-s-fpret-fsprt-plongee-dans-les 
-fichiers-de-l-antiterrorisme).
 100 Fiche S refers to a registry of security used by law enforcement to flag 
an individual who is considered to be a threat to national security 
(S comes from sûrété de l’état – state security). In 2015, the estimated 
number of individuals with such a marking was 20,000. Two years 
later, in 2017, the number of individuals having S fiche was 25,000, 
of whom 9,700 were suspected of radicalisation. See: ‘Sortie de l’état 
d’urgence : Un bilan et des chiffres clés’ (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2 
November 2017, https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Espace-presse/Dossiers 
-de-presse/Sortie-de-l-etat-d-urgence-un-bilan-et-des-chiffres 
-cles).
 101 See ‘Valls: « 20.000 personnes font l’objet d’une fiche S en France »’ 
(Le Figaro, 24 November 2015, https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu 
/2015/11/24/97001-20151124FILWWW00383-valls-20000-fiches-s 
.php).
 102 The lawyer works on the cases of Kurdish individuals who have been 
the object of legal procedures. These numbers are based on two pre-
sentations that the lawyer gave at the National Assembly in 2015 and 
2016.
 103 See ‘Jugement attendu pour une filière française du PKK’ (Le 




 104 See ‘Tourments au “Petit Kurdistan”’ (Le Monde, 12 February 2013, 
https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/02/12/tour 
ments-au-petit-kurdistan_1830894_3210.html).
 105 See ‘Vague d’arrestation dans les milieux kurdes en région parisi-
enne’ (Le Monde, 5 February 2007, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe 
/article/2007/02/05/vague-d-arrestation-dans-les-milieux-kurdes 
-en-region-parisienne_863529_3224.html).
 106 See ‘La Turquie et la France signent un vaste accord sécuritaire’ 
(Le Point, 7 October 2011, https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/la-turquie 
-et-la-france-signent-un-vaste-accord-securitaire-07-10-2011 
-1381945_24.php#).
 107 See ‘Annulation d’une enquête antiterroriste contre un Kurde qui criait 
au complot’ (20 Minutes, 27 February 2014, https://www.20minutes 
.fr/societe/1310794-20140227-20140227-annulation-enquete-anti 
terroriste-contre-kurde-criait-complot).
 108 See ‘Dix Kurdes condamnés à Paris pour financement du PKK’ (Le 
Monde, 28 January 2015, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article 
/2015/01/28/dix-kurdes-condamnes-a-paris-pour-financement-du 
-pkk_4565253_3224.html).
 109 See the ‘Tribunal administratif de Nantes, 22 juin 2016, n° 1408162’ 
at https://www.doctrine.fr/d/TA/Nantes/2016/AC62D450DF4026D 
98E2B2 and ‘Peut-on se voir refuser la nationalité française pour ses 
positions politiques ?’ (Agence Anadolu, 20 January 2020, https://
www.aa.com.tr/fr/monde/peut-on-se-voir-refuser-la-nationalit 
%C3%A9-francaise-pour-ses-positions-politiques-/1708308).
 110 ‘Mme A B épouse X demande l’annulation de la décision du 3 février 
2015 par laquelle le ministre de l’intérieur a également rejeté sa 
demande de naturalisation au motif que le loyalisme de son époux vis-
à-vis de la France et de ses institutions n’est pas garanti …’. Translation 
by the author.
 111 See ‘Projet de loi constitutionnelle Protection de la Nation’ (Senat, 
https://www.senat.fr/rap/l15-447/l15-4476.html).
 112 See ‘“La déchéance de nationalité ne facilite pas la lutte contre le ter-
rorisme”’ (Arte, 13 August 2016, https://info.arte.tv/fr/la-decheance 
-de-nationalite-ne-resoudra-pas-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme).
 113 See ‘Denmark bans Kurdish TV station and fines it £1.2m’ (The 
Guardian, 25 July 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/media 
/greenslade/2013/jul/25/kurds-denmark).
244 The Kobane Generation
 114 See ‘Belgium: Belgian police raid Kurdish buildings and TV stations’ 
(Reuters, 5 March 2010, https://reuters.screenocean.com/record 
/701187).
 115 See ‘Kurdish ROJ TV Sparks Debate’ (DW, 10 December 2008, 
https://www.dw.com/en/kurdish-roj-tv-sparks-debate/a-3863144).
 116 The YPG is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK), although this relationship is often con-
tested since the latter features on the EU’s and United States’ lists of 
terrorist organisations. See ‘Turkey v Syria’s Kurds v Islamic State’ 
(BBC, 19 February 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle 
-east-33690060).
 117 See ‘Asya Abdullah: «Les femmes kurdes ne se soumettront jamais à 
Daech»’ (Le Figaro, 12 February 2015, http://www.lefigaro.fr/inter-
national/2015/02/12/01003-20150212ARTFIG00392-asya-abdullah 
-les-femmes-kurdes-ne-se-soumettront-jamais-a-daech.php).
 118 See ‘Ces revenants du Rojava qui inquiètent les services de rensei-
gnement’ (Mediapart, 1 September 2019, https://www.mediapart.fr 
/journal/international/010919/ces-revenants-du-rojava-qui-inquie 
tent-les-services-de-renseignement?onglet=full).
 119 See ‘Father of British YPG volunteer in Syria arrested over terrorism 
offences’ (The Guardian, 27 December 2019, https://www.theguardian 
.com/uk-news/2019/dec/27/father-of-british-ypg-volunteer-in-syria 
-arrested-terrorism-offences).
 120 See ‘Ces volontaires français combattent Daech en Syrie mais pour 
la Turquie, ce sont des terroristes’ (Slate, 2 November 2017, http://
www.slate.fr/story/153158/ces-volontaires-francais-combattent 
-daech-en-syrie-mais-pour-la-turquie-ce-sont-des).
 121 See ‘François Hollande vient réconforter la communauté juive à la syna-




 122 Between 40,000 and 50,000 Yezidi Kurds fled the troops of ISIS to 
Sinjar mountain in August 2014, after ISIS had massacred approxi-
mately 4,000 Yezidi men. A combination of international troops, the 
YPG and PKK troops managed to open a corridor from the moun-
tain to the Iraqi Kurdistan region.
 123 Kobane Calling was also the name of the comic illustrated book written 
and designed by an Italian author, Zerocalcare. The book tells of the 
author’s journey to the Turkish–Syrian border near Kobane, in 2014.
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 124 See the Kurdish-European Society website at https://www.kurdish 
european.eu/index.php.
 125 By ‘international’, I refer here to influential news outlets of print and 
visual media that ‘act as a meaning-making and opinion-moulding 
venue for mainly western societies’, to quote Kardaş and Yesiltaş 
(2017).
 126 ‘Rehana, the Kurdish Female Fighter Who “Killed” 100 Isis Fighters, 
Spotted in Kobane’ (International Business Times, 8 June 2015, http://
www.ibtimes.co.in/rehana-kurdish-female-fighter-who-killed-100 
-isis-fighters-spotted-kobane-photo-635123).
 127 See ‘#BBCtrending: Who Is the “Angel of Kobane”?’ (BBC, 3 November 
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-29853513).
 128 See ‘These Remarkable Women Are Fighting ISIS – It’s Time You Know 
Who They Are’ (Marie Claire, October 1, 2014, https://www.marie 
claire.com/culture/news/a6643/these-are-the-women-battling-isis).
 129 See ‘The Kurdish Stalingrad’ (The Economist, 1 November 2014, 
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2014/11/01 
/the-kurdish-stalingrad).
 130 Also, The Economist titled one of its articles on Kobane ‘The Kurdish 
Stalingrad’ (1 November 2014, http://www.economist.com/news 
/middle-east-and-africa/21629475-kobane-has-acquired-huge 
-symbolic-significance-all-those-fighting-it).
 131 See ‘Kobané, ville martyre’ (Arte, 10 July 2015, https://info.arte.tv/fr 
/kobane-ville-martyre).
 132 I will use both terms, transnational field and transnational space, 
interchangeably.
 133 The current study did not inquire into first-generation members’ 
lived experiences, so this section is based on how the second-gener-
ation members reflected on this issue.
 134 Mahdod (2016: 6) briefly discusses diasporic consciousness in her 
book Kurdish Diaspora Online: From Imagined Communities to Man-
aging Communities.
 135 The interviewee refers to the military clashes that took place between 
the Turkish military and the PKK in 2009.
 136 The significance of global and cyber spaces to changing political 
landscapes and subjectivities needs further attention than unfortu-
nately is possible to grant it within the constraints of this book.
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A small Kurdish city located in northern Syria, Kobane, became symbolically signifi cant when ISIS laid siege to the city between September 2014 and January 2015. 
This pivotal moment in the fi ght against ISIS threw the inter-
national spotlight on the Kurds. The Kobane Generation analyses 
how Kurdish diaspora communities mobilised in France after the 
breakout of the Syrian civil war and political unrest in Turkey and 
Iraq in the 2010s. Tens of thousands of people, mostly but not 
exclusively diaspora Kurds, demonstrated in major European 
capitals, expressed their solidarity with Kobane, and engaged 
in transnational political activism towards Kurdistan.
This seminal book discusses a series of critical events that led 
to di erent forms of transnational participation towards Kurdistan. 
The focus is particularly on how diaspora mobilisations became 
visible among the second generation, the descendants of Kurdish 
migrants. The Kobane Generation o ers important insights on 
the generational dynamics of political mobilisations and their 
signifi cance to understanding diaspora contributions. More 
broadly, it sheds light on second-generation political activism 
beyond the diaspora context, analysing it in relation to global 
transformations in political subjectivities.
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